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Summary 
This Thesis contains three studies related to corporate governance and narrative disclosure. In 
Chapter 1, we study whether new CEOs engage in qualitative strategies to extend their tenure. In 
Chapter 2, we analyze a friction in the managerial labor market. In particular, we study the 
relationship between a decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs, the incumbent CEO level of 
entrenchment, firms’ financial reporting quality and narrative disclosure. Finally, in Chapter 3, 
we study the effect of hostile takeover susceptibility on narrative disclosure. 
The concept of Corporate Governance can be defined as the set of rules applied to control 
and lead a company. Corporate boards have been extensively studied in the literature. Every 
company has a board of directors and many studies want to discern whether differences across 
boards can explain firms’ behaviour and performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). The main 
goals of corporate boards are to advise and monitor management. One of the duties of the board 
is to appoint the new CEO and decide about dismissing the incumbent one in case, for instance, 
of poor performance.  
On the other hand, managers can decide about the narratives they use in their 10-K reports. 
Narrative disclosure is an efficient way to disclose relevant firms’ information (Merkley, 2014). 
There is an increasing stream of literature showing that not only quantitative but also qualitative 
information is relevant for investors and has relevant economic effects (Frazier et al., 1984; 
Gibbins et al., 1990; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Huang et al., 
2014b).  
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When a new CEO is appointed, the board applies its monitoring role to assess his or her 
ability using all the available information (both quantitative and qualitative). This ability 
assessment is an important component of corporate governance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2017).  
Prior literature confirms that managers worry about how firm performance influences the 
labor market assessment of their managerial skills and, also, that they are willing to take real and 
reporting decisions to improve this perception and construct good reputations (e.g., Nagar, 1999; 
Ali and Zhang, 2015). Linking with this idea, in Chapter 1, Optimistic Disclosure Tone and 
CEO Career Concerns, we argue that CEOs use narrative disclosure tone to assuage career 
concerns. In particular, we predict that more talented CEOs use a more optimistic tone at the 
beginning of their tenures to build a reputation of strong performance ability. Ali and Zhang 
(2015) show that newly appointed CEOs are likely to engage in earnings management activities 
(i.e., quantitative strategies) given their career concerns. Our argument is that new CEOs are 
likely to engage not only in quantitative but also qualitative strategies to extend their tenure. We 
run our tests on a large sample of US firms’ 10-K reports and show that highly able CEOs use a 
more optimistic tone early in their careers. Overall, our evidence indicates that optimistic tone is 
used by CEOs to signal their superior performance ability. Firms with more optimistic 
disclosures present higher value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns around last quarter 
earnings announcements, and are more likely to access future debt, engage in greater future 
capital investment and pay more future dividends. Thus, we show that skilled CEOs engage in 
qualitative strategies (i.e., narrative disclosure) at the beginning of their tenure to ensure long 
tenures. 
When the board needs to hire a new CEO, the options are choosing an internally or externally 
appointed CEO. Boards need to look at the pool of potential new CEOs which includes every 
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insider and outsider who has the required abilities to be the next CEO of the firm. Donatiello et 
al. (2018) run a survey to directors of the largest US companies and find that 73% of the 
interviewed directors agree on that less than 5 people (including both insiders and outsiders) 
have the required abilities to be the next CEO. Then, it is fair to assume that any shock that 
decreases the pool of replacement CEOs is likely to affect firms. In this line, in Chapter 2, CEO 
Labor Market Incentives and Accounting Quality: The Unintended Consequences of Trade 
Secret Regulations, we examine the impact of a decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs on 
the incumbent CEO level of entrenchment and firms’ financial reporting quality. By integrating 
the staggered enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act with the pre-existing pool of talent, 
we develop a novel firm and time specific measure of changes in the pool of replacement CEOs. 
We find that decreases in this pool lead to longer tenure, lower forced turnover, and higher 
compensation for incumbent CEOs, as well as lower financial reporting quality and narrative 
disclosure quality. Decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs are also associated with lower 
CEO-firm match, lower firm efficiency, lower performance and higher over-investment. The 
results are robust to alternative measures of decreases in the pool of talent and to controlling for 
additional trade secrets protection measures.  Our collective findings indicate that labor market 
institutions are important drivers of firm outcomes and accounting quality. 
Corporate boards have also a role in takeover situations. During the early 1980s there were 
several waves of hostile takeovers affecting even to the largest US companies (Gompers et al., 
2003). As a result, firms and states implement antitakeover provisions and laws, respectively. In 
Chapter 3, Takeover Protection through Narrative Disclosure, we assess the effect of hostile 
takeover susceptibility on narrative disclosure. We predict that firms use narrative disclosures as 
a takeover defense mechanism. Our results show that managers of firms with higher likelihood 
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of receiving an unwelcome bid have more negative and pessimistic tone in their 10-K reports. 
We also find that our main results are stronger for firms more attractive for potential acquirers 
and that more pessimistic firms in hostile environments are less related with new acquisition 
announcements. Our results are robust to a shock that represents lower need of firm-initiated 
antitakeover provisions. 
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Chapter 1 
Optimistic Disclosure Tone and CEO Career Concerns 
1.1. Introduction 
We examine the association between CEO career concerns, CEO ability, and tone in corporate 
narrative disclosures. In particular, we investigate CEOs use of optimistic tone in 10-K narrative 
disclosures. Optimistic tone refers to the use of abnormally positive language in firm disclosures, 
given current and past firm performance (Huang et al. 2014a, 2014b). CEOs usually hold the 
most power within the company (Andrews, 1987), but their real managerial abilities may be, at 
least partly, unknown to markets (Pan et al., 2015). This is especially true early in their careers, 
giving rise to incentives to improve their performance, but also, to enhance and embellish it 
(Holmstrom, 1999). Prior literature confirms that managers worry about how firm performance 
influences the labor market assessment of their ability and performance and also, that they are 
willing to take real and reporting decisions to improve this perception and build their reputations 
(e.g., Nagar, 1999; Ali and Zhang, 2015).  
CEO career concerns stem from markets’ and boards of directors’ evaluations, which, if 
considered subpar, may lead to their dismissal (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). Even in the 
absence of such extreme measures, CEO reputation is a valuable asset associated with substantial 
long-run benefits. Managers assessed to be of superior ability enjoy greater autonomy and 
compensation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2017), not only during their tenure, but also, after 
leaving the firm, through improved post-retirement benefits (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
6 
 
Managerial ability appraisal eminently occurs during the early years of CEO tenure, where 
corporate performance and earnings news have a major impact on CEO assessment (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998; Pan et al., 2015). Managers, aware of the importance of these early 
assessments, are expected to select those reporting and disclosure choices that enhance the 
perceptions of third parties, signaling their type. Consistent with career concerns driving CEO 
reporting choices, Ali and Zhang (2015) show greater income-increasing earnings management 
at the beginning of CEO tenures. We build on this prior work and predict that CEOs also use 
narrative disclosure tone to influence their assessments, given that markets and boards of 
directors examine CEO ability using all available information (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; 
Pan et al. 2015), and that tone drives markets’ attention (Elliot et al., 2015) and has economic 
consequences (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2010).  
Against this backdrop, differences in CEOs skills become crucial to understand managerial 
disclosure choices. However, little is known about what narrative practices managers may devise 
to enhance ability assessment, and, importantly, how these practices link to their true ability.  
We argue that highly able CEOs anticipate the importance of narrative tone and use it in 
response to career concerns, to improve the beliefs of third parties concerned with CEO 
assessment. High ability CEOs differently use tone to signal their ability and superior future 
performance for at least two reasons. First, the use of optimism in narrative disclosures increases 
litigation risk (Rogers et al., 2011), acting as a deterrent to engage in cheap talk. Second, 
optimism in disclosure unravels, i.e., it is soon revealed to be either informative or opportunistic. 
This is because managerial disclosures trigger additional information searches by analysts and 
other market participants (Barron et al., 2002). CEOs who fail to meet their voluntary disclosures 
may damage their reputation and the firm’s image (Ferreira and Rezende, 2007), leading to a loss 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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of investors’ confidence (Graham et al., 2005). These CEOs would self-reveal as the low ability 
ones. Given these costs, low ability CEOs are unlikely to imitate high ability CEOs’ narrative 
practices. In line with this view, Nagar (1999) shows that managerial uncertainty about 
performance evaluation can deter managerial disclosure, and that it is the ‘not very talented’ 
managers that are particularly prone to nondisclosure. 
Thus, while high ability CEOs could use optimistic tone to assuage career concerns, the 
opposite may hold for low ability CEOs. Without considering CEO ability or tenure, Huang et al. 
(2014a) show that optimistic narrative disclosures relate, on average, with managerial attempts to 
mislead market’s perceptions of future firm results and hide poor future realizations. Assuming 
that optimistic disclosures attract market attention and increase litigation risk (Rogers et al., 
2011), new CEOs may use lower optimistic tone to avoid attracting excessive market attention, 
particularly, given the evidence that these CEOs report inflated earnings via the use of income-
increasing accruals (Ali and Zhang, 2015). Also, new CEOs may prefer to use big bath 
strategies, and blame their predecessors for any initial poor firm performance. This would lead to 
negative disclosure tone in CEO early years of tenure.    
Given the above discussion, we predict that high (low) ability CEOs use greater (lower) 
optimistic tone early in their tenures. As CEO tenure progresses, managers develop a reputation 
and, absent any shocks, monitoring decreases (Dikolli et al., 2014; Pan et al. 2015), as they are 
expected to maintain or improve their knowledge and skills (Wu et al., 2005). Thus, optimistic 
tone is less useful after the early years. The finding in Ali and Zhang (2015) that CEOs do not 
engage in earnings management in the middle years of their careers is consistent with this 
attenuation in career concerns. Regarding the final year of tenure, Brickley et al. (1999) show 
that strongly-performing departing CEOs are more likely to serve in their own board or join 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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other boards. Monetary post-retirement benefits may also hinge on late career performance 
(Kalyta, 2009). Thus, CEOs may face career concerns at this late stage, if they stay active in the 
job market. However, CEOs may be entrenched by this point, making such strategies redundant. 
In line with this later argument, Holmstrom (1999) analytically demonstrates that managers work 
harder in the first years of tenure than in the last one. In addition, it is unclear whether CEOs can 
perfectly foresee which will be their last year in the job and thus, disclosure tone in the last year 
of tenure is an empirical question of interest.  
We analyze the links between CEO ability, CEO career concerns, and tone in 10-K reports 
using a large sample of US firms for the period 1993 to 2013. To conduct our tests, we follow 
the approach of Ali and Zhang (2015), who study the links between CEO career concerns and 
earnings management. We follow Huang et al. (2014a) to calculate optimistic disclosure tone, 
and condition our analyses on managerial ability as measured by Demerjian et al. (2012). Our 
results show that highly skilled CEOs use more optimistic tone, particularly, as a response to 
career concerns. For our sample of CEOs, optimistic tone is linked to higher future access to 
debt, greater future capital investment and dividend payments. Overall, this suggests that CEOs 
use optimistic tone to convey their true managerial ability. We validate that our CEO ability 
proxy measures management skills by showing that CEO ability is negatively associated with the 
probability of forced turnover. Forced turnover is also less probable for CEOs with more 
optimistic disclosure tone. Overall, our evidence is consistent with CEOs influencing firm 
narratives, and with CEOs narrative disclosures being driven, at least partly, by their career 
concerns. 
Our main results are not sensitive to the use of an alternative measure of CEO ability 
developed by Rajgopal et al. (2006), to the inclusion of CEO fixed effects (Abowd et al., 1999), 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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to controlling for managerial sentiment, or for earnings management as in Ali and Zhang (2015). 
This latter analysis permits providing novel evidence on the complementarities between 
reporting and disclosure choices, adding to the work of Lo et al. (2017).  
To appease endogeneity concerns, we use the 2003 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
NASDAQ board regulations to identify a plausible exogenous shock to career concerns. We 
apply a difference-in-differences approach following Guo and Mauslis (2015) and identify those 
firms that did not comply with the 50% board independence threshold as our treatment firms. 
These firms experience an exogenous increase in board independence, and thus, in CEO 
monitoring and career concerns. The results obtained confirm that career concerns drive 
narrative disclosure tone. Additionally, we instrument CEO ability with the average ability of the 
rest of CEOs by industry and year and obtain comparable results. 
Finally, confirming that optimistic tone can have signaling value for high ability CEOs, we 
provide evidence of positive economic consequences associated with optimistic tone. 
Specifically, we show that optimistic tone generates higher value-weighted cumulative abnormal 
returns in different windows around last quarter earnings announcements. Second, we show that 
firms using more optimistic tone appear to enjoy greater market trust and have access to greater 
future debt, engage more in capital investment and pay more future dividends.  This indicates 
optimistic tone may be perceived as a signal of true managerial skills.  
We make a number of contributions to prior research. First, we contribute to the literature on 
narrative disclosure. There is limited work explaining variation in narrative disclosure quality 
and exploring what CEO characteristics may lead to firm-level variation in narratives. The 
closest work to ours is by Davis et al. (2015) and Bochkay et al. (2017), who study CEO 
language in conference calls. Although they focus on CEO tenure rather than career concerns, 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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the finding in Bochkay et al. (2017) that CEOs disclosures in conference calls varies over tenure 
is consistent with our results. Davis et al. (2015) also show that tone in conference calls is related 
with manager-specific factors, particularly with early career experiences affecting managerial 
beliefs. Our work complements their findings, by investigating a different disclosure setting 
which reflects different incentives and CEO concerns. We focus on 10-K reports because, as 
stated by Kothari et al. (2009a), they contain different sections where managers can disclose 
information, and constitute a formal communication discourse. Thus, they are markedly different 
from the content of more spontaneous and interactive discourses, such as conference calls with 
analysts and other attendants. The later can provide rich information sets (including verbal and 
non-verbal cues) but may also contain irrelevant and boiler plate statements (Glassman, 2003) 
and importantly, CEO tone is likely driven by the questions and pressure imposed by the third 
parties present in the call. We also contribute to prior work studying CEO reporting choices by 
considering narrative disclosure. This is of interest, given that both quantitative and qualitative 
features are used to evaluate managerial abilities and firm performance (Amir and Lev, 1996), 
and there is a limited research on the links between reporting and disclosure. Finally, we add to 
the recent literature studying the links between managerial ability and accounting quality (e.g., 
Baik et al., 2011; 2017; Demerjian et al., 2013). We provide novel empirical evidence consistent 
with Nagar (1999) suggesting that disclosure strategies are linked to managerial human capital, 
and to CEO concerns about performance assessment evaluations.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature and presents 
the hypotheses. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the method, and present the sample and main 
results. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 provide robustness and additional analyses and Section 1.7 
concludes. 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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1.2.  Prior Research and Hypotheses Development on Disclosure and CEO Career 
Concerns 
1.2.1.  CEO Discretion in Reporting and Disclosure 
CEO disclosure can be informative of true firm performance (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). 
However, managerial disclosure is often planned, focusing on news that emphasize positive 
aspects and can affect stock prices favorably, while deemphasizing negative news (Verrecchia, 
1983; Dye, 1985). Prior research presents evidence that managers discretionary report and 
disclose information, exploiting their superior information advantage for personal gain 
(Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik 2000), and that they are willing to report optimistic news 
and withhold bad news, such as dividend cuts, to avoid negative market reactions (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009a; Ali et al., 2015; Campbell, 2018). 
Regarding the use of narratives, the literature is less developed. Overall, the evidence 
reported indicates that narratives have information content (Merkley, 2014), drive markets’ 
attention (e.g., Elliot et al., 2015) and have economic consequences (Gibbins et al., 1990; 
Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2014b), but also, that significant firm-level 
heterogeneity exists along narrative dimensions such as financial statements readability (e.g. Li, 
2008), or tone (Frazier et al., 1984; Feldman et al., 2010).1 Importantly, prior research suggests 
that managers have narrative styles that can change in connection to their goals, ability and 
experience. For example, Bonsall et al. (2013) and Huang et al. (2014a) note that managers are 
more willing to use optimistic disclosure tone to avoid negative market reactions. Prior work also 
                                                 
1 This prior literature generally studies narrative disclosures by using content analysis techniques (e.g., Francis et al., 
1997; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2014). Textual analysis is a subset of content analysis important to study managerial 
writing style that has significantly developed thanks to machine-based analyses (Breton and Taffler, 2001; Kothari 
et al., 2009b). A seminal paper in this literature is Frazier et al. (1984) who show that the annual reports content 
analysis can be useful to forecast performance.  
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
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predicts that CEOs are more credible when they have greater expertise and an easy-to-understand 
communication style (see, e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). The 
evidence in Davis et al. (2015) supports the existence of this manager-specific component in 
narrative tone. They show that CEO and CFO language styles in conference calls have an impact 
on capital markets, as measured by the value-weighted cumulative market-adjusted returns in the 
two-day window centred on the conference call date.  
1.2.2. CEO Career Concerns and Optimistic Disclosure Tone 
CEOs do not change firms often, and hence, their abilities can rarely be assessed relative to prior 
achievements (Brickley et al., 1999). Similar concerns pervade internal appointments, as the 
required skills for a CEO are different from those needed in other managerial positions (Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992). This means that when companies appoint new CEOs, their ability is not 
fully known and boards need to uncover their type. This information asymmetry may create CEO 
incentives to engage in practices to build their reputation and influence the market assessment of 
their abilities.2 Career concerns thus emerge in connection with managerial ability reputation 
building. CEOs have incentives to construct and preserve a good reputation that secures them a 
long tenure, greater compensation and more freedom in decision making (Fama, 1980; Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). In turn, long tenures are secured by 
influencing insiders’ and outsiders’ perceptions of firm performance and of their ability. Godfrey 
et al. (2003, p. 98) note that the future remuneration of managers is revised by labor markets 
“depending on the perceived success or failure of the firm they are managing.”   
                                                 
2 Fama (1980), Diamond (1989), Holmstrom (1999) and Milbourn (2003) refer to CEO reputation as the market 
assessment of their managerial abilities. Similarly, Francis et al. (2008, p. 114) consider that CEO reputation “can be 
thought of as the totality of enduring images that major stakeholders form based on perceived CEO performance, 
his or her ability, and values.” 
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Performance assessment is not equally spread throughout CEO tenure. CEOs are subject to 
greater scrutiny at the beginning of their tenure. Indeed, Coyne and Rao (2005) find that 
companies dismiss one third of their CEOs within their three first years of tenure, and Vancil 
(1987) argues that CEOs manage the beliefs of boards and senior staff by promoting their 
management skills during their first and second year in the job. Also confirming this view that 
managerial assessment happens early on in their tenure, Pan et al. (2015) develop a Bayesian 
learning model showing that when a new CEO arrives, markets use firm performance to update 
their beliefs about CEO ability, increasing return volatility. This volatility decreases as CEO 
tenure increases, because markets know the CEO better in terms of ability and skills. Hence, 
CEO career concerns are highest during the early years of tenure.  
Against this backdrop, the association between CEO career concerns and narrative tone is not 
obvious. Bochkay et al. (2017) argue that optimistic disclosures in conference calls decrease over 
CEO tenure, reflecting the reduction in the uncertainty over CEO ability to manage the firm and 
to create value. These authors claim that CEOs use relatively more positive tone early in their 
careers to positively influence outsider’s perception of their managerial ability. However, this 
evidence on tone in conference calls may not extend to optimism in the narratives of legal 
documents, such as the firm audited financial statements. Optimistic disclosure tone increases 
attention and litigation risk (Rogers et al., 2011). For new CEOs who face stringent monitoring 
(Pan et al., 2015) and are likely managing earnings upwards (Ali and Zhang, 2015), a plausible 
strategy may be to keep a neutral tone to avoid increased market scrutiny over managed earnings. 
This strategy would be in line with the arguments in Lo et al. (2017), who show that earnings 
management is usually accompanied by obfuscation in narratives and low readability. Further, 
Huang et al. (2014a) show that managers use optimistic tone to hide negative performance. If 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
14 
 
new CEOs opt for ‘big bath’ strategies (Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993), they 
would likely blame departing CEOs of poor firm performance, leading to lower optimistic tone. 
Finally, new CEOs may need to secure stakeholders’ confidence by establishing an initial and 
realistic set of performance goals (Vancil, 1987), limiting optimism. Thus, we expect that, on 
average, new CEOs use less optimistic tone. Formally, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: On average, CEOs use less optimistic narrative disclosure tone during their early 
years of tenure. 
After this initial phase, CEOs may reach a stage where they have developed a reputation 
based on past actions and financial results obtained. By then, they likely hold significant stock in 
the company (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and directors and other senior staff are personally 
loyal to them, increasing their bargaining power (Graham et al., 2017), and lowering their 
monitoring pressures (Dikolli et al., 2014). Thus, long-tenured CEOs do not have the same 
incentives as recently appointed ones (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Goldman et al., 2017). 
They have survived retention decisions taken by boards (Milbourn, 2003), and their concern is 
mainly focused on reputation protection rather than reputation building (Diamond, 1989). The 
literature suggests that long-tenured CEOs become more risk-averse (Simsek, 2007) by, for 
example, reducing R&D expenditures (Barker and Mueller, 2002), capital expenditures (Dechow 
and Sloan, 1991), or international acquisitions (Matta and Beamish, 2008). As McClelland et al. 
(2012, p. 1389) claim: “long-tenured CEOs will (…) be more likely to value the status quo versus 
the unknown outcomes of enacting change.” Therefore, during these intermediate years of tenure, 
CEOs likely become interested in maintaining stable firm’s results, and focus on their own career 
security. This would lead to limited discretion in disclosure tone in these middle years, consistent 
with H1, which predicts discretionary tone is concentrated in the early years of CEO tenure.  
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A potentially interesting period is the turnover year. CEOs may increase post-retirement 
benefits by improving their late-career performance (e.g., Kalyta, 2009). Thus, departing CEOs 
may inflate earnings (Zhang, 2009) or use more optimistic tone to showcase their ability. 
However, the relationship between CEO final year and disclosure tone is difficult to predict. 
Prior research shows that CEO turnover is often linked to poor performance (Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al.; 1988, Weisbach, 1988). Moreover, CEOs may not be able to know 
their final year in advance. Additionally, during the turnover year, the power of the departing 
CEO is likely to diminish in favor of the incoming CEO. Then, departing CEOs may not be able 
to influence narrative disclosures, as 10-Ks are likely prepared weeks after the fiscal year end by 
the new managerial team. Thus, we make no predictions about tone in CEOs final year. 
1.2.3. CEO Ability and Optimistic Disclosure Tone 
While investors and boards of directors may not be able to perfectly discern the ability of all 
potential candidates, it is fair to assume that boards seek to appoint highly able CEOs, i.e., those 
with greater skills and more business knowledge, and who can lead to better firm performance 
(Demerjian et al., 2013).3 The literature studying the links between managerial ability and 
financial reporting quality presents somewhat mixed results (Francis et al., 2008), but generally 
supports the view that high ability CEOs provide better disclosures and higher financial reporting 
quality. De Franco et al. (2017) show that highly able managers obtain lower bank-loan prices 
mainly through improved financial disclosure. High ability CEOs also make lower earnings 
forecasts’ errors (Baik et al. 2011), and have fewer restatements, higher earnings and accruals 
persistence, and higher quality accruals estimations (Demerjian et al. 2013).  
                                                 
3 Despite some concerns that CEOs play a limited role in the running of their companies (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), 
extant prior evidence suggests that CEOs matter (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Schoar and Zuo, 2016). 
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In terms of human capital, the literature suggests that reputed CEOs have more to lose if they 
make poor accounting and disclosure choices (Francis et al., 2008). Managers are aware that 
disclosure of their private information, via narratives or quantitative disclosure practices, is likely 
to trigger additional information searches by analysts and other market participants (Barron et 
al., 2002), leading to revisions in the capital market’s assessment of their human capital. This 
creates uncertainty about managerial future wages, as argued in Nagar (1999), because managers 
have incomplete knowledge about internal and external markets’ information sets, such as their 
prior beliefs or the processes used by investors to value the information disclosed. Nagar (1999) 
demonstrates that this uncertainty affects managerial disclosure decisions and shows that 
nondisclosure is more prevalent in untalented managers.  
Building on this prior research, we expect that high ability CEOs, on average, are able to 
produce better future firm performance, to become better informed about capital markets 
information sets, and also, to produce more informative disclosures than their low ability 
counterparts. Thus, we expect that they will have different narrative disclosure practices, to 
signal their superior ability and separate themselves from less talented managers. Given the 
above discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: CEOs with higher ability use more optimistic narrative disclosure tone. 
Thus, we expect that high ability CEOs apply narrative disclosure practices to show their 
managerial type rather than as an opportunistic behavior. This is particularly likely given that 
optimistic narrative disclosure attracts attorneys’ attention and increases litigation risk (Rogers et 
al., 2011). Therefore, only high ability CEOs could credibly communicate strong future firm 
performance by using optimism. Low ability CEOs are unlikely to imitate high ability ones in the 
use of optimistic narratives, to avoid increased litigation risk, but also, because it is eventually 
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revealed, during CEO tenure, whether optimism was warranted or not. Low disclosure quality 
and failure to meet expectations would reveal managerial type as low ability. Consistent with this 
view, prior research indicates that failure to meet voluntary disclosures is likely to lead to a loss 
of reputation and trust (Graham et al., 2005; Ferreira and Rezende, 2007).  
Following the theoretical arguments in Nagar (1999), we predict that CEO human capital 
influences managerial discretionary disclosure choices, and specifically, disclosure tone. Given 
our above discussion with respect to how career concerns lead to the development of predictable 
patterns in CEO narratives, we expect that the differences in narrative tone between early and 
late years will be more pronounced for high ability CEOs. Oyer (2008) and Axelson and Bond 
(2015) show that when new employees in high profile jobs report poor performance, they are 
labeled as ‘low ability,’ which is likely to negatively affect their whole careers. In the spirit of 
Pan et al. (2015), it is expected that disclosure tone practices reflect managerial ability. 
Therefore, we expect high ability CEOs to be particularly able to manage early career 
uncertainty, and to develop differential practices in their narrative disclosures, to signal their 
superior quality in the early years of their careers, positively impact the market assessment of 
their ability, build their reputations, and increase investors’ and boards of directors’ trust in them. 
In contrast, low ability CEOs may prefer to engage in big bath strategies early in their tenure 
(e.g., Elliot and Shaw, 1988, Porciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993), to facilitate 
obtaining subsequent strong performance. This type of strategies would lead to lower optimistic 
tone early on in their tenures (as predicted under H1), if they opt to clean up the financial 
statements and attribute poor performance to their predecessors. 
Thus, our final hypothesis is as follows: 
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H3:  Optimistic narrative disclosure tone is greater in the early years of high ability 
CEOs’ service than in the later years. 
1.3. Empirical Constructs on Optimistic Disclosure and CEO Career Concerns 
1.3.1. Main Variables Measurement 
Variation in disclosure tone in 10-Ks is likely affected by firm-specific variables. For example, if 
a firm has experienced strong performance in the past, it is likely that, ceteris paribus, tone will 
be more positive. For our analyses, we are not interested in past performance, but rather, in 
managerial use of tone to signal their quality and higher ability. To overcome this problem, we 
follow Huang et al. (2014a), who create a proxy of abnormal tone not driven by firm’s innate 
characteristics and past performance. Specifically, they decompose narrative disclosure tone into 
normal and abnormal components, using the following model:  
Toneit = β0 + β1Earningsit + β2Returnsit + β3Sizeit+ β4BTMit + β5Std Returnsit + 
+β6Std Earningsit+ β7Firm Ageit + β8Bussegit+ β9Geosegit+ β10Loss + 
+β11Change Earningsit+ β12afe + β13af + uit,              (1) 
 
where disclosure tone (Tone) is measured using the Loughran and McDonald lists of positive 
and negative words created specifically for financial documents,4 and the remaining variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 reports the estimation results of model (1), both with and 
                                                 
4 Other widely used word lists in the accounting and finance literature are the Harvard’s General Inquirer (GI), 
Diction and the list developed by Henry (2008). Henry (2008) developed one of the first words lists for analyzing 
the language used in earnings press releases. However, its main drawback is the limited number of words which do 
not include relevant keywords common in financial texts such as ‘loss,’ ‘losses,’ ‘impairment’ or ‘adverse’ 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2016). Harvard GI and Diction word lists have been used in a number of studies as they 
were the first word lists publicly available. Diction word list can be purchased in www.dictionsoftware.com. 
However, the most appropriate word list for financial documents is the one developed by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011; 2015). 
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without analysts’ variables. Following Huang et al. (2014a), our proxy for optimistic disclosure, 
Optimism is the residual of the annual cross-sectional regressions obtained from model (1). 
To construct Tone, we use the 2014 updated version of the Loughran and McDonald (2015) 
word list, which contains 354 positive and 2,329 negative words.5 This list presents two 
important advantages: 1) it is more complete than other lists developed in the literature as it 
comprises every common positive and negative word; and 2) it is the only existing word list 
customized to financial documents and specifically created from 10-Ks (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016), making it suitable to derive our proxy for CEO optimism. We download the 
10-K reports from EDGAR using a php algorithm. The parsing mechanism of 10-K fillings is 
described in Appendix 3. In total, we examine 516,628,725 words containing 3,465,099 positive 
words and 7,595,709 negative words in a total of 30,122 10-K reports.6 We find more negative 
than positive words which is consistent with prior literature and is a direct consequence of the 
dictionary, which is overpopulated with negative words to account for the fact that managers 
may ‘hide’ negative information by using positive words. Indeed, companies, unconditionally of 
their results, use more positive words to create an overall positive tone (Schleicher and Walker, 
2010). As Loughran and McDonald (2016, p. 35) state: “a careful manager might use 90% 
positive words in dismissing an employee.” This average negative tone of 10-Ks may also be 
related to managerial attempts to appease litigation concerns (Huang et al., 2014a).  
Consistent with Huang et al. (2014a), we find that disclosure tone is more positive when 
firms present positive earnings, are smaller and younger, have fewer business segments and 
smaller book-to-market ratio, present less losses, lower change in earnings and have more 
                                                 
5 We thank the authors for updating and making available the data at: http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html. 
6 These filings include 10-K, 10-K405, 10-KSB and 10-KSB40. We remove all the amended reports (/A) because 
we want to analyze disclosure tone of CEOs in the first version of the report. This is consistent with prior research. 
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analyst forecast errors. Differently to Huang et al. (2014a), we find that returns relate in a 
negative and statistically significant way with disclosure tone. Our results also show that firms 
present more positive disclosure tone when they have less volatile returns and earnings 
indicating that the use of positive disclosure tone may relate with better firms. Finally, we find 
that firms with less geographical segments present more positive disclosure tone consistent with 
the results obtained for the business segments. Both elements proxy for firms’ complexity.  
Some of our results in model (1) differ from Huang et al. (2014a) because some elements of 
our study are different. First, Huang et al. (2014a) study press releases instead of 10-K reports. 
We focus on 10-K reports because they contain formal information and are composed by 
different sections where managers can disclosure information addressed to different users 
(Kothari et al., 2009a). Recent research by Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) shows that managers 
use different disclosure practices in earnings press releases than in 10-K reports. Second, Huang 
et al. (2014a) keep financial firms in their analysis. We remove them because, as Jegadeesh and 
Wu (2013) state, some words that have negative meaning in non-financial firms (e.g., risk or 
casualty) might not be negative for financial firms. Third, the sample periods are different. For 
Huang et al. (2014a) the sample period is from 1997 to 2007 while our sample period spans the 
period between 1993 and 2013. Finally, we should note that the adjusted R-sq. obtained in our 
model (1) is 0.197 and that we obtain statistical significance for every variable except for analyst 
following. Therefore, we conclude that model (1) explains Tone, and thus, the residuals from this 
model may be used to assess abnormal tone (i.e., optimistic or pessimistic narrative tone).7 
                                                 
7 Huang et al. (2014a) obtain an adjusted R-sq. of 0.04 and they obtain statistical significance for eight variables. 
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1.3.2. Main model on Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO Career Concerns 
To test our hypotheses and analyze the relationship between career concerns, CEO ability, and 
optimism in 10-K reports, we use the following model: 
Optimismit = β0+ 𝜏𝑖+ 𝜑𝑡 + β1Early Yearsit + β2CEO Abilityit ∗  Early Yearsit +  
+ β3Final Yearit + β4CEO Abilityit ∗  Final Yearit + β5CEO Abilityit+ 
+ β6Big Bathit+β7ROAit+ β8CEO Ageit+ β9Leverageit + uit,            
(2) 
where Optimism are the residuals obtained from model (1) annual cross-sectional 
regressions. Model (2) includes firm- (τi) and year- (φt) fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control 
for time invariant firm-specific unobservable characteristics and year fixed effects control for 
any shock that occurs in a given year. This helps to assuage endogeneity concerns. Early Years 
proxies for career concerns at the beginning of CEO tenure and equals one when CEOs are in the 
first three years of their tenure; zero otherwise. We use the first three years as a cutoff following 
Ali and Zhang (2015).8 In addition to enhancing the comparability of our findings with prior 
research, this cut-off fits our theoretical approach. Many companies have staggered boards, 
where directors are appointed to serve for three years. In non-staggered boards, directors are 
reappointed annually. This means that, in a period of three years, all directors are subject to 
reelection (Srinivasan, 2005), with CEOs likely influencing these appointments. Additionally, 
Coyne and Rao (2005) find that one third of CEOs are dismissed during their three first years of 
tenure and Pan et al. (2015) show that markets update their assessments about CEO ability 
mainly during the three first years of tenure. Thus, the first three-year period is crucial for new 
                                                 
8 Ali and Zhang (2015) explain that Gibbons and Murphy (1992) use as cutoff the median value of the variable 
“CEO tenure” divided by two which is equal to four years. In Ali and Zhang (2015) the median value of the variable 
tenure is six which divided by two equals three. In our sample, the median for CEO tenure is seven and divided by 
two would be three and a half years. However, following the spirit of Ali and Zhang (2015) and previous evidence 
(Coyne and Rao, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Pan et al. 2015) we also use three years as a cutoff. 
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CEOs to showcase their abilities, and also, when career concerns are arguably greater. Model (2) 
also includes a variable that identifies the turnover year, Final Year, measured as one when 
CEOs are in the last year of their tenure; zero otherwise.  
Our fundamental research question links to CEO ability assessment and whether high ability 
CEOs differentiate themselves by using optimistic tone. To answer these questions, we include 
CEO Ability in model (2) and its interaction with our career concerns proxies. CEO ability is 
measured using the MA-Score of Demerjian et al. (2012), which assesses managerial efficiency 
in generating revenues, given a set of firm-specific characteristics (size, market share, cash 
availability, life cycle, operational complexity and foreign operations). We use the MA-Score 
updated to 2013.9 This measure identifies and separates firm- from managerial-efficiency 
(Demerjian et al., 2013) and provides a proxy of superior management performance, our 
construct of interest. To obtain a clearer interpretation, we take the decile ranks (scaled to take 
values between 0 and 1) of the MA-Score, following the procedure in Barth et al. (2008). This 
also helps to reduce concerns about measurement error in the original proxy. We expect that high 
ability CEOs use more optimistic tone, and manage career concerns early in their tenure through 
optimism in narratives. Thus, under H2 and H3, we predict that β2 and β5 will be positive in 
model (2), showing that CEOs with higher ability are aware of the market impact of qualitative 
disclosure practices and use more optimistic disclosure, particularly, during their early years of 
tenure. In model (2), optimistic tone in the first years of CEO tenure is compared to tone in the 
middle years. Given our interactions, the variable Early Years (Final Year) captures optimism at 
the beginning (in the last year) of tenure for low ability CEOs. Under H1, we predict that β
1
will 
                                                 
9 We thank the authors for updating and making available the data at: http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. 
This measure has been recently applied by other researchers such as De Franco et al. (2017). 
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be negative, reflecting that low ability CEOs use a less optimistic tone than highly able ones, 
particularly early on in their tenures. We make no predictions for Final Year. 
Following prior literature such as Rogers et al. (2011), Davis et al. (2015) or Haggard et al. 
(2015) we include a vector of control variables in model (2) which may affect optimistic 
disclosure and reporting quality and are not included in model (1). By including these controls, 
we can isolate the effect of CEO career concerns on optimistic disclosure. In particular, we 
control for big bath accounting (Elliot and Shaw, 1988), and predict that it will be accompanied 
by less optimistic disclosure in 10-Ks reports. We include a Big Bath dummy variable which 
proxies for large losses, asset write-downs, or other non-recurring charges (Haggard et al., 2015), 
and equals one for any fiscal year-end observation for which Special Items in Compustat is 
negative and exceeds 1% the lagged firm’s total assets and zero otherwise (Elliot and Shaw, 
1988).10 ROA is the return-on-assets ratio. We expect that strong accounting performance will be 
reflected in lower need of discretion in narrative disclosure practices, leading to lower optimism. 
CEO Age is the age of the CEO. Long- tenured CEOs are likely to be older and long tenure leads 
to lower reputation concerns. Thus, it is expected that they use a lower optimistic disclosure. 
Finally, Leverage is total debt scaled by total assets. This variable controls for distressed firms. 
Firms may try to overcome the negative effect of reporting losses or of being highly leveraged by 
explaining it away in an optimistic way (Loughran and McDonald, 2016).  
1.4. Sample and Results Chapter 1 
                                                 
10 Elliot and Shaw (1988) do not include asset write-downs that can be classified as non-discretionary. Following 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) and Haggard et al. (2015) we use all the Special Items in Compustat. Removing 
some non-discretionary items could lead to exclude situations where non-discretionary events are used by managers 
to fulfill self-serving objectives.  
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CEO characteristics are obtained from ExecuComp. Financial and accounting data come from 
Compustat. The variables needed to calculate analysts’ proxies are obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Merging the four databases results in a total of 12,746 firm-year observations composed by 1,461 
firms and 2,382 CEOs for the period 1993 to 2013. We remove financial firms because their 
characteristics and disclosure tone differ from non-financial firms, as previously discussed. After 
removing financial firms, our final sample consists of 11,169 firm-year observations representing 
1,251 US non-financial firms and 2,085 CEOs for the period 1993 to 2013, although we lose 
some observations when running robustness checks. 
Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. Tone is on average 
negative, suggesting that CEOs in our sample include more negative than positive words in 10-
Ks, consistent with how the dictionary is defined and with previous literature (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016). Optimism are the residuals from the Huang et al. (2014a) model,11 and have a 
positive mean and median suggesting that, on average, CEOs in our sample use optimistic tone. 
CEOs are, on average, 57 years old.12 CEOs stay in the job 9 years on average.13 In Appendix 4, 
Panels A and B we show the 25 most common positive and negative words, respectively, loss 
(and losses) is the most commonly used negative word, while best, beneficial and effective are 
the most used positive words. In Figure 1 we can observe the percentage for the top 50 most 
frequent words. The first 12 most frequent negative words have higher percentages than the 
positive ones. This is in accordance with our expectations and the Zipf’s law: a phenomenon in 
natural language processing stating the existence of a small number of very high-frequency 
                                                 
11 Optimism is multiplied by 100 for interpretation purposes. 
12 As an example of an extreme observation, Walter Joseph Zable served as CEO in Cubic Corporation for 62 years 
being the world’s oldest CEO with 97 years old.  
13 Consistent with previous studies, in our sample, only 58 CEOs (2.78%) are CEOs in more than one firm. 
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words and a large number of very low-frequency words (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
Overall, our narrative evidence is consistent with prior findings, and validates our parsing 
procedure. 
Table 1 Panel B presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. We find a 
negative and significant correlation between Optimism and Early Years, and between Tone and 
Early Years, suggesting that, on average, new CEOs do not use more optimistic disclosure tone, 
consistent with H1. CEO Ability is positively correlated with both Tone and Optimism, 
suggesting that high ability CEOs may differently use disclosure tone, consistent with H2. ROA 
is positively correlated with Tone and Optimism (under Spearman correlations), indicating that 
CEOs that obtain better economic results are more optimistic in their 10-Ks. Big Bath presents a 
negative and significant correlation with Tone and Optimism and a positive correlation with 
Early Years and Final Year. This is as expected and consistent with these accounting practices 
being taken surrounding CEO changes and being accompanied by less optimistic disclosure tone, 
possibly, because new CEOs attribute departing CEO any poor results. Big Bath is also 
negatively correlated with CEO Ability potentially indicating that low ability CEOs are more 
likely to engage in these accounting practices, to facilitate future strong performance.  
1.4.1. Main Results on Optimistic Disclosure and CEO Career Concerns  
Table 2 Panel A presents the results of running model (2). For completeness, we report four sets 
of results. The first column presents the model including only Early Years to show the 
relationship between the first years of CEO tenure and the level of disclosure optimism used by 
the average CEO. Next, in column 2, we add CEO Ability and its interaction with Early Years, 
our baseline model (2). Finally, columns (3) and (4) show results when including all controls and 
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both Early Years and Final Year as proxies for CEOs career concerns. Throughout, Early Years 
presents a negative and significant coefficient, consistent with H1. This indicates that the average 
CEO in our sample uses less optimistic disclosure tone in response to career concerns. Given our 
model specification, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of Early Years in 
columns (2), (3) and (4) shows that it is CEOs with low ability who use less optimistic tone at the 
beginning of their tenure compared to CEOs in their middle and final year of tenure (columns 2 
and 3) and compared to the middle years of tenure (column 4). The results are consistent when 
we add control variables. Overall, this suggests that low ability CEOs react to career concerns by 
using a less optimistic tone, potentially lowering scrutiny and future litigation risk.14 
Regarding CEO ability, we find a positive and significant coefficient on CEO Ability 
indicating that skilled CEOs use more optimistic disclosure. The interaction between CEO 
Ability and Early Years is consistently positive and statistically significant. This means that 
CEOs with the highest level of ability (CEO Ability = 1) use more optimistic disclosure during 
their early years of tenure in comparison with CEOs in their middle and final year (columns 2 
and 3) and their middle years of tenure (column 4). Additionally, we show that the sum of the 
coefficients of CEO Ability and its iteration with Early Years is positive and statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with H2 and H3 and suggest that high ability CEOs use 
optimistic disclosure strategies during their first years of tenure, and that overall, they are more 
optimistic.15  Because litigation risk is associated with optimistic disclosure, a possible 
explanation for our findings is that low ability CEOs prefer not to run the risk that, by disclosing 
more optimistic information that later on unravels to suggest opportunism, they could reveal their 
                                                 
14 Untabulated results show that if we control for the Resigned and Retired variables from ExecuComp and their 
interaction with Final Years our main results remain unchanged. 
15 Untabulated results show that if the dependent variable is Tone, the main findings do not change.  
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type, uncovering their real (low) skills. This is also consistent with the theoretical model of 
Nagar (1999) and suggests that managers’ human capital influences their disclosure strategies, 
and that non-talented managers use different disclosures strategies than talented managers.  
Regarding the control variables, Big Bath is negative and significant. As mentioned before, 
big bath accounting probably occurs when a new CEO is appointed and may lead to narrative 
attributions of poor performance to the departing CEO, and thus, to less optimistic disclosure. 
ROA is negative and significant possibly showing that firms with strong performance are less 
optimistic. Finally, CEO Age and Leverage are not statistically significant. To lose the fewest 
number of observations, we replace every missing variable of CEO Age by its mean value (57 
years). We add a dummy variable called dummy CEO Age that equals one for every missing 
observation of CEO age that we have replaced; zero otherwise. This dummy absorbs any effect 
of this change.16 These results do not change if we follow previous literature (Pan et al., 2015) 
and drop CEOs who have been less than three years in office. In this case, the variable Early 
Years would only exist for CEOs who stay in office 3 years or more. 
Finally, Table 2 Panel B shows the results of our main model adding all the control variables 
used to construct the variable Optimism following Huang et al. (2014a). Our main results remain 
unchanged which proves that our results are not affected by any linear combination created by 
the controls used in their model. 
                                                 
16 Results do not change if we control for externally appointment CEOs. However, we do not obtain significance for 
this variable. Externally appointed CEOs are those who were not part of the board of directors before being CEOs.  
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1.4.2. CEO Influence over 10-K Reports 
Questions may arise on the degree of CEO influence over 10-Ks, as they are mandatory SEC 
filings subject to wide scrutiny and complex auditing processes. Although 10-Ks are not 
predicted to be directly written by CEOs, managers are expected to have the power to influence 
and alter their content. This is because CEOs not only sign them, but also participate actively in 
their production as they have a legal responsibility for their content. If CEOs influence 10-Ks, 
the tone in the turnover year (by the departing CEO) should be different to the tone in the early 
years of CEO tenure (by the new CEO). To analyze this assumption, we compare Optimism in 
the turnover year with average and median Optimism in the early years of CEOs tenure. 
Untabulated results show that the average Optimism during the early years of CEO tenure is 
significantly lower than the optimism in the turnover year of the previous CEO. This is 
consistent with our main results for the average CEO and with CEOs influencing disclosure tone, 
and being able to adjust firms’ narratives to their preferences. 
The use of firm fixed effects in our main model also provides assurance that we are capturing 
CEO optimism. In addition, and as an additional test to understand the links between departing 
and incoming CEOs, in untabulated results we repeat the main analyses of Table 2, interacting 
Early Years and CEO Ability with Big Bath. Big bath accounting is a strategy that is likely 
adopted by incoming CEOs, to ‘clean up the balance sheet,’ start afresh, and perhaps attribute 
any initial poor performance to the departing CEO. As such, big bath accounting strategies 
correspond to new CEOs, but may obscure the strategies applied by departing CEOs, if for 
example, the transition does not occur precisely at the fiscal year end. The interactions Big 
Bath*Early Years and Big Bath*CEO Ability mitigate the potential overlap in strategies. Our 
main results do not change.   
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Overall, the evidence reported in section 4 supports the view that CEOs have the incentives 
and ability to influence corporate disclosure tone, and that career concerns drive managerial tone 
in narrative disclosures. In particular, leading to greater optimism in high ability CEOs.  
1.5. Robustness Checks on Optimistic Disclosure and CEO Career Concerns 
1.5.1. Alternative CEO Ability Proxy 
We examine if our results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of CEO ability. We 
repeat our analyses using the CEO talent measure of Rajgopal et al. (2006). They compute the 3-
year average of the cumulative distribution function of ROA for each CEO-firm-year by 
industry, where higher values indicate that the CEO outperformed the industry and lower values 
indicate that the CEO underperformed the industry. We lose around 3,000 observations in 
calculating this CEO Ability proxy. Table 3 Panel A shows the results obtained using this 
alternative measure. All our results hold. In every regression, the coefficient of Early Years 
remains negative and statistically significant. The coefficient for CEO Ability is positive and 
statistically significant meaning that skilled CEOs use more optimistic disclosure in the 10-K 
filings. The interaction between Early Years and CEO Ability is positive and statistically 
significant as in our main analysis. Additionally, as in our main model, in every regression the 
sum of the coefficients of CEO Ability and its iteration with Early Years is positive and 
statistically significant. Overall, the findings are consistent with those previously reported.17 
17 Chang et al. (2010) develop an alternative measure of CEO ability based on relative CEO payment calculated as 
the ratio of the CEO’s total pay to the total pay of the four other highest-paid executives in the company over the last 
three full fiscal years before the CEO’s departure. We create this alternative measure of CEO ability and run our 
main models. Untabulated results show the expected signs although we lose statistical significance as sample size 
drops to less than 500 observations.   
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1.5.2. CEO Fixed Effects 
Prior literature examines manager-specific characteristics to explain firms’ financial reporting 
and disclosure choices. For example, DeJong and Ling (2013) find that manager fixed effects are 
related to the use of quantitative disclosure strategies. Consistently, Ge et al. (2011) report that 
CFOs unobservable characteristics influence firms’ accounting choices, and Davis et al. (2015) 
find that the tone used in conference calls has an important manager-specific component. Our 
measure of CEO ability is not time-invariant, as CEOs may become more able in time. As an 
alternative specification, we repeat our main analyses adding CEO fixed effects. Table 3 Panel B 
shows that our results do not change, suggesting that CEO unobservable characteristics are not 
biasing our results and that it is CEO ability that drives the findings. Additional, untabulated, 
analyses show that our results are also consistent if we follow the method in Graham et al. (2012) 
(the AKM method), who use the method in Abowd et al. (1999), to derive managerial fixed 
effects both for CEOs that change and do not change firms. Thus, the AKM method allows us to 
disentangle firm and CEO fixed effects not only for movers but also for some non-movers, which 
increases the number of observations and the power of the regression. 
1.5.3. Additional Controls for Earnings Management, Managerial Sentiment and 
Overconfidence 
Ali and Zhang (2015) show that CEOs engage in income-increasing earnings management early 
in their tenures, they interpret their findings as indicative of opportunism. However, earnings 
management can be also informative (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), and possibly, used by managers 
to signal improved future performance and dividend changes (Subramanyam, 1996). Our 
findings thus far show that high ability CEOs use more optimistic disclosure at the beginning of 
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their tenure. We have argued that they may use optimism to signal their beliefs over the firm 
future outlook suggesting a complementary relationship between reporting and disclosure 
practices for high ability CEOs. To ensure our disclosure results are not confounded by reporting 
strategies, we rerun our main model and introduce the McNichols (2002)18 measure of absolute 
discretionary accruals. Table 4 Panel A shows the results. All of our main inferences are 
retained. The coefficient for Abnormal Accruals is, for all models, positive and statistically 
significant indicating that when CEOs engage in greater earnings management, they use more 
optimistic disclosure, suggesting possible complementarities between these two strategies.19  
A second potentially confounding effect relates to sentiment. Brown et al. (2012) show that 
managerial pro-forma earnings disclosures are influenced by sentiment. Sentiment also affects 
analysts’ estimates (Clement et al., 2011; Hribar and McInnis, 2012) and investors’ portfolio 
allocation decision (Cornell et al. 2014). Hribar et al. (2017) find evidence of a negative 
relationship between managerial sentiment and loan loss provisions in the banking sector. They 
argue that accrual estimation depends on managerial expectations about future realizations so 
that managerial sentiment (unjustified optimism) could lead to misspecification of future 
accruals. To ensure our results are not confounded by sentiment, we follow Hribar et al. (2017) 
and construct a proxy for managerial sentiment using the Duke University/CFO Magazine 
Business Outlook Survey.20 The mean value of Managerial Sentiment is 66.19, in line with 
                                                 
18 We use the McNichols (2002) measure of abnormal discretionary accruals following Ali and Zhang (2015). 
Results hold if we construct the Abnormal Accruals variable using the modified Jones model developed by Dechow 
et al. (1995). 
19 Untabulated results show that the interaction between Abnormal Accruals and Early Years and the interaction 
between Abnormal Accruals and CEO Ability are negative but not significant. Our main results do not change when 
we include these interactions. 
20 More information about the survey and data can be found at http://www.cfosurvey.org/past-results-1996.html. 
This survey aggregates on a quarterly basis the individual responses of CFOs in different industries. We manually 
collect data on the mean response, each quarter, to the question: “Rate your optimism about the financial prospects 
of your own company on a scale of 0-100, with 0 being the least optimistic and 100 being the most optimistic.” This 
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Hribar et al. (2017). The correlation between Managerial Sentiment and Tone and Optimism are 
positive, but low (0.11 and 0.01, respectively) and only statistically significant for Tone. Table 4 
Panel B shows that our main results do not change if we add sentiment, suggesting that Optimism 
does not reflect unjustified expectations.21 Managerial Sentiment is negative but not significant.  
A third confounding effect may relate with CEO overconfidence. As our dependent variable 
is optimism in the 10-K report, it is fair to assume that more overconfident CEOs produce more 
optimistic reports. To check if this is driving our results we create a proxy for CEO 
overconfidence following Campbell et al. (2011),22 which follows the logic that more confident 
CEOs tend to hold options for a longer period, and only exercise the options that are deep in the 
money. Untabulated results show that in the model with all the controls included, the CEO 
Overconfidence variable is positive and statistically significant but our main results do not 
change. This indicates that CEO overconfidence is not driving our results. 
1.5.4. Litigation Risk and Big Bath Accounting 
Litigation risk, as well as the decision by newly appointed CEOs to take an accounting bath may 
affect optimistic disclosure tone. We have argued in prior sections that when litigation risk is 
high, low ability CEOs are less likely to be optimistic to avoid attracting attention. Also, we have 
                                                 
question is only available from 2002 onwards, significantly reducing our sample size. We calculate the mean 
response for the quarters of each industry and create an annual measure of managerial sentiment. 
21 The Managerial Sentiment variable is created with a survey conducted in different industries so there could exist a 
disconnection with our dependent variable which is firm-specific. We create the industry-adjusted measure of our 
dependent variable, Optimism, and re-run the main model. We find the same results and the Managerial Sentiment 
variable remains statistically insignificant. However, it is common in the literature to have firm-specific dependent 
variables and industry-specific independent variables (e.g., Shroff et al., 2017). 
22 Following Campbell et al. (2011) first we compute the realizable value per option dividing the estimated value of 
in-the-money unexercised exercisable by the number of unexercised exercisable options. Second, we calculate the 
average exercise price as stock price at the end of the fiscal year minus the realizable value per option. Then, the 
average percent moneyness of the options equals to the per-option realizable value divided by the average exercise 
price. Finally, the CEO Overconfidence proxy is a dummy variable that equals one when CEOs hold stock options 
that are more than 100% in-the-money and 0 otherwise. All these data are available in ExecuComp database. 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
33 
 
argued that when CEOs take a bath, and particularly when they take a large bath that would 
likely require additional disclosures, they may be less optimistic.  
We study these issues in Table 5. Panel A replicates our main analyses, splitting the sample 
according to whether there is evidence of big bath accounting, as measured following Elliot and 
Shaw (1988) and Haggard et al. (2015). We split the sample into three groups: (i) firms that 
show no evidence of big bath accounting, (ii) firms that show some evidence of big bath 
accounting, and (iii) firms that take a large bath. As can be readily seen, optimism is 
concentrated in the firms that have no evidence of big bath accounting, while the firms that take 
the largest baths (over 5% of lagged total assets) show the lowest optimism. This is in line with 
our expectations, and the descriptive evidence on Table 1 Panel B, where we show a negative 
correlation between the presence of high ability CEOs and big bath accounting. Untabulated 
descriptive evidence also indicates that large baths are on average more likely during the early 
years of CEO tenure (t-stat=8.87; z-stat=8.86) and in the final year of CEO tenure (t-stat=11.18; 
z-stat=11.14), they are also more likely when CEOs are of low ability (t-stat=2.05; z-stat=1.81). 
Second, in Table 5 Panel B we split the sample into high and low litigation risk firms, following 
Kim and Skinner (2012). We find consistent signs for all variables of interest, but both optimistic 
and pessimistic tone are concentrated in the firms that operate in high litigation risk industries, as 
expected. In particular, we find that low ability CEOs are significantly less optimistic when they 
operate in high litigation risk industries, consistent with our arguments. The evidence in Panel B 
may also suggest that absent litigation risk, signaling by high ability CEOs may be less effective.  
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1.5.5. Exogenous Shock to Career Concerns  
We include fixed effects in our models to control for firm- and time- invariant factors. We also 
run a number of sensitivity analyses. To further assuage endogeneity concerns, and better 
establish a causal link, in this section, we identify a plausible exogenous shock to career 
concerns. Following Guo and Masulis (2015), we use the 2002-2003 Sarbannes-Oxley Act, 
NYSE and NASDAQ rules requiring board independence in a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
analysis. A significant number of firms had to increase the number of independent directors as a 
consequence of the passage of these regulations, providing a quasi-natural experimental setting, 
where we can identify firms that experienced an exogenous increase in independent directors 
(treatment firms), and also, firms that were already in compliance and did not have to modify 
their board composition (control firms). CEOs who experience an exogenous increase in board 
independence have their career concerns clocks reset to zero, i.e., they face an exogenous 
increase in board monitoring (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2014), and thus, in career concerns, even if 
they are already late in their careers. We repeat our main analyses using the following model:  
Optimismit = β0 + β1TiPt +β2CEO Abilityit+ β3TiCEO Abilityit+  
β4TiPtCEO Abilityit + λ ∑ Controlsit + uit,             (3) 
where Ti equals one for those firms that are noncompliant with the NYSE and NASDAQ 
regulation of having more than 50% of independent directors in the board in year 2001; zero 
otherwise. Pt is the indicator for the post-treatment period (2005 and later years); zero otherwise. 
The main coefficient of interest in model (3) is the DiD estimator β1 that measures the change in 
optimistic disclosure tone for treated firms from before to after the treatment, as compared to the 
control firms. Consistent with H1, we predict a negative β1, indicating that CEOs in treated firms 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
35 
 
reduce optimism. Under H2, we predict a positive β2 indicating that more able CEOs use a more 
optimistic tone. Finally, under H3, we expect a positive β
4
 coefficient, albeit we have no 
exogenous variation in CEO Ability, and thus, we cannot claim causality for this interaction.  
Table 6 shows the results. First, for the DiD analysis and controls (column 1) and then, we 
add CEO Ability (column 2) and its interactions (column 3). Finally, we add our Early Years and 
Final Year proxies (column 4). The DiD coefficient is negative and statistically significant 
throughout, consistent with H1. CEO Ability is positive and significant throughout, consistent 
with H2 and our prior findings. Finally, we find no evidence of greater positive tone in high 
ability CEOs, but as noted above, we have no exogenous variation in CEO ability. Overall, the 
results reported in this section confirm that CEOs react to career concerns by affecting disclosure 
tone.  
1.5.6. CEO Talent as an Instrument for CEO Ability  
As previously mentioned, the type of CEO hired by the board is an endogenous decision. Thus, if 
there exist missing variables that affect the choice of the type of CEO in terms of ability as well 
as their optimism during their first years of tenure, this could be biasing our results. We further 
assuage these concerns by using an instrumental variables model that allows us to identify the 
effect of CEO Ability on optimism in 10-K reports. We require that our instrument is correlated 
with CEO skills but not with the structural residual of firm optimism. In particular, we 
instrument CEO ability with CEO Talent, defined as annual average industry-level CEO ability 
(using SIC 3-digits) of the other CEOs operating in the same industry excluding the own firm. 
This variable is likely to affect 10-K optimism only through CEO Ability (i.e., only-through 
condition). Greater amount of high ability CEOs by industry-year likely indicates a greater talent 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
36 
 
pool, increasing the likelihood that the ability of every CEO in the industry is high. But, a priori, 
there is no clear reason to think that the higher ability of the other CEOs in the industry will 
affect the level of optimism in a given firm i.  
Table 7 provides the results. In column (1), we regress CEO Ability on CEO Talent and 
controls, and we show that CEO Talent is a strong instrument, as it is positive and statistically 
significant (Atanasov and Black, 2016). Column (2) shows the first stage of the instrumental 
variables regression when we instrument both CEO Ability with the variable CEO Talent and 
Early Years*CEO Ability with the variable Early Years*CEO Talent.23 Column (3) shows the 
second stage (2SLS regression) where our main results remain unchanged. This is, high skilled 
CEOs are more optimistic at the beginning of their tenure, and low ability CEOs are less 
optimistic. In the final columns (4) and (5) we show the first and second stage regression results 
when we also add Final Year.24 Our main results are retained.  
We report both Cragg-Donald Wald and Wald rank F-statistics. As we have more than one 
endogenous regressor, we concentrate on the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (Sanderson and 
Windmeijer, 2016). In the first regression, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (100.9) exceeds the 
threshold for the Stock-Yogo 10% maximum size distortion critical value of 7.03,25 rejecting the 
null hypothesis of weak instruments.  
1.6. Additional Analyses on Optimistic Disclosure and CEO Career Concerns 
                                                 
23 Untabulated results show that in the first stage the relationship between Early Years*CEO Ability and Early 
Years*CEO Talent is positive and statistically significant. Consistently, the correlation between CEO Ability and 
CEO Talent is 0.25 (p-value<0.01), the correlation between Early Years*CEO Ability and Early Years*CEO Talent 
is 0.17 (p-value<0.01) and between Final Year*CEO Ability and Final Year*CEO Talent and 0.23 (p-value<0.01). 
24 Untabulated results of the first stage show that the relationship between the interactions and their instruments is 
positive and significant. 
25 Stock and Yogo (2005) proposed tests for weak instruments. As Stock-Yogo critical values are derived under 
assumptions of homoscedasticity, Baum et al. (2007) suggest that comparison between Cragg-Donald statistic and 
Stock-Yogo critical value must be made with caution. 
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1.6.1. Future Firm Performance 
Our results show that high ability CEOs use more optimistic disclosure, particularly, at the 
beginning of their tenures. If CEOs use these strategies to signal their type to investors, optimism 
at the beginning of CEO tenure should be positively related to future firm performance. To 
provide evidence on this issue, we analyze the relationship between optimism and future 
earnings and cash flows. Table 8 provides the results, both with and without the full interactions. 
Overall, and consistent with our expectations, we find that CEO Ability has a positive and 
significant relationship with future firm performance (both cash flows and accruals). We also 
find that high ability CEOs that are optimist in their Early Years (Optimism*Early Years*CEO 
Ability) obtain higher future earnings and future cash flows. On average, Optimism is not 
associated with greater future earnings and cash flows, consistent with Huang et al. (2014a). 
1.6.2. CEO Forced Turnover 
Thus far, we have argued that skilled CEOs use optimistic tone to help investors and third parties 
assess their ability and overall performance. If this holds true, and CEOs use optimism to 
assuage career concerns, the probability of observing a forced CEO turnover should be 
negatively associated with optimistic disclosure tone. Similarly, if CEO Ability reflects CEO 
skills, highly skilled CEOs should have a lower probability of forced turnover. To provide 
evidence on these issues, we study the probability of forced turnover. Following Brickley et al. 
(1999) we focus on performance in the year before turnover. We calculate the top and bottom 
Returns and ROA quartiles which relate to the ‘worst’ and ‘best’ performers in the market. Our 
forced turnover variable equals one when the departing CEO is managing a firm in the bottom 
quartile of performance; zero otherwise. Table 9 shows the results where the dependent variable 
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is forced turnover. Results for performance measured as Returns are reported in columns (1) and 
(2) and as ROA in columns (3) and (4). We include industry- and year- fixed effects in every 
model. Optimism is negative and significant in all model specifications, indicating that the 
probability of forced turnover decreases for those CEOs who use more optimistic tone.26 Also, 
high ability CEOs have a lower probability of being forcefully fired.27 This is in line with our 
theoretical development and our previous findings.28 Additionally, we find that older CEOs and 
big bath accounting are positively associated with CEO forced turnover, while CEOs in firms 
with better accounting performance (higher ROA) are less likely to experience forced turnover.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with a decreasing probability of CEOs being forcefully 
dismissed when they use optimistic narratives and they are highly skilled. This helps to validate 
our proxies for CEO ability and optimism in 10-Ks.  
1.6.3. Economic Consequences of Optimistic Disclosure 
Overall, our study suggests that optimistic tone can signal CEO ability and superior future 
performance. However, consistent with Huang et al. (2014a) we do not find a positive 
relationship between optimistic disclosure tone and future firm’s performance in terms of 
earnings or cash flows in the short-to-medium term (t+1 to t+3). In this final section, we aim to 
provide additional evidence on the association between optimistic tone and firm future 
performance. In particular, we look at future firm debt financing and investment, as well as CEO 
                                                 
26 Untabulated results show that more optimistic CEOs are less likely to stay in office 3 years or less. Consistently, 
we also find that optimistic and high skilled CEOs have more probability of having longer tenure.  
27 Untabulated results show that this holds for our alternative CEO ability proxy based on Rajgopal et al. (2006). 
28 Untabulated results show that the triple interaction between Optimism, Early Years and CEO Ability is not 
significant under any model specification.  
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payment of dividends. If optimistic disclosure tone contains information about CEO ability that 
markets incorporate, it is fair to assume that these firms will enjoy higher market trust.  
We create two sets of dummy variables: (i) Debt Increase, CAPEX Increase and Dividend 
Increase that equal 1 if the change in debt, capital expenditures or dividend payments, 
respectively, is higher than 5%; zero otherwise; and (ii) Debt Increaset+1,t+2,t+3, CAPEX 
Increaset+1,t+2,t+3, and Dividend Increaset+1,t+2,t+3 which equals one if the sum of the changes in 
debt, capital expenditures or dividend payments, respectively, from the three periods from t to 
t+3 is higher than 5%; 0 otherwise. Table 10, Panels A to C show that optimistic disclosure tone 
is associated with greater future access to debt, more future investments, and greater dividend 
payments. Overall, this evidence indicates that firms that use more optimistic disclosure have 
better outlooks, explaining why managers use optimistic tone.  
Finally, we study the reaction to optimistic earnings announcements by studying the earnings 
drift (Beaver, 1968; Ball and Brown, 1968).29 We follow the work of Henry and Leone (2016) 
and analyze if optimistic tone is informative in terms of firms’ value-weighted cumulative 
abnormal returns. We first compute Unexpected Earnings (UE), defined as actual earnings per 
share (EPS) minus median estimated EPS and weighted by beginning of year share price, and 
CAR which is cumulative abnormal returns from day t-1 to t+60 around the earnings 
announcement date in the last quarter as our data is constructed in annual basis.30 We compare 
CAR between two firms’ portfolios. The first portfolio includes firms in the highest quintile of 
                                                 
29 More recently, authors such as Chen et al. (2017) provide evidence for the existence of the post earnings 
announcement drift by showing that the earnings drift is related with the accounting-associated component of 
liquidity risk. Chen et al. (2017) measure the accounting-associated component of liquidity risk with a cross-
sectional regression of liquidity risk on accounting quality. 
30 Abnormal returns are calculated as raw returns minus value-weighted market return. Value-weighted market 
return is raw returns divided by market value.  
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optimistic tone, unexpected earnings and CEO ability. The second portfolio includes firms in the 
lowest quintile of optimistic tone, unexpected earnings and CEO ability. Then, we run 
regressions for each portfolio and graph the Optimism coefficient from this model: 
CAR[−1,+1,…,+60] = β0 + β1Optimismit + β2∆Optimismit + β4CEO Abilityit 
+ β5Early Yearsit+ β6Final Yearit+ β7CEO Ageit+ β8Leverageit + 
+ β9Dummy CEO Ageit+β10Unexpected Earningsit+ 
+β11Lossit+ β12Sizeit+ uit,                 
 
(4) 
 where all the regressions include fixed effects by year. We include controls from Henry 
and Leone (2016), where Loss is calculated as an indicator variable that equals one if the actual 
EPS is negative; 0 otherwise. We also include variables to control for CEO career concerns 
(Early Years and Final Year) and CEO characteristics (CEO Ability and CEO Age). The variable 
∆Optimism which is Optimism in period t minus Optimism in period t-1 is included to control for 
changes in the level of optimistic disclosure tone that could affect our dependent variable.  
Figure 2 plots the findings and provides evidence of a drift, consistent with optimistic 
disclosure tone containing relevant information. The relationship between optimistic disclosure 
and CAR is always more positive for firms in the high portfolio than for firms in the low 
portfolio. This evidence is consistent with previous literature such as Davis et al. (2015) who 
state that narrative tone includes information about manager-specific characteristics.  
1.7. Summary and Conclusions Chapter 1 
We study whether career concerns influence CEOs optimistic disclosure tone and whether more 
able CEOs use narrative tone differently. Our main analyses focus on the early years of CEO 
tenure for which management skills are largely unknown. We show that high ability CEOs use 
more optimistic tone, particularly, in the early years of their tenure. Our findings suggest that 
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talented CEOs use optimistic tone to signal their superior skills. Our evidence suggests that these 
high ability CEOs, aware that disclosure tone has a potential impact on markets (e.g., Frazier et 
al., 1984; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Li, 2008), likely use it to affect market’s 
assessments of their ability, as a positive assessment is likely to increase the length of their 
tenure and maximize their future welfare (Godfrey et al., 2003). To better infer causality, we use 
mandatory changes to board independence as a plausible exogenous shock to career concerns 
and board monitoring. Using this shock, we provide confirmatory evidence that CEOs respond to 
career concerns changing their narratives. We also instrument CEO Ability, obtaining 
comparable results. As additional confirmatory evidence, we provide evidence of positive market 
reactions to optimistic disclosures using cumulative abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements in the last quarter. We also find that more optimistic firms have greater access to 
future debt financing, engage in more capital investments and pay higher future dividends.  
Our study has a number of implications. Tone at the top is an important issue, but addressing 
it in a meaningful manner requires the understanding of CEOs incentives. When reading and 
interpreting corporate reports, users should consider that CEO incentives related to career 
concerns affect the disclosure tone of the companies they manage. Our findings indicate that 
CEOs develop recognizable patterns in their narrative disclosures linked to their careers, and that 
optimistic disclosures reflect the genuine optimism of highly skilled CEOs in the early stages of 
their career. This optimistic tone fades as CEOs become more conservative and risk averse as 
their tenure increases. The understanding of these patterns is important for investors. These 
findings are also of interest to policy makers and highlight the importance of qualitative 
disclosures. Our results indicate that the understanding of both qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure strategies is needed to form a coherent view of the organizational reality.   
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1.8. Appendices Chapter 1.  
Appendix 1 Variables definition Chapter 1 
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Optimism  Optimistic disclosure calculated as the residual of the model from 
Huang et al. (2014a). 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, 
IBES. 
Tone  Disclosure tone calculated as the difference between the total 
number of positive and negative words divided by total number of 
words in each firm-year 10-K report. 
Loughran and 
McDonald word list 
and php algorithm  
Positive Words Total number of positive words in each firm-year 10-K filing using 
the Loughran and McDonald dictionary. 
Loughran and 
McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Negative Words Total number of negative words in each firm-year 10-K filing using 
the Loughran and McDonald dictionary. 
Loughran and 
McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Total Words Total number of words in each firm-year 10-K filing using the 
Loughran and McDonald dictionary. 
Loughran and 
McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
CEO Tenure Number of years each CEO stays in office.  EXECUCOMP 
Early Years Dummy variable that equals one if CEOs are in their three first 
years of tenure and 0 otherwise.  
EXECUCOMP 
Final Year Dummy variable that equals one in the year of CEO turnover and 0 
otherwise.   
EXECUCOMP 
CEO Ability  CEO’s ability measure from Demerjian et al. (2012). It is ranked to 
be comprised between 0 and 1. 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
CEO Ability (2) Following Rajgopal et al. (2006) we proxy for CEO talent by 
computing the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ROA for 
each CEO-firm-year by industry and then calculate the 3-year 
average of the CDF rank of ROA. 
Rajgopal et al. (2006) 
and COMPUSTAT 
Returns  Contemporaneous annual stock returns calculated using CRSP 
monthly return data. 
CRSP 
ROA Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets.  
COMPUSTAT 
Big Bath  Big bath is a dummy variable that equals one in any fiscal year-end 
observation for which Special Items is negative and exceeds 1% of 
lagged firm total assets and 0 otherwise (Elliot and Shaw, 1988).  
 
COMPUSTAT 
CEO Age  The age of the CEO. Every missing observation is replaced by the 
mean value of the variable (57 years old). 
EXECUCOMP 
dummy CEO Age Dummy variable that equals one for every missing value of CEO 
Age that has been replaced by its mean value and 0 otherwise. 
EXECUCOMP 
Loss Dummy variable that equals one if earnings are negative and 0 
otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
Leverage Firm’s total debt divided by total assets. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
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VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
ForcedTurnRe Dummy variable that equals one if a firm is in the bottom returns 
quartile in the year preceding the CEO turnover. 
COMPUSTAT 
ForcedTurnROA Dummy variable that equals one if a firm is in the bottom ROA 
quartile in the year preceding the CEO turnover. 
COMPUSTAT 
Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Size Logarithm of firm market value. COMPUSTAT 
BTM Book-to-market ratio.  
Std Returns Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the fiscal year. CRSP 
Std Earnings Standard deviation of EARN calculated over the last five years, 
with at least three years of data required. 
COMPUSTAT 
Firm Age Logarithm of 1 plus the firm age calculated from the first year the 
firm entered the CRSP dataset.  
EXECUCOMP 
Bussseg Logarithm of 1 plus number of business segments, or 1 if the value 
is missing from Compustat.  
COMPUSTAT 
Geoseg Logarithm of 1 plus number of geographic segments, or 1 if the 
value is missing from Compustat.  
COMPUSTAT 
Change Earnings Difference between Earnings in period t versus period t-1 scaled by 
total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
af Analyst consensus forecast for one-year-ahead earnings per share 
scaled by stock price per share at the end of the fiscal year to 
control for managerial assessment about future performance. 
 
IBES 
afe Analyst forecast error, defined as IBES earnings per share minus 
the median of the most recent analysts’ forecasts, deflated by stock 
price per share at the end of the fiscal year. 
IBES 
Cashflow Cash flow from operations. COMPUSTAT 
T Indicator for the treatment which equals one for those firms that in 
year 2001 are noncompliant with the listing rule of having more 
than 50% of independent directors in the board and zero otherwise. 
 
RISKMETRICS 
P Indicator for the post-treatment period which equals one for 2005 
and later years and zero otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
Managerial 
Sentiment 
Managerial sentiment proxy using the mean response of CFOs in 
the Duke University/CFO Magazine Business Outlook Survey of 
the following question: “Rate your optimism about the financial 
prospects of your own company on a scale of 0-100, with 0 being 
the least optimistic and 100 being the most optimistic.” 
 
Duke University/CFO 
Magazine Business 
Outlook Survey 
CEO Talent This is the average ability by industry (SIC 3-digits) and year of the 
other firms’ CEOs. 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
and COMPUSTAT 
Debt Increase Dummy variable that equals one if the change in total debt is higher 
than 5% and 0 otherwise.  
COMPUSTAT 
CAPEX Increase Dummy variable that equals one if the change in capital 
expenditures is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
Dividends Increase Dummy variable that equals one if the change in dividends 
payment is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
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Appendix 2 Disclosure tone model 
 (1) (2) 
 Tone Tone 
   
Earnings 0.0042*** 0.0039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Returns -0.0034** -0.0035** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Size -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Std Returns -0.0026*** -0.0024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Std Earnings -0.0303*** -0.0302*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Age -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Busseg -0.0003* -0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Geoseg -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss -0.0013*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Change Earnings -0.4258*** -0.4119*** 
 (0.110) (0.111) 
afe  0.0029* 
  (0.002) 
af  0.0001 
  (0.001) 
Constant 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 11,169 11,169 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.196 0.197 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The model 
is estimated using a pooled OLS regression. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated using the Huber-White 
procedure. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. All continuous variables have been winsorized at 1% and 99% to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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 Appendix 3. Parsing 10-K reports 
Using SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR), we download the 10-K filings corresponding 
to firms in our database. It is done with a customized web crawling algorithm constructed with php programming 
language. Several types of 10-K reports are downloaded: 10-K, 10-K405, 10-KSB and 10-KSB40. 
A few number of filings appear empty or with little information mostly before the year 1996. We contacted SEC for 
information and they responded that “not all documents filed with the Commission by public companies will be available 
on EDGAR. Companies were phased into EDGAR filing over a three-year period, ending May 6, 1996. As of that date, all 
public domestic companies were required to make their filings on EDGAR, except for filings made in paper because of a 
hardship exemption. Third-party filings with respect to these companies, such as tender offers and Schedules 13D, are 
also filed on EDGAR. More information appears in https://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm.” We remove those filings 
that appear empty or with little information. 
 
After downloading all the 10-Ks filings, we take the following steps: 
 
1) Remove all HTML tags from each filing. 
2) Exclude the cover page (the header) which contains the filer’s name, CIK number and firm address.  
3) Exclude all the tables and exhibits because these items are more likely to contain template language that is less 
meaningful to measure disclosure tone (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
4) Capital letters: we do not eliminate them because the algorithm already takes it into account (with the command 
ignore case). 
5) Stop words: we do not eliminate them as they should be part of the number of total words of each 10-K. 
6) Punctuation: we do not eliminate it because the algorithm takes it into account. For example, ‘increase. The’ is 
equivalent to increase and the without taking into account punctuation or capital letters. This is done through 
regular expressions in php programming language. A regular expression, also known as regex, is a sequence of 
characters that forms a search pattern.  Regular expressions consist of constants and operator symbols that denote 
sets of strings and operations over these sets, respectively.  
 
 
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
46 
Appendix 4. The 25 most frequent positive and negative words 
Panel A. Positive Words.   Panel B. Negative Words. 
Words 
Word 
Repetition 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
 
Words 
Word 
Repetition 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
BEST 19,177 2.08% 2.08%  LOSS 971,058 10.36% 10.36% 
BENEFICIAL 18,986 2.06% 4.14%  LOSSES 495,717 5.29% 15.65% 
EFFECTIVE 18,671 2.03% 6.17%  IMPAIRMENT 356,653 3.81% 19.46% 
BENEFIT 17,302 1.88% 8.05%  CLAIMS 318,868 3.40% 22.86% 
GREATER 17,095 1.86% 9.91%  AGAINST 232,077 2.48% 25.34% 
IMPROVEMENTS 15,703 1.70% 11.61%  ADVERSE 224,357 2.39% 27.73% 
ABLE 15,599 1.69% 13.30%  RESTRUCTURING 211,961 2.26% 29.99% 
GAIN 15,296 1.66% 14.96%  RESTATED 193,492 2.06% 32.06% 
GAINS 14,645 1.59% 16.55%  ADVERSELY 180,074 1.92% 33.98% 
OPPORTUNITIES 14,539 1.58% 18.13%  DISCONTINUED 178,934 1.91% 35.89% 
IMPROVE 14,370 1.56% 19.69%  LITIGATION 159,963 1.71% 37.60% 
PROFITABILITY 13,596 1.48% 21.17%  TERMINATION 126,598 1.35% 38.95% 
GOOD 13,574 1.47% 22.64%  DECLINE 116,966 1.25% 40.20% 
FAVORABLE 13,565 1.47% 24.12%  CLOSING 90,111 0.96% 41.16% 
IMPROVED 13,522 1.47% 25.58%  FAILURE 84,396 0.90% 42.06% 
ACHIEVE 13,282 1.44% 27.03%  DAMAGES 83,207 0.89% 42.95% 
SUCCESSFUL 13,258 1.44% 28.47%  VOLATILITY 81,141 0.87% 43.81% 
LEADING 13,231 1.44% 29.90%  UNABLE 78,623 0.84% 44.65% 
SUCCESS 13,209 1.43% 31.34%  LIMITATIONS 67,966 0.73% 45.38% 
STRONG 12,792 1.39% 32.73%  COMPLAINT 67,636 0.72% 46.10% 
IMPROVEMENT 12,580 1.37% 34.09%  DEFAULT 67,420 0.72% 46.82% 
ENHANCE 12,354 1.34% 35.43%  CRITICAL 67,357 0.72% 47.54% 
SUCCESSFULLY 12,335 1.34% 36.77%  DOUBTFUL 65,666 0.70% 48.24% 
ADVANTAGE 11,850 1.29% 38.06%  FORCE 61,772 0.66% 48.90% 
BETTER 11,841 1.29% 39.34%  TERMINATED 59,789 0.64% 49.53% 
This Appendix summarizes the most common words found in the 10-K of sample firms, using the Loughran and McDonald (2015) dictionary.
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1.9. Tables and Figures Chapter 1 
Figure 1 Proportions of the top 50 most frequent words 
 
 
Figure 1 plots the percentages of the 50 most frequent positive and negative words in our sample using the Loughran and 
McDonald (2015) dictionary.  
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Figure 2 Post Earnings Announcement Drift – CAR and Optimistic Disclosure Tone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 plots the post-earnings announcement drift for the two portfolios that include different levels of Optimistic 
disclosure tone, CEO ability and Unexpected Earnings. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
PANEL A. Descriptive evidence 
 N Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Tone 10,941 -0.007 0.005 -0.046 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 0.022 
Optimism 10,941 0.037 0.450 -3.741 -0.219 0.061 0.324 2.607 
Negative Words 10,941 460 408 0 138 367 673 4,063 
Positive Words 10,941 213 162 0 87 190 300 3,098 
Total Words 10,941 31,349 24,465 92 14,020 28,005 42,379 464,821 
CEO Ability 10,941 0.471 0.334 0 0.222 0.444 0.778 1 
CEO Ability 2 8,619 0.570 0.238 0.010 0.390 0.567 0.755 1 
CEO Age 10,941 57 6.357 28 55 56 60 97 
CEO Tenure 10,941 8.995 7.615 1 4 7 12 62 
Early Years 10,941 0.218 0.413 0 0 0 0 1 
Final Year 10,941 0.168 0.374 0 0 0 0 1 
Abnormal Accruals 10,901 0.074 0.092 0.000 0.021 0.047 0.095 3.112 
Managerial Sentiment 6,564 66.192 4.355 52.666 64.031 67.026 69.165 81.798 
ForcedTurnRet 10,941 0.047 0.211 0 0 0 0 1 
ForcedTurnROA 10,941 0.045 0.208 0 0 0 0 1 
Big Bath 10,941 0.343 0.475 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 10,941 0.043 0.095 -1.254 0.019 0.047 0.084 1.247 
Leverage 10,941 0.196 0.189 0 0.033 0.176 0.297 3.675 
 
PANEL B. Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Tone  0.848 -0.066 -0.068 0.064 0.260 -0.081 -0.141 0.233 0.038 0.036 
(2) Optimism 0.843  -0.055 -0.010 0.018 0.156 -0.022 -0.055 0.070 0.053 0.053 
(3) Early Years -0.099 -0.079  -0.011 -0.060 0.006 0.000 0.044 -0.030  0.006 -0.014 
(4) Final Year -0.089 -0.017  -0.061  -0.033  -0.046 -0.010 0.081 -0.088 0.115 0.011 
(5) CEO Ability 0.098 0.028 -0.071 -0.024   0.283 0.090 -0.041 0.422 0.024 -0.196 
(6) CEO Ability 2 0.236 0.126 0.012  -0.045 0.278  0.008  -0.141 0.539 0.070 -0.207 
(7) Abnormal Accrual -0.085 -0.007 -0.021 0.017  0.084 0.009  0.115 0.017 -0.085 -0.137 
(8) Big Bath -0.163  -0.063  0.086 0.078 -0.034 -0.144 0.121  -0.285 -0.071 0.060 
(9) ROA 0.198 -0.025 -0.078  -0.104  0.319  0.454 -0.139 -0.270  0.035 -0.329 
(10) CEO Age 0.025 0.028  -0.187 0.126 -0.009 0.055  -0.086 -0.064  0.042  0.037 
(11) Leverage -0.023 0.001 -0.010 0.007  -0.138 -0.166 -0.077 0.049 -0.127 0.041   
 
The sample with all the controls included comprises 10,941 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. Panel B presents the correlation matrix. It shows the Pearson (below the diagonal) and the 
Spearman (above the diagonal) correlation coefficients. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance at 1% level. All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
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Table 2 Optimistic disclosure tone and CEOs’ career concerns 
PANEL A: Optimistic disclosure and career concerns 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Early Years  β1 -0.071*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.118*** 
   (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Early Years*CEO Ability  β2  0.109*** 0.103** 0.103** 
    (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
CEO Ability  β3  0.072*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Final Year  β4    -0.024 
      (0.016) 
Final Year *CEO Ability  β5    -0.013 
      (0.030) 
Big Bath   β6   -0.023* -0.022* 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
ROA  β7   -0.386*** -0.397*** 
     (0.050) (0.050) 
CEO Age  β8   0.000 0.000 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
dummy CEO Age  β9   -0.035 -0.027 
     (0.073) (0.073) 
Leverage   β10   -0.074 -0.075 
     (0.048) (0.048) 
       
Significance β1+β2    0.755 0.636 0.537 
Significance β2+β3    0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Firm FE   YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES 
Observations   11,169 11,169 10,941 10,941 
Adj. R-sqr.   0.557 0.559 0.562 0.563 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated using double 
clustering by firm and year following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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PANEL B: Optimistic disclosure and career concerns with all controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Early Years β1 -0.071*** -0.117*** -0.109*** -0.111*** 
  (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Early Years*CEO Ability β2  0.109*** 0.100** 0.099** 
   (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
CEO Ability β3  0.072*** 0.072** 0.077** 
   (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) 
Final Year β4    -0.017 
     (0.016) 
Final Year *CEO Ability β5    -0.023 
     (0.029) 
Big Bath  β6   -0.029** -0.028** 
    (0.011) (0.011) 
CEO Age β7   -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
dummy CEO Age β8   -0.017 -0.010 
    (0.075) (0.074) 
Leverage  β9   -0.003 -0.005 
    (0.048) (0.048) 
Earnings β10   -0.602*** -0.607*** 
    (0.086) (0.088) 
Returns β11   -0.236 -0.239 
    (0.150) (0.150) 
Size β12   0.131*** 0.130*** 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
BTM β13   0.062*** 0.062*** 
    (0.019) (0.019) 
Std Returns β14   0.224** 0.226** 
    (0.093) (0.094) 
Std Earnings β15   0.539** 0.539** 
    (0.196) (0.196) 
Firm Age β16   -0.019 -0.015 
    (0.050) (0.049) 
Busseg β17   0.008 0.007 
    (0.019) (0.018) 
Geoseg β18   -0.043** -0.043** 
    (0.020) (0.020) 
Loss β19   0.033* 0.034* 
    (0.019) (0.019) 
Change Earnings β20   30.867*** 30.633*** 
    (9.881) (9.860) 
afe β21   0.003 -0.002 
    (0.184) (0.183) 
af β22   0.386*** 0.389*** 
    (0.074) (0.073) 
      
Significance β1+β2   0.756 0.726 0.601 
Significance β2+β3   0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  11,169 11,169 10,941 10,941 
Adj. R-sqr.  0.554 0.557 0.576 0.576 
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Table 3 Optimistic disclosure tone and CEOs’ career concerns: Alternative CEO Ability proxy and CEO Fixed Effects 
  PANEL A: Alternative CEO Ability Proxy 
(Rajgopal et al. 2006)  
 PANEL B: CEO Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
Early Years β1 -0.270*** -0.522*** -0.521*** -0.524***  -0.049** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
  (0.052) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132)  (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Early Years*CEO Ability β2  0.507** 0.518** 0.520**   0.093** 0.088** 0.085** 
   (0.230) (0.227) (0.228)   (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
CEO Ability  β3  0.178*** 0.178*** 0.169***   0.063** 0.111*** 0.114*** 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)   (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Final Year β4    -0.039     -0.014 
     (0.031)     (0.015) 
Final Year* CEO Ability β5    0.039     -0.023 
     (0.050)     (0.027) 
ROA β6        -0.002 -0.002 
         (0.011) (0.011) 
Big Bath β7   -0.033*** -0.032***    -0.451*** -0.458*** 
    (0.010) (0.010)    (0.056) (0.056) 
CEO Age β8   0.002*** 0.002***    0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.006) (0.007) 
dummy CEO Age β9   -0.004 -0.002    -0.079 -0.086 
    (0.011) (0.011)    (0.054) (0.054) 
Leverage  β10   0.074*** 0.073***    -0.050 -0.051 
    (0.026) (0.026)    (0.055) (0.054) 
           
Significance β1+β2   0.898 0.976 0.971   0.901 0.975 0.943 
Significance β2+β3   0.003 0.002 0.002   0.001 0.000 0.000 
           
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES  NO NO  NO NO 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Firm & CEO FE  NO NO NO NO  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  8,719 8,719 8,719 8,719  10,944 10,944 10,712 10,712 
Adj. R-sqr.  0.115 0.124 0.127 0.127  0.588 0.590 0.593 0.593 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013 All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A shows our main model results using the 
alternative CEO Ability measure from Rajgopal et al. (2006). This variable is described in Appendix 1 as CEO Ability (2).  Models are estimated using industry (SIC 2-
digits) and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated using the Huber-White procedure. Panel B is estimated using firm, year and CEO fixed 
effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by firm and year following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate 
the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Controls for earnings management and managerial sentiment 
 PANEL A: Abnormal Accruals  PANEL B: Managerial Sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Optimism Optimism Optimism  Optimism Optimism Optimism 
        
Abnormal Accruals 0.155*** 0.126*** 0.128***     
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)     
Managerial Sentiment      0.002 0.002 0.002 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Early Years -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.119***  -0.123*** -0.127*** -0.129*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Early Years*CEO Ability 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.111***  0.110** 0.098** 0.093** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) 
CEO Ability 0.067** 0.104*** 0.106***  0.075** 0.128*** 0.134*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Final Year   -0.026    -0.033 
   (0.016)    (0.037) 
Final Year*CEO Ability   -0.012    -0.015 
   (0.032)    (0.022) 
Big Bath   -0.023* -0.022*   -0.016 -0.018 
  (0.011) (0.011)   (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA  -0.377*** -0.387***   -0.473*** -0.483*** 
  (0.053) (0.054)   (0.069) (0.068) 
CEO Age  0.000 0.000   -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
dummy CEO Age  -0.033 -0.025   0.029 0.034 
  (0.072) (0.071)   (0.106) (0.104) 
Leverage   -0.086 -0.087*   -0.083 -0.082 
  (0.051) (0.050)   (0.054) (0.054) 
        
Firm FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 10,882 10,660 10,660  6,526 6,433 6,433 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.536 0.538 0.539  0.617 0.622 0.623 
 
The sample in Panel A comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. Sample in Panel B comprises 
6,526 firm-year observations for the period 2002-2013 because the Managerial Sentiment variable is only available from 
2002. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are calculated using double clustering by firm and year following Petersen (2009). All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Big bath accounting and Litigation risk 
PANEL A: Big Bath Accounting 
 Low Big Bath (1%<TA<5%)  High Big Bath (>5% TA)  No Big Bath 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
Early Years -0.083** -0.083** -0.074**  -0.140** -0.130** -0.131**  -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.128*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)  (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
CEO Ability 0.027 0.060 0.085  0.0171 0.0505 0.0569  0.058* 0.081** 0.080** 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.056)  (0.069) (0.065) (0.074)  (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) 
Early Years*CEO Ability 0.034 0.027 0.009  0.1365 0.1262 0.1243  0.137*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)  (0.122) (0.119) (0.123)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Final Year   0.073**    0.0024    -0.0420** 
   (0.032)    (0.047)    (0.020) 
Final Year*CEO Ability   -0.125**    -0.0242    0.004 
  (0.055)    (0.113)    (0.037) 
ROA  -0.355** -0.331*   -0.265** -0.269**   -0.313*** -0.319*** 
  (0.159) (0.160)   (0.119) (0.119)   (0.100) (0.102) 
CEO Age  -0.002 -0.002   0.002 0.002   0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002) 
dummy CEO Age  -0.183 -0.226   -0.2247 -0.2249   0.017 0.025 
  (0.177) (0.183)   (0.131) (0.131)   (0.061) (0.063) 
Leverage  0.006 0.008   0.1819 0.1813   -0.179*** -0.180*** 
  (0.080) (0.079)   (0.125) (0.125)   (0.062) (0.062) 
            
Firm FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 2,357 2,357 2,357  818 818 818  7,069 7,069 7,069 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.615 0.617 0.617  0.557 0.562 0.560  0.552 0.554 0.555 
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Table 5 (Continuation) 
PANEL B: Litigation risk subsamples 
 High Litigation Risk  Low Litigation Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Early years -0.074*** -0.140*** -0.136*** -0.140***  -0.063** -0.030 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
CEO Ability  0.054 0.099*** 0.103***   0.116** 0.130** 0.129** 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)   (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
Early Years*CEO Ability  0.164*** 0.155*** 0.155***   -0.066 -0.069 -0.068 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)   (0.089) (0.087) (0.087) 
Final Year    -0.029     -0.009 
    (0.018)     (0.030) 
Final Year*CEO Ability    -0.019     0.008 
    (0.034)     (0.046) 
Big Bath   -0.022 -0.021    -0.020 -0.020 
   (0.014) (0.014)    (0.017) (0.017) 
ROA   -0.428*** -0.442***    -0.237* -0.239* 
   (0.061) (0.061)    (0.126) (0.128) 
CEO Age    0.000 0.001    0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002)    (0.003) (0.003) 
dummy CEO Age   -0.009 -0.001    -0.235 -0.231 
   (0.070) (0.069)    (0.238) (0.237) 
Leverage    -0.093 -0.095    -0.027 -0.027 
   (0.056) (0.056)    (0.098) (0.097) 
          
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,966 7,966 7,803 7,803  3,203 3,203 3,138 3,138 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.538 0.542 0.546 0.547  0.596 0.598 0.600 0.599 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A provides evidence splitting them sample 
into firms that show no evidence of big bath accounting, and those that do, we follow Elliot and Shaw (1988) and Haggard et al. (2015) and classify a low (high) bath as 
any fiscal year-end observation in Compustat for which Special Items (SPI) is negative and between one and five (over five) percent of lagged firm total assets. Panel B 
shows evidence by high and low litigation risk, we classify firms into high and low risk following the definitions of Table 2 Panel A in Kim and Skinner (2012). Models 
are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated using double clustering by firm and year following Petersen (2009). All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Difference-in-differences analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Optimism Optimism Optimism Optimism 
     
T*P -0.123*** -0.119*** -0.156*** -0.155*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.044) 
CEO Ability  0.128*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 
  (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
T*CEO Ability   -0.110* -0.113** 
   (0.052) (0.053) 
T*P*CEO Ability   0.0756 0.082 
   (0.060) (0.060) 
Early Years    -0.049*** 
    (0.016) 
Final Year    -0.026** 
    (0.011) 
Big Bath -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
ROA -0.351*** -0.466*** -0.468*** -0.476*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
CEO Age 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
dummy CEO Age -0.066 -0.071 -0.071 -0.080 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.050) (0.048) 
Leverage  -0.079 -0.074 -0.072 -0.075 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
CEO-firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations  10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.592 0.594 0.595 0.596 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated using firm, year and CEO-firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by firm 
and year following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. Column (2) shows the DiD analysis. Columns (2) and (3) show the DiD analysis incorporating Early Years and 
CEO Tenure as additional proxy for possibly additional CEO career concerns. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 CEO Talent as instrument for CEO Ability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CEO Ability CEO Ability 
(First Stage1) 
Optimism 
(Second Stage1) 
CEO Ability 
(First Stage2) 
Optimism 
(Second Stage2) 
      
CEO Talent 0.255*** 0.271*** 1.085** 0.280*** 1.050** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.453) (0.040) (0.449) 
Early Years*CEO Talent  -0.083 1.063*** -0.088 1.074*** 
  (0.056) (0.355) (0.058) (0.350) 
Final Year*CEO Talent    -0.0537* 0.2943 
    (0.030) (0.321) 
Early Years  -0.001 -0.068*** -0.001 -0.069*** 
  (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) 
Final Year  0.002 -0.039*** 0.003 -0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) 
Big Bath 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.027** 0.007*** -0.027** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) 
ROA 0.364***   0.364*** -0.809*** 0.364*** -0.817*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.177) (0.029) (0.177) 
CEO Age -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
dummy CEO Age -0.012 -0.012 0.038 -0.011 0.044 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.084) (0.015) (0.086) 
Leverage -0.038* -0.038* -0.041 -0.038* -0.044 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.064) (0.022) (0.065) 
      
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.654 0.654 0.535 0.654 0.534 
Wald Rank F-statistic   22.24  15.14 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic   100.9  66.63 
Stock-Yogo critical value   7.03  N/A 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by firm and year 
following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
  
Chapter 1. Optimistic disclosure tone and CEO career concerns 
 
58 
Table 8 Optimistic disclosure tone, future firm performance and future investment opportunities 
PANEL A: Optimism disclosure, CEO Ability, career concerns and future performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Earningst+1 Earningst+2 Earningst+3 Cashflowt+1 Cashflowt+2 Cashflowt+3 
       
Optimism 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CEO Ability 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.009* 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.014** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Early Years -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004* -0.005* -0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Final Year -0.009*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
       
Controls, Industry and Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 9,823 8,637 7,556 9,800 8,598 7,518 
Adj. R-sq. 0.405 0.228 0.161 0.333 0.243 0.186 
PANEL B: Optimism disclosure and future performance with interactions 
 Earningst+1 Earningst+2 Earningst+3 Cashflowt+1 Cashflowt+2 Cashflowt+3 
       
Optimism -0.001 -0.004 -0.008* 0.003 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
CEO Ability 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.009* 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.012** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Early Years 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Final Year -0.007 0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Optimism*CEO Ability 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Optimism*Early Years 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.010* 0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Optimism*Final Year -0.008 0.002 0.011 -0.001 0.008 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO Ability*Early Years -0.028 -0.038* -0.039* -0.041* -0.035 -0.031 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) 
CEO Ability*Final Year -0.004 -0.028 0.085** -0.007 -0.014 0.004 
 (0.031) (0.050) (0.042) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) 
Optimism*Early Years*CEO Ability 0.026 0.041* 0.040* 0.041* 0.042 0.033 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) 
Optimism*Final Year*CEO Ability 0.000 0.001 -0.095** 0.013 0.022 0.013 
(0.030) (0.048) (0.042) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) 
       
Controls, Industry and Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 9,823 8,637 7,556 9,800 8,598 7,518 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.405 0.229 0.162 0.334 0.243 0.187 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated using industry and year fixed effects. The controls included are Big Bath, CEO Age, dummy CEO 
Age, Leverage and Earnings. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated using clustering by firm. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10 % levels, respectively.  
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Table 9 Probability of forced turnover 
 ForcedTurnRet  ForcedTurnROA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Optimism -0.019*** -0.013**  -0.026*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Early Years  -0.007   0.012* 
  (0.006)   (0.006) 
Early Years*Optimism  -0.025*   -0.012 
  (0.013)   (0.013) 
CEO Ability -0.020** -0.020**  -0.066*** -0.064*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Big Bath  0.020*** 0.020***  0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) 
ROA -0.372*** -0.375***    
 (0.048) (0.048)    
CEO Age 0.001** 0.001**  0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
dummy CEO Age 0.0365*** 0.0366***  0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage  -0.021** -0.022**  0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011) 
      
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 11,058 11,058  11,058 11,058 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.069 0.069  0.052 0.052 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated including industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated clustering 
by firm and year following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. Forced turnover in columns 1 and 2 is calculated using Returns and in columns 3 and 4 using ROA. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Optimistic Disclosure Tone and Future Debt Financing, Capital Investment and 
Dividend Payments 
 
 PANEL A. Debt Financing  PANEL B. Investment  PANEL C. Dividends 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Debt 
Increase 
Debt Increase 
t+1,t+2,t+3 
 CAPEX 
Increase 
CAPEX Increase 
t+1,t+2,t+3 
 Dividends 
Increase 
Dividends 
Increase 
t+1,t+2,t+3 
         
Optimism 0.056*** 0.059**  0.037*** 0.073***  0.446*** 0.390*** 
 (0.017) (0.022)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.112) (0.135) 
CEO Ability 0.124*** 0.149***  0.149*** 0.172***  0.759*** 0.660*** 
 (0.020) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.026)  (0.172) (0.225) 
Early Years -0.008 -0.028  -0.037*** -0.083***  -0.283*** -0.451*** 
 (0.008) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.014)  (0.091) (0.103) 
Final Year -0.019 -0.034  -0.040** -0.041***  -0.074 -0.260*** 
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.016) (0.011)  (0.078) (0.084) 
Big Bath -0.006 -0.031*  -0.039*** -0.041***  -0.091 -0.127 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.075) (0.086) 
Earnings -0.079 -0.280  0.524*** 0.657***  8.238*** 6.966*** 
 (0.082) (0.167)  (0.070) (0.084)  (1.153) (1.256) 
CEO Age -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.003***  0.005 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Leverage  0.297*** 0.472***  -0.004 -0.009  -0.527 -0.918** 
 (0.093) (0.120)  (0.034) (0.050)  (0.354) (0.464) 
dummy CEO 
Age 
-0.027 -0.042*  0.006 0.009  -0.285** -0.331** 
 (0.016) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.121) (0.141) 
         
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 6,431 5,043  10,941 10,892  5,818 5,458 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.050 0.091  0.085 0.133  0.115 0.112 
 
The sample comprises 11,169 firm-year observations for the period 1993-2013. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Models are estimated using industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by firm and year 
following Petersen (2009). All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
CEO Labor Market Incentives and Accounting Quality: The Unintended 
Consequences of Trade Secret Regulations 
2.1. Introduction 
We examine how CEO labor market incentives influence financial reporting quality. In 
particular, we study the real and accounting consequences of a decrease in the pool of 
replacement CEOs. For this purpose, we develop a firm-specific, time-varying measure of CEO 
labor market incentives by integrating the staggered enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA, henceforth) with the pool of existing talent in each industry. Using this proxy, we study 
whether decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs impact on incumbent CEO entrenchment 
levels and its effect on financial reporting quality. 
UTSA aims to protect firms’ competitive advantage, by means of protecting their 
proprietary information, i.e. trade secrets, from rivals (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). UTSA lowers uncertainty on the legal protection afforded to trade secrets, 
limiting information misappropriation (Samuels and Johnson, 1990). Trade secrets -commonly 
referred to as the jewel crown- (Jorda et al., 2007; Castellaneta et al., 2017), are an important 
source of firm risk and, if disclosed, can lead to significant impairments in competitive 
advantage and economic losses (Klasa et al., 2018), which have been estimated to be as high as 
$50 billion annually (PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2002). Given their economic relevance, it is not 
surprising that trade secrets litigation is on the rise both in state and federal courts (Almeling et 
al., 2010, 2011).
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Although UTSA only pursues firms’ competitive advantage protection, we argue that it 
impacts an important labor market institution: the pool of replacement CEOs. This is 
because after the enactment of UTSA firms can more easily litigate against top management 
team members that disclose firm trade secrets, as well as against any firm that hires 
these departing executives. Thus, greater trade secrets protection reduces the mobility of 
incumbent CEOs and of other top executives (supply side), as well as lowers the probability that 
they receive offers from other firms (demand side). Overall, this means that by increasing 
litigation risk for managers in possession of trade secrets and proprietary information, UTSA 
may reduce both the availability and attractiveness of labor-market opportunities (Castellaneta et 
al., 2017).   
We expect that the effects of UTSA will be particularly pervasive on industry-level labor 
markets, creating frictions at the industry level. Greater trade secrets protection increases the 
proprietary cost of disclosure (Li et al., 2018), limits the information flows from other firms, and 
increases information asymmetry (Glaeser, 2018). Top executives, such as CEOs, are likely to 
have industry-relevant knowledge as well as privileged access to proprietary information 
(Andrews, 1987). Therefore, within-industry top executives form up the pool of talent from 
which replacement CEOs are drawn when boards of directors seek to appoint a new CEO. These 
managers also experience the greatest increase in litigation risk when UTSA is enacted, which 
becomes particularly problematic given the rise in externally appointed CEOs noted in (Murphy 
and Zábojník, 2007), who argue that the increasing importance of external relationships with 
different stakeholders means boards put more weight on external rather than internal skills. 
Driven by UTSA, we predict that decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs have 
unintended consequences on managerial labor market characteristics and key firm outcomes. In 
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particular, it is likely that the talent drain increases incumbent CEO tenure and compensation, as 
firms have fewer options to replace them. As noted, greater trade secret protection reduces 
information flows and increases within-industry information asymmetry (Li et al., 2018, Glaeser, 
2018). When labor market shifts increase CEO entrenchment, and managers who are not 
fulfilling their duties face a lower quality information environment, we expect to observe 
decreases in financial reporting quality, leading to poor subsequent decision-making and 
performance. As an alternative explanation, firms may not have incentives to hire executives 
with trade secrets information (demand side). This is because, under UTSA, firms can take to 
court both the executives with the trade secrets information as well as the firm hiring them.31 In 
this situation, we would not expect to find an increase in the incumbent CEO level of 
entrenchment generated by a decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs. 
By focusing on the labor market consequences of UTSA, this is among the first studies to 
evaluate the impact of labor market institutions on financial reporting quality, ceteris paribus 
other mechanisms of corporate governance. While we examine a number of different financial 
reporting quality metrics, prior work on entrenchment usually focuses on earnings management, 
with mixed theoretical views. On the one hand, the quiet life perspective (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003) would predict lower earnings management, if managers are no longer 
concerned with beating earnings targets. On the other hand, the opportunistic or expropiation 
perspective would predict that entrenched managers who operate in poor quality information 
environments may engage in earnings management, for example, to increase the profits from 
their insider-trading activities (Beneish and Vargus, 2002). 
                                                 
31 For instance, in the court case Diomed, Inc., Diomed Holdings, Inc., and Diomed Limited v. Vascular Solutions, 
Inc. and Nancy Arnold (2006), the defendants are both a company and an executive. 
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To test our predictions and shed light on these contrasting views, we create a firm-specific, 
time-varying measure of the annual decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs by integrating the 
staggered enactment of UTSA with the existing within-industry pool of potential new CEOs 
(Pool Decrease). In particular, our proxy captures, for each firm, the annual percentage of the 
within-industry pool of talent that is impaired, i.e. of firms belonging to the same industry that 
are incorporated in states with UTSA.32 This percentage is then multiplied by the quartile of one 
over the total pool of top management team members available in the industry. This measure 
follows the quasi-experimental shift share research designs used in previous literature (Borusyak 
et al., 2018). The intuition underlying Pool Decrease is that a firm experiences a stronger 
decrease in its potential pool of replacement CEOs as more firms in the same industry are 
incorporated in states where UTSA is enacted, particularly, when the number of individuals 
forming the available pool of talent is small. The use of the quasi-natural experiment provided by 
the staggered adoption of UTSA in 48 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, reduces 
endogeneity concerns as (1) firms cannot control the state of incorporation of other firms in their 
industry; (2) UTSA was enacted by policy-makers without considering the specific economic 
and political situation in each state (Png, 2017); and (3) the focus of the study is on the 
unintended consequences of UTSA over managerial labor markets. 
We implement a difference-in-difference research design and use a large sample of U.S. 
firms from the period 1980 to 2016. We report two key findings. First, validating that Pool 
Decrease reflects managerial labor market frictions, the results indicate that incumbent CEOs 
                                                 
32 We use the state of incorporation considering the Internal-Affairs Doctrine which states that firms' issues such as 
voting rights of shareholders, distributions of dividends or corporate property (which includes intellectual property 
and trade secrets) are determined in accordance with the law of the state in which the company is incorporated. 
More information can be found at: https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/internal-affairs-doctrine 
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have longer tenure, lower forced turnover, lower sensitivity of turnover to firm performance, and 
benefit from higher compensation as a consequence of the exogenous decrease in the pool of 
replacement CEOs. This is as expected, given that when firms have lower options to replace their 
incumbent CEOs, the demand for new CEOs rises above the supply, leading to an increase in 
prices (McConnell et al., 2017). It is also in line with (Donatiello et al., 2018) who argue that 
managerial compensation has increased in recent years because of the limited number of 
managers who are qualified (and available) to run large public companies. Second, decreases in 
the pool of replacement CEOs lead to lower financial reporting quality and worse narratives. 
This is shown to be particularly true in settings characterized by having a higher ex-ante 
likelihood of being in possession of trade secrets, such as in technological firms and in firms 
with higher competition. 
In additional analyses, we also find that decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs generate 
lower firm efficiency and impair CEO-firm match. To proxy for firm efficiency, we use the 
proxy developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). To measure CEO-firm match, we regress firm 
efficiency on firm and CEO characteristics and an UTSA enactment indicator. Our measure of 
CEO-firm match are the CEO fixed effects coefficients from this regression. We also find that 
the subsample of low talented outsider CEOs from companies without the UTSA benefit greatly 
from the shock. Other additional analyses show that the talent drain leads to a deterioration in 
future firm performance and to over-investment, in line with the opportunistic view of 
entrenchment. These results are consistent with Ma and Pan (2017) who show that unobservable 
inadequacy in CEO-firm match affects firm performance and corporate policies. 
We perform four robustness checks. First, we create an alternative measure of Pool Decrease 
that accounts for the ability of the individual executives affected by the passage of UTSA. This 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
66 
refined measure explicitly considers the talent drain. The results obtained using this proxy 
confirm that impairments in the pool of talent negatively impact financial reporting quality. 
Second, we run the model including leads and lags of UTSA adoption by firms in the same 
industry and find that our main results are not anticipated by firms.  This is as expected, as it is 
unlikely that managers engaging in trade secrets misappropriation stop because they are 
concerned that UTSA will be enacted. Indeed, a misappropriation occurred before UTSA 
enactment, cannot be prosecuted under UTSA.33 Third, we run placebo tests where UTSA 
enactment is randomly assigned and find that the t-statistics from the simulated financial 
reporting quality regressions are normally distributed. Finally, we control for additional trade 
secrets protection regulations (Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Non-competition Agreements) 
and the main results remain unchanged. 
Our study contributes to previous research in several aspects. We create a novel firm-
specific, time-varying measure of changes in the pool of replacement CEOs by integrating the 
staggered enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act with the pre-existing pool of talent. This 
allows us to provide evidence on how institutional changes in managerial labor markets affect 
financial reporting quality and the information environment.  To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study showing that an increase in trade secrets protection impacts CEO labor markets 
and financial reporting quality. Previous accounting literature commonly assumes that 
managerial labor markets are competitive and efficient, i.e., frictionless, (e.g., Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008). The economic literature is interested in studying the behavior of the labor 
                                                 
33 In particular, the Michigan UTSA establishes the following: This act takes effect October 1, 1998 and does not 
apply to misappropriation occurring before the effective date. With respect to a continuing misappropriation that 
began before the effective date, this act does not apply to the continuing misappropriation that occurs after the 
effective date (448 MI. Trade \& Commerce §1901-1910).} 
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markets (both employment and unemployment) developing mostly analytical models to 
understand them and their frictions and potential consequences (Rogerson et al., 2005).  
However, these papers normally concentrate on labor market in general, this is, including any 
type of employee (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), but we empirically analyze a friction in 
the managerial labor market and its consequences in terms of the incumbent CEO level of 
entrenchment and financial reporting quality. 
In addition, our study contributes to the growing line of research studying the unexpected 
consequences of regulation, and add to a number of prior studies, such as, for example, Leuz et 
al. (2008), Autor et al. (2007) or Palia (2000).34 Therefore, our findings are relevant for both 
firms and policy-makers, as we provide evidence on the unintended consequences over 
managerial labor markets and financial reporting quality of a set of laws introduced to boost 
innovation (Png, 2017) and protect firms’ competitive advantage. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the hypotheses, 
sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the methods, data and main results. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 present 
additional analyses and robustness checks and, finally, section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2. Prior Research and Hypotheses Development on Managerial Labor Markets, Trade 
Secrets and Financial Reporting Quality 
2.2.1. Labor Market Institutions: The Pool of Replacement CEOs 
                                                 
34 Leuz et al. (2008) demonstrate the unintended consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on SEC 
deregistrations by providing evidence that after SOX a significant number of firms go dark. Autor et al. (2007) 
shows that mandated employment protection (measured through the wrongful-discharge US laws) reduce firms' 
productivity as it distorts production choices. Palia (2000) shows that more regulated industries attract worse (i.e., 
CEOs with lower education levels) CEOs as they can extract less benefits from their human capital skills. 
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A fundamental institution in managerial labor markets is the pool of replacement CEOs (e.g., 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2017). This pool consists of all existing CEOs, internal and external top 
management team members, employees and other experts with the required skills, social 
networks, institutional knowledge and availability to be appointed by the board of directors as 
the next CEO. The pool of available talent influences, for example, the probability that 
incumbent executives receive competing job offers from other firms, which, in turn, influences 
CEO compensation (Gao et al., 2015). 
Both hiring and firing a CEO are important tasks of boards of directors (Gao et al., 2017). 
Management and industry expertise are critical for successful executives (Donatiello et al., 
2018), but the matching process necessary to successfully appoint a new executive is a risky 
endeavour, as it requires identifying the appropriate candidate from the talent pool. Choosing the 
wrong CEO may have significant consequences over firm investment, financial, and organization 
practices (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), and lead to significant replacement costs. Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that forced CEO turnovers may lower shareholder value by 
approximately 112 billion dollars.35 
When boards of directors consider hiring a new top executive (in particular, a new CEO), 
they face a number of dilemmas, but as noted in Jongjaroenkamol and Laux (2017) a particularly 
relevant one is: should they appoint an insider or an outsider? Even though internally appointed 
managers possess a deep knowledge of the firm and its products, supply chain, or corporate 
culture, increasingly, firms appoint external CEOs (see Figure 1) (Zajac, 1990; Parrino, 1997; 
                                                 
35 The study by PwC's Strategy& on CEO succession planning “The cost of failed CEO succession planning” can be 
found at https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/cost-failed-ceo-succession-planning 
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Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; Graham et al., 2018).36 These outsiders have differential knowledge, 
skills and networks that are particularly valuable in firms that require a fresh view or structural 
changes. For example, Helmich (1974) and Helmich and Brown (1972) show that firms’ rates of 
growth and organizational change after choosing a new CEO are larger when she is an outsider. 
The increasing importance of externally appointed CEOs links with the shareholder-rights 
movement beginning in the late 80’s which has forced CEOs to consider stakeholders’ needs. 
Stakeholder-relation and communicating skills are general and not firm-specific, lowering 
insiders’ value. Murphy and Zábojník (2007) show that in environments where the supply of 
CEOs is relatively elastic, an increase in the importance of external managerial ability makes 
boards value external CEOs more which reflects on a positive impact on their compensation. A 
further element explaining the increasing appointment of external CEOs is the shift towards 
more independent boards of directors, as firms with a high percentage of outsider directors in the 
board are more likely to hire external CEOs (Borokhovich et al., 1996). 
In response to this shift towards external appointments, top managers have become more 
mobile across sectors,37 their business skills are more diverse and the percentage of CEOs who 
possess an MBA has raised (Schoar, 2007; Murphy and Zábojník, 2004). 
But, how are these external CEOs hired? Prior literature sometimes assumes the existence of 
a competitive and flexible managerial labor market (i.e., frictionless). For instance, Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) develop an analytical and frictionless model in which the best CEOs run the 
largest companies. In their model, CEOs have different skills and are matched to firms in a 
                                                 
36 This is consistent with findings in Friedrich (2016) who uses a European sample and shows that, in most 
industries, boards appoint more external CEOs. 
37 External CEOs usually demand additional compensation to offset the mid-career changing firm risk (Cadman et 
al., 2016). 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
70 
frictionless assignment model, leading to perfect CEO-firm matches. Jenter et al. (2016) define 
such matches in frictionless managerial labor markets: If there were another CEO candidate who 
would improve firm value net of the compensation required to hire him, he would have already 
been hired (page 7). However, in practice, there are frictions that disrupt the CEO-firm match 
and lower shareholder value. In a seminal paper, Johnson et al. (1985) analyze fifty-three 
announcements of unexpected executive deaths and show evidence of negative stock price 
reactions that depend on executive characteristics such as age, tenure and replacement costs. 
These replacement costs, in turn, are associated with executives’ talent and decision-making 
responsibilities. Johnson et al. (1985) interpret these negative reactions as evidence against the 
existence of a frictionless labor market, as otherwise, shareholder wealth would be independent 
of managerial continuation or termination because there would be perfect substitutes in the 
managerial labor maket.38 Terviö (2008) argues that in a frictionless managerial labor market 
environment, some systemic failures and agency problems are ignored. These elements are, for 
example, the skimming compensation view of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) or managerial 
empire-building theories (Jensen, 1986).39 
Against this backdrop, we analyze frictions in the managerial labor market generated by trade 
secrets regulation enactment. In particular, we focus on a plausible exogenous decrease in the 
pool of replacement CEOs driven by UTSA staggered enactment. These frictions are relevant as 
firms’ talent pools (including both internal and external candidates) are likely to be, overall, 
small. For example, in a survey to board members of Fortune 250 firms, Donatiello et al., (2018) 
find that 73% of surveyed directors agree that fewer than 5 people (including insiders and 
                                                 
38 See also, for additional evidence on unexpected CEOs deaths Worrell et al. (1986) or Salas (2010).  
39 The skimming compensation view argues that the increase in managerial compensation in recent years is explained 
by the increase in managerial entrenchment as well as by a loosening of social norms against excessive pay. 
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outsiders) qualify to be a good CEO of their company. In this scenario, any reductions in the 
pool of replacement CEOs would be dramatic for the firm. 
2.2.2. The Universal Trade Secret Act 
Trade secrets were in origin governed by common law (Castellaneta et al., 2017). The seminal 
court case Peabody v. Norfolk in the state of Massachusetts dates from 1868.40 In 1979, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act,41 creating a legal framework that protects trade secrets and punishes their 
misappropriation (Samuels and Johnson, 1990).42 Trade secrets protection is part of the 
corporation property which, according to the Internal-Affairs Doctrine, must be determined in 
accordance with the law of the state of incorporation. Since it was first published, UTSA was 
enacted in 38 states and the District of Columbia between 1981 and 1990, and in another 10 
states between 1991 and 2013.43 
UTSA has three main objectives: (1) create common definitions of trade secrets and trade 
secrets misappropriation; (2) create a uniform legal framework for every state; and (3) provide a 
uniform statute of impediments for non-contractual theories of liability based on the 
misappropriation of trade secrets (Lydon, 1987). 
                                                 
40 Later, in 1939, the Restatement (First) of Torts (Section 757, Comment b) defines a trade secret as follows: “A 
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It 
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern 
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers”. 
41 In August 1985 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws introduced amendments to 
remove technical deficiencies but maintaining the original philosophy of the Act (Lydon, 1987). 
42 Some important trade secrets court cases would be Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) or 
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 99 S.Ct. 1096, 201 U.S. 1 (1979). 
43 Appendix 6 presents the US map of the states' adoption of UTSA and Appendix 7 shows the states that have 
incorporated the UTSA, the year and the statute that contains the law. By 2018, only New York has not enacted the 
UTSA as Massachusetts enacted it during year 2018: https://www.bna.com/massachusetts-adopts-uniform-
n73014481815/ 
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For a piece of information to be the subject of trade secret protection, UTSA establishes that 
the information must be secret, create economic value thanks to its secrecy status, it is not easily 
ascertainable by others, and also, that firms make reasonable efforts to protect its secrecy. 
Reflecting trade secrets relevance for firms, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that every 
year firms loose around $50 billion given proprietary information and intellectual property 
misappropriation (PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2002).44 
Trade secrets misappropriation can occur without secrets being used or disclosed (Pooley, 
1997), and thus, even though UTSA does not forbid or impose direct restrictions on managerial 
mobility, it clearly affects the probability that executives accept positions at rival companies, as 
it significantly increases managerial litigation risk.  This is because trade secrets are key to retain 
the firm competitive advantage (Jorda et al., 2007; Castellaneta et al., 2017), and so their 
detection and protection is part of boards’ fiduciary duties, as their disclosure may generate 
important economic losses (Klasa et al., 2018). In fact, in the case of CEO’s fraudulent use of 
firm’s trade secrets, even if the board fails to take action, shareholders can directly initiate a 
derivative action to legally claim what the company’s board failed to defend.45  
2.2.3. Managerial Labor Market Incentives and Financial Reporting Quality  
While the objective of UTSA is to implement a framework to fight against misappropriation of 
trade secrets, thereby protecting firms’ competitive advantage, we argue that it may affect other 
firm-level dimensions. For instance, Castellaneta et al., (2017) show that UTSA has a positive 
effect on market value in industries where skilled workers have higher mobility, and a negative 
                                                 
44 Their survey also highlights that the most common types of trade secrets are related to firm’s customers, strategic 
plans and financial information. 
45 Examples about these cases can be found at: http://www.jerryburleson.com/minority-shareholder-
rights/shareholder-derivative-actions/  
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effect in industries with higher uncertainty and poor investment. We expect that a further 
consequence of UTSA is that it shrinks the managerial talent pool. 
This contraction in the pool can be explained by three reasons. First, top management team 
members are likely to have the greatest information on firm trade secrets, being the better 
informed agents. They are, thus, also the most likely targets of litigation associated with trade 
secret protection.46 This increase in litigation risk for managers is predicted to reduce their 
mobility (i.e., reduce the supply of managerial talent). Consistent with this view of litigation risk 
increase, Almeling et al. (2010, 2011) document that litigation due to trade secrets protection has 
become more pervasive both state and federal courts, signaling that UTSA is actively enforced. 
Second, UTSA permits suing not only the employees but also the firms that misappropriate 
the trade secret, i.e., it impacts the demand side. While a risk-taking executive with highly 
valuable institutional knowledge may still be willing to accept an offer from a rival firm, 
competing firms would be less likely to hire managers of firms in states that have enacted UTSA, 
vis-a-vis those that have not. This lowers the relative attractiveness of these managers in labor 
markets and the value of their outside option. Thus, a plausible consequence is that when firms 
affected by UTSA want to hire new executives, they may have to offer higher wages to (on 
average) lower quality executives. 
Finally, the labor market will be negatively impacted because trade secret protection 
decreases the incoming information from other companies. Glaeser (2018) and Li et al (2018) 
                                                 
46 Other employees, not currently in the top management team of any firm, are unlikely to be considered by boards 
when looking to appoint a new CEO. The labor market for these middle managers and entry level employees could 
also be affected by UTSA, but these employees may have non-disclosure agreements in their contracts regardless of 
UTSA. This is less likely for top management team members and CEOs, who increasingly have implicit rather than 
explicit contracts (Gillan et al., 2009).   
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show that trade secret protection leads to lower disclosure of firm proprietary information and 
higher information asymmetry. In particular, Li et al. (2018) state that information gathering is 
harder to achieve when there are limitations to employees’ labor market mobility. This is also 
consistent with the evidence in Gao et al. (2015), who show that managerial job hopping 
transfers information on outside option values of the remaining managerial team members. 
Therefore, an unintended consequence of UTSA is that it likely affects managerial labor 
markets by reducing both (1) firm’s options to change their incumbent CEO by an external one, 
and (2) executives availability and mobility. Indeed, by improving the legal framework to deal 
with trade secrets misappropriation, the enactment of UTSA progressively affects firms in the 
industry, reducing the availability and attractiveness of new labor opportunities for all executives 
in the industry. This decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs particularly affects the supply of 
managerial talent, draining the talent pool, with consequences for a number of firm-level 
outcomes. 
First, the shortage of replacement CEOs is likely to increase managerial entrenchment as it 
becomes harder to find suitable executives to replace incumbent ones. There is evidence that 
confirms this view, showing that some executives are irreplaceable or very difficult to replace 
(Donatiello et al., 2018). Acharya et al. (2016) develop an analytical model in which managerial 
entrenchment increases because of an increase in competition for talent in the job market. This is 
the setting investigated in the current work, where the supply of CEOs is lower than the demand, 
generating greater competition for talent among firms. This is expected to have a number of 
consequences for labor market characteristics, such as prolonging CEO tenure, and lowering the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor performance. In addition, because the demand for executive 
talent is higher than the supply, prices (i.e. wages) are likely to increase. The labor demand is 
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negatively sloped because a rise in wage rate reflects on firms’ costs which also influences their 
selling prices. While the labor supply (i.e., amount of potential new CEOs) is positively sloped. 
Thus, the first hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H1: Decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs lead to increases in managerial 
entrenchment. 
 A question of interest is how this talent pool drain impacts financial reporting quality, 
understood as the precision with which financial reporting reflects the real information about 
firm operations (Biddle et al., 2009).47 
 Under H1, we expect higher CEO entrenchment. This means that market discipline over 
managers likely decreases. Prior literature provides arguments and evidence of both positive and 
negative effects of CEO entrenchment on financial reporting quality. This prior work usually 
equates settings in which executives have greater power (are more entrenched) with situations 
where boards of directors are weak, i.e. poor monitors of managerial decision making. Against 
that background, more powerful executives may be associated with higher financial reporting 
quality, in terms of lower earnings management activities, for at least two reasons. First, they 
may prefer to enjoy the quiet life (Hicks, 1935; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). This would 
lead to lower opportunism if entrenched managers prefer to avoid difficult decisions and costly 
efforts. In addition, if entrenched CEOs avoid intense monitoring and scrutiny from boards, they 
may become more long-term oriented, avoiding myopic decision-making and growing less 
                                                 
47 This definition is consistent with the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 of 1978 which 
establishes that financial reporting is to inform every investor (both present and potential) to make rational 
investment decisions after determining expected firms' cash flows. 
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concerned with short-term earnings goals.48 This view is consistent with Di Meo et al. (2017) 
who show that entrenched managers engage less in earnings management to meet short-term 
financial reporting goals. They argue that these executives have a long-term view and are less 
likely to take decisions that can negatively affect firm future value. 
 The alternative view to the quiet life arguments is the opportunistic or expropriation 
view. Entrenched CEOs are likely to attempt to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), for example, by staying in the job even if 
they do not have the required skills. This is likely in this setting, as decreases in the pool of talent 
are likely to lower CEO-firm match, increasing the likelihood of appointing CEOs that do not 
have the required skills. This expropriation view would predict that entrenched managers are 
willing to engage in costly earnings management to, for example, obtain outside funding to 
invest in pet projects or to grow the firm beyond its optimal size. A second important 
consideration is that the labor market friction originates from the enactment of trade secret 
protection regulation. The direct effect of this type of regulation is, as documented in Glaeser 
(2018) and Li et al. (2018), an increase in information asymmetry and a reduction in the 
information flows from other companies in the industry. It is then likely that CEOs may attempt 
to benefit from their increased power and the higher information asymmetry to extract rents and 
engage in sub-optimal decision-making. Then, low financial reporting quality via earnings 
management or low quality narratives becomes a useful instrument, for example, to obtain 
greater profitability from their insider-trading activities (Beneish and Vargus, 2002). 
                                                 
48 Although not directly testing this hypothesis, the work of Faleye et al. (2011) is consistent with the view that 
intense board monitoring may put pressure on managers to concentrate in short-term goals instead of in long-term 
ones. 
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 Therefore, the extent to which decreases in the talent pool have financial reporting quality 
consequences is an empirical question of interest. We test the following hypothesis:   
H2: Decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs lead to decreases in financial 
reporting quality. 
As noted above, prior literature usually equates managerial entrenchment with weak 
governance (Zhao and Chen, 2008), where managerial power vis-a-vis board power is 
endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2017). A novel element in our setting is that we focus on 
an exogenous change in labor markets that increases CEO power, ceteris paribus board 
characteristics. This provides a unique setting to re-examine whether increases in entrenchment 
impact on financial reporting quality. 
2.3. Empirical Constructs on CEO Labor Market Incentives 
We study the effect of a decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs on executives’ labor market 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. In particular, we analyze how the enactment of 
UTSA in the state of incorporation of firms in the same industry affects incumbent CEOs level of 
entrenchment and firms’ financial reporting quality.  
To test our predictions, we run the following model: 
Dependent Variableijt = αi + αt + 𝛽Pool Decreaseijt + ϵijt 
(1) 
where i indexes firms,  j industry, and t years. αi corresponds to firm fixed effects and αt is 
year fixed effects. The main variable of interest in model (1) is Pool Decrease. To construct Pool 
Decrease, we first measure the percentage of firms in the same industry that are incorporated in 
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states with the UTSA (Percentage of firms).49 Second, we multiply this percentage by the 
quartile of one divided by the total number of top management team members in all the firms in 
the industry (quartile of one divided by Talent Pool where Talent Pool is Total Firms multiplied 
by Total Executives)50. Pool Decrease is constructed following the quasi-experimental shift share 
research designs (Borusyak et al., 2018). Percentage of firms represents the observed shock and 
the quartile of one divided by Total Executives is the shock exposure weight.51 To construct 
Total Executives, we use ExecuComp database as it contains all the firms’ executives in the top 
management team.52 I use the inverse of the total number of top management team members in 
firms from the same industry to consider that the shock is likely higher for lower pools. That is, 
when 50% of top management team members belonging to a given industry are less willing to 
move to a firm seeking to appoint a new CEO, the effect is likely higher in pools that were 
originally composed of 30 people than in pools of 300 people.53 
To test H1, as Dependent Variable we use CEO Tenure, Forced Turnover, CEO Pay Slice, 
Salary, Bonus and Total Compensation. All variables definitions can be found in Appendix 5. To 
test H2, we use seven proxies for financial reporting quality (FRQ 1, FRQ 2, AQWi, AQ, Fog, 
Bog and Tone). The four first are accruals quality measures and the last three are narrative 
disclosure measures. In particular, FRQ 1 and FRQ 2 are the residuals from the Dechow et al. 
                                                 
49 We use SIC2 for industry classification. If we use the Fama and French 12 or 48 industry classification to 
construct the variable Pool Decrease, the main results do not change. 
50 If we use the tercile or decile of one over Talent Pool, most of the main results remain unchanged.  
51 More examples of papers using shift share research designs are Hornbeck and Moretti (2018) or Diamond (2016).  
52 To maximize sample size, missing data are replaced with the average number of top management team members 
(i.e., 6 executives). 
53 A real numerical example in our sample would be the following: Firm X belongs to the chemical industry (SIC-2 
28) and is incorporated in Delaware. In year 2000, for this industry (and including firm X) there are 55.31% of 
companies incorporated in a state that have enacted UTSA. This company belongs to the first quartile of 1/Talent 
Pool where Talent Pool in year 2000 for Firm X is 2,368 people. Pool Decrease for firm X and year 2000 equals to 
0.5531*1 = 0.5531. 
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(1995) and from the Jones (1991) model, respectively, adding lagged ROA as suggested by 
Kothari et al. (2005).54 FRQ 1 and FRQ 2 are multiplied by minus one to reflect that higher 
values indicate lower financial reporting quality. Total accruals are calculated using balance 
sheet items to retain observations before 1987.55 The third proxy (AQWi) is calculated following 
Biddle et al. (2009), and is the accruals quality measure proposed by Wysocki (2009). It is the 
ratio between the standard deviations of the residuals (from year t-5 to t-1) from the simpler to 
the full model. The simpler model is the regression of working capital accruals on current cash 
flows. The full model is the regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current and future 
cash flows. AQ is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow et al. 
(1995) model from year t-5 to year t-1. It is calculated following Biddle et al. (2009) and 
multiplied by minus one so that higher values indicate lower financial reporting quality. The 
narrative measures are Fog, Bog and Tone. In particular, Fog is the readability measure, Fog 
index, elaborated by Li (2008). Bog is the Bog Index elaborated by Bonsall et al. (2017). This 
measure provides more comprehensive factors than Fog index and is calculated with a pre-
programmed algorithm which avoids researcher discretion when calculating it. Finally, Tone is 
disclosure tone which is positive minus negative words scaled by total words. We use the 2014 
updated version of the Loughran and McDonald (2015) word list.56 More positive tone relates 
                                                 
54 We use the signed values of the residuals because using the absolute value of discretionary accruals can bias the 
results increasing the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management (Hribar and Nichols, 
2007). 
55 Total accruals are calculated following Dechow et al. (1995) as follows: change in total current assets - change in 
cash/cash equivalents - change in current liabilities + change in short-term debt included in current liabilities - 
depreciation and amortization expense and all scaled by lagged total assets. Using Compustat database the cashflow 
from operations data is available only from year 1987 and my period of study starts in 1980. This is important as 
UTSA was enacted for first time in 1981. 
56 We download the 10-K reports from EDGAR and count the number of positive, negative and total words using a 
php algorithm. 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
80 
with lower financial reporting quality. In this line, Huang et al. (2014) who show that managers 
may use optimistic tone to influence investors’ perceptions about firm’s fundamentals.   
Under H1, it is expected that 𝛽 is positive (negative) when the dependent variable is CEO 
Tenure (Forced Turnover). This is consistent with the argument that when firms have a lower 
pool of replacement CEOs, incumbent CEOs become more entrenched. We also expect that 𝛽 is 
positive when the dependent variables are CEO Pay Slice, Salary, Bonus or Total Compensation 
showing increases in CEO compensation when the CEO’s demand is higher than the supply. 
This result would also be consistent with higher incumbent CEO entrenchment. The alternative 
view would be that firms are not willing to hire executives from firms with UTSA given their 
own litigation risk. Under this view, CEOs’ supply would be higher than the demand and 𝛽 
should be negative.  H1 helps us to validate that Pool Decrease represents a friction in the 
managerial labor market. 
Under H2, we expect a negative and significant 𝛽 showing that a decrease in the pool of 
replacement CEOs has a negative effect on firms’ financial reporting quality. In developing H2, 
we also discussed the alternative view, that greater entrenchment may lead to a quiet life 
approach to financial reporting. Under that view, 𝛽 should be positive or not significant. 
X is a vector of firm and CEO controls. In particular, the firm controls are Firm Size, ROA, 
MTB and Leverage, as larger and better performing firms are likely to attract more talented 
CEOs (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008; Pan, 2017). As CEO characteristics we include 
CEO Age and Outsider CEO. Older CEOs may be more entrenched and perform differently. In 
this line, Li et al. (2017) show that CEOs’ investment strategies are linked to their age. In 
addition, outsider CEOs are different from internally chosen ones as they do not possess internal 
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firm information and may behave differently than insider CEOs. In particular, externally 
appointed CEOs may have different tenure and salaries than internal ones (Cadman et al., 2016). 
In the models analyzing financial reporting quality, we also control for Early Years as CEOs 
may behave differently early in their careers to construct a good reputation and be able to stay 
longer in the job, lowering financial reporting quality through higher accrual-based earnings 
management (Ali and Zhang, 2015). Finally, we also include Cycle, REM, Audit Tenure and 
Big8 as controls. Cycle accounts for firms’ accounting flexibility. Firms with longer operating 
cycles have larger accruals and longer periods for accruals to reverse so they have more room to 
manipulate (Zang, 2012). REM is added to account for the findings in Zang (2012) that managers 
adapt the level of accrual manipulation depending on the level of realized real earnings 
management. Audit Tenure proxies for the level of auditor scrutiny. Big8 takes into account that 
firms audited by a large auditor are less likely to manage accruals. These controls are relevant 
when analyzing financial reporting quality as stated in Zang (2012). Finally, in a recent paper, 
Chen et al. (2018b) analyze the common procedure of using as dependent variable the residuals 
from Jones (1991) type models to study earnings management, and argue that a double step of 
calculating the residual and then using it as the dependent variable in a different regression may 
generate biased coefficients and incorrect standard errors. To account for this potential problem 
and obtain unbiased estimators, in untabulated results, we incorporate as controls the variables of 
the first-stage regression estimated to obtain the financial reporting quality measures in the 
second-stage regression and the main results remain unchanged.    
2.4. Results on CEO Labor Market Incentives, CEO entrenchment and Accounting Quality 
2.4.1. Sample and Descriptive Evidence 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
82 
The sample contains firm-year observations from BoardEx database. Financial and accounting 
data comes from Compustat and returns from CSRP. Auditor data comes from Audit Analitics, 
and top management team members and CEO characteristics from ExecuComp.  CEO ability and 
firm efficiency are made available by Demerjian et al. (2012). We drop financial (SIC2 60-69), 
utilities (SIC2 40-49) and public administration (SIC2 99) firms and obtain a final sample of 
45,391 firm-year observations, representing 4,096 firms and 9,439 CEOs for the period 1980 to 
2016. 
Table 1 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean of 
Percentage of firms is 0.42 which means that, on average, 42% of same-industry firms have 
incorporated UTSA. The variable Talent Pool is calculated as Total Firms (total firms in the 
same industry) multiplied by Total Executives (total number of top management team members 
in each company from the same industry). The talent pool has a median value of 827 executives, 
with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5,388.57 Given that the average firm in the sample has 
six executives (the CEO and five top management team members, commonly including the Chief 
Financial Officer [CFO], the Chief Operational Officer [COO], the Chief Technology Officer 
[CTO], the Chief Administrative Officer [CAO], and the Chief Informational Officer [CIO]), this 
means that, for the average firm, there are 138 firms belonging to the same industry from which 
to draw talent, in addition to five insiders that could also potentially substitute the incumbent 
CEO.58 CPS variable is CEO Pay Slice and represents the percentage that CEO payment 
represents over the top five best paid executives. The maximum is 3.12 which means that, for 
                                                 
57 The minimum of 3 executives corresponds to the Retail Trade industry where there are small firms. In particular, 
this observation corresponds to a firm in the lowest quartile of firm size in my sample. The maximum of 5,388 
executives corresponds to the Services industry. In particular, this corresponds to a firm which size is in the third 
quartile of the firm size distribution in our sample. 
58 See Menz (2012) for a review of top management team members studies. 
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that observation, CEO payment is more than three times bigger than the sum of the payments of 
the five best paid executives in the firm. 
Table 1 Panel B shows that, when the percentage of firms from the same industry 
incorporated in UTSA states is higher than 50%, 75% or 90%, the number of CEOs appointed 
from the same industry is lower. This is consistent with litigation risk discouraging top managers 
to join companies in industries incorporated in UTSA states. This also links with UTSA lowering 
the mobility of executives. Untabulated results show that the CEO Ability mean when the 
percentage of firms is the same industry with UTSA is higher than 50%, 75% or 90% equals to 
0.012, -0.063 and -0.089 respectively. When the percentage same-industry firms with UTSA is 
lower than 50%, 75% or 90% the CEO Ability mean equals to 0.000, 0.005 and 0.004, 
respectively. All the mean differences are statistically significant. We find that, on average, CEO 
ability decreases when the percentage of same-industry firms with UTSA is higher than 75%. In 
this line, we also find that the CEO ability mean (median) for firms incorporated in states that 
have enacted the UTSA is 0.006 (-0.018) and for firms without UTSA it equals to 0.014 (-0.003) 
being this difference statistically significant. Thus, the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs 
reduces the likelihood that firms find a good match when looking for a CEO replacement.  
Panel C shows that, overall, and consistent with Figure 1, firms increasingly hire outsider 
CEOs even after the passage of UTSA, although this effect disappears at the highest level of 
impairment in the pool of talent. This suggests that when the drain in the pool is extreme, boards 
search within the firm and hire their own insiders. Overall, the univariate evidence indicates that 
decreases in the pool of talent lead boards to seek outsider CEOs from firms that they may have 
not considered previously. Whilst before boards may have preferred to appoint knowledgeable 
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managers from the same industry, the UTSA-related pool impairment seems to limit the 
appointment of same-industry CEOs, as expected.  
As previously discussed, the identified impairment in the pool of replacement CEOs is 
likely to reduce the mobility of those executives with better access to trade secrets information 
(i.e., the most talented). Thus, a plausible consequence is that less informed (less talented) CEOs 
are hired. I look at this issue in Panel D of Table 1, where we formally model the likelihood of 
having outsider vs. insider CEOs following previous literature (Murphy and Zábojník, 2004; 
Jongjaroenkamol and Laux, 2017), and split CEOs depending on whether they come from the 
same industry or not, and whether they are classified as highly talented of not, using the 
Demerjian et al. (2012) talent measure. If Pool Decrease captures a friction that reduces the 
mobility of highly able executives with access to trade secrets, low talented managers in 
unrelated industries may be indeed the “winners” under this law, benefiting from having greater 
access to top executive positions. 
Panel D shows a positive and significant relationship between Pool Decrease and 
Outsider CEO (Column 1). This is consistent with the univariate results in Panel C, the graphical 
evidence in Figure 1, and the results in previous literature showing that there has been an 
increase in external CEO appointments during the different years. Columns 2 through 6 provide 
evidence by grouping CEOs depending on whether they belong to the same industry and are 
classified as high or low talent. There is no significant relationship between Pool Decreases and 
outsider CEOs coming from the same industry (column 2), but, as expected, there appears to be 
an increase in the appointment of low talented outsider CEOs (column 3) and low talented 
outsider CEOs coming from the same industry (column 4). Columns 5 and 6 also show a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between Pool Decrease and outsider CEOs from 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
85 
different industries and low talented outsider CEOs from different industries, respectively. This 
evidence would suggest that boards are more likely to hire low talented CEOs after the shock.59  
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. The correlations between Pool Decrease and the 
variables measuring entrenchment (CEO Tenure, CEO Pay Slice, Salary and Total 
Compensation) are positive and statistically significant. Regarding financial reporting quality, we 
find that most of them have a positive correlation with Pool Decrease but only AQWi and AQ are 
statistically significant. Bog has a negative and significant correlation with Pool Decrease. The 
largest correlations are between Leverage and MTB (corr=0.420) and between Firm Size and 
Big8 (corr=0.390). This is expected as Leverage is calculated as total debt scaled by book value 
of equity which would be mechanically positively correlated with market-to-book ratio, and 
larger firms are likely to have a Big 8 auditor. Given the size of these correlations, it is unlikely 
that multicollinearity is an issue in our setting (Allison, 1998). 
2.4.2. Main Results  
Table 3 shows the results of testing H1. We find that Pool Decrease leads to longer CEO Tenure 
(Panel A), and lower Forced Turnover (Panel B). Regarding the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
changes in firm performance and following Gao et al. (2017) and Ertimur and Patrick (2018), 
Panel C shows that Pool Decrease*ChangRet is negative and statistically significant, indicating 
a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to changes in firm performance after the decrease in the pool 
of talent. Results are robust to the use of different proxies to measure firm performance. Thus, 
Pool Decrease is associated with longer incumbent CEO tenure, lower probability of being 
                                                 
59 Untabulated results show that if we create the dummy variables for outsider CEOs with high talent from the same 
industry we do not obtain significant results. In addition, if the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the CEO is an outsider, we find that the Pool Decrease coefficient is negative and significant.  
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forcefully fired and lower sensitivity of turnover to performance.60 This suggests greater CEO 
entrenchment. In Panels B and C the coefficients on CEO Age and Outsider CEO are 
systematically positive. This is as expected given that boards are more likely to remove older 
CEOs, and also, that external CEOs are subject to greater board scrutiny because of the higher 
information asymmetry regarding their firm-specific skills (Palomino and Peyrache, 2013), and 
thus, are also more likely to be forcefully fired. 
Table 3 Panel D shows the effects over CEO compensation. Pool Decrease positively impacts 
CEO Pay Slice. This means that incumbent CEOs of firms that experience a decrease in the pool 
of replacement CEOs have higher compensation with respect to the top five executives in their 
company. We also find a positive and significant relationship between Pool Decrease and 
Salary. Again, consistent with Palomino and Peyrache (2013), the coefficient of Outsider CEO is 
positive in these regressions. This is explained by outsider CEOs receiving a higher 
compensation than internally appointed ones, to compensate for the higher risk of greater board 
monitoring and greater risk of being dismissed early. 
Overall, these results validate our Pool Decrease proxy as identifying a friction in managerial 
labor markets. The evidence indicates a decrease in market monitoring over incumbent CEOs, 
leading to greater entrenchment, as predicted under H1. Decreases in the pool of replacement 
CEOs appear to reduce executives’ incentives to move, thereby increasing incumbent CEOs 
power as board struggle to find options to replace her. 
In our second set of main analyses, we study whether this managerial job market friction affects 
firms’ financial reporting and narrative disclosure quality. Table 4 shows that Pool Decrease has 
                                                 
60 Untabulated results show that if ROA is used (instead of returns) to construct the variable Forced Turnover, our 
main results remain unchanged. 
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a negative and significant relationship with the four different proxies for financial reporting 
quality and a positive and significant relationship with Fog, Bog and Tone. In particular, the 
evidence reported systematically reveals a deterioration in the firm information environment, as 
all four proxies of accruals quality are negatively associated with Pool Decrease (see columns 1 
through 4). The evidence also indicates a deterioration in the quality of firms’ narratives, with 
the complexity of 10-K disclosures increasing after experiencing an impairment in the pool of 
talent (Fog and Bog are positively associated with Pool Decrease in columns 5 and 6, 
respectively), and the use of more positive tone in narratives (column 7). These results link with 
Lo et al. (2017) who show that firms with lower readability are more likely to manage earnings. 
To better understand the effects of Pool Decrease over financial reporting quality, and 
given that we have argued that trade secret protection impairs the pool of talent, we repeat the 
analyses of Table 4 separately for samples where we expect this impairment to be greater: in 
technological firms and in firms operating in more competitive environments. Table 5 Panels A 
and B shows that the effects are concentrated in the subsamples of technological firms and of 
more competitive firms (as measured using the Herfindahl index). These are the firms that are 
more likely to have trade secrets, and thus, be more affected by UTSA. We construct the 
subsample of technological firms following Png (2017) and Hecker (1999).61 Technological 
firms and those operating in more competitive industries are in constant change and are more 
likely to need to replace their CEOs. For our sample, the average forced turnover for high (low) 
technological firms is 0.060 (0.047), while the average forced turnover for high (low) 
competitive firms is 0.053 (0.041). These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
61 We exclude SIC3 372, 376 and 381 following Brown et al. (2009). 
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Untabulated results also show that the effect of Pool Decrease is higher in the subsample of 
firms with lower CEO entrenchment and lower governance controls. Firms with lower CEO 
entrenchment are those in the lower quintiles of the E-index elaborated by Bebchuk et al. (2008). 
Firms with lower governance are those in the lower quintiles of the G-index created by Gompers 
et al. (2003). This is consistent with our results that Pool Decrease generates an increase in CEO 
entrenchment, and thus, that the most affected companies are those with lower pre-Pool 
Decrease entrenched and monitored CEOs. 
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that decreases in the pool of replacement CEOs 
leads to lower financial reporting quality, as predicted under H2. In particular, results are aligned 
with the expropriating view of entrenched CEOs as incumbent CEOs engage in activities that 
reduce their firm’s financial reporting quality. The results reported in this section strongly 
suggest that impairments in the pool of replacement CEOs affect executives labor market 
characteristics and firms’ financial reporting quality. 
2.5. Additional Analyses on CEO Labor Market Incentives 
2.5.1. CEO-Firm Match, Future Performance and Potential “Winners” 
Thus far, the results indicate that the shock generates greater CEO entrenchment and a greater 
probability of hiring low talented outsider CEOs. This is suggestive of firms and boards 
encountering greater restrictions and limited options to replace their incumbent CEOs. Thus, we 
expect that talent pool impairments may (i) affect CEO-Firm match, as it is less likely that firms 
find a CEO that perfectly matches their expectations, and also, (ii) to the extent that CEOs and 
firms are not well matched, firm efficiency may decrease. A final related consequence is (iii) that 
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low ability executives may reap the benefits of this friction, being considered for CEO 
appointments when they would have otherwise not been short-listed for those positions. 
To measure Firm Efficiency, we use the proxy developed by Demerjian et al. (2012).62 
Then, we create the CEO-Firm match variable by regressing Firm Efficiency on several firm and 
CEO characteristics. In particular, I use the variables that Demerjian et al. (2012) use to obtain 
their managerial ability proxy (Firm Age, Firm Market Share, Cash Availability, Life Cycle, 
Operational Complexity and Foreign Operations), and we also add UTSA, Outsider CEO and  
CEO Age. See Appendix 5 for all variable definitions.  The coefficient on the CEO fixed effects 
from this regression is our proxy for CEO-Firm match. Manager fixed effects reflect specific 
CEO characteristics associated with firm strategic decisions and investment (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). CEO-firm match has a mean of 0.025 (0.001) before (after) the decrease in the 
pool of replacement CEOs. Using this proxies, Table 6 shows that Pool Decrease has a negative 
and significant relationship with both current and future CEO-Firm match and Firm Efficiency, 
as expected. 
Given this evidence on lower firm efficiency and lower CEO-Firm matches, it appears 
sensible that future firm performance will be lower in firms suffering from pool decreases. Table 
7 confirms this view and shows that Pool Decrease leads to lower industry-adjusted future firm 
performance. We use industry-adjusted performance as there exists a momentum effect in 
industry components (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). In addition, industry-adjusted firm 
performance is free from the effect of industry-specific characteristics and only depends on firm-
specific characteristics. 
                                                 
62 We use the updated 2017 version of the Demerjian et al. (2012). However, the authors explicitly request to be 
cited by the paper of 2012. 
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As noted above, to the extent that the shock affects managerial labor markets, “winners” 
and “losers” may emerge. In essence, certain executives may be better off after the impairment in 
the pool of replacement CEOs, such as, for example, top manager team members in companies 
without the law. In particular, we are interested in the low talented ones, as boards may consider 
hiring them after the shock, when they would not have considered them previously. Table 8 
shows the relationship between Pool Decrease and CEO Tenure and Forced Turnover for 
subsamples of plausible “winners.” We create two proxies. Winners 1 is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 when the outsider CEO comes from a firm without UTSA and 0 otherwise. This 
first dummy does not account for managerial talent. Winners 2 is an indicator variable that equals 
1 when the outsider CEO is low talented and comes from a firm without UTSA and 0 otherwise. 
The results show that these low talented CEOs from firms without the law benefit from the 
managerial job market friction. Overall, we find that these CEOs have higher tenure and lower 
forced turnover than other CEOs. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as 
the number of observations is greatly reduced due to data constraints. 
2.5.2. “Expropriation” versus “Quiet Life” Effects: Over-investment 
To provide further evidence on the “expropriation” versus “quiet life” consequences of CEO 
entrenchment, we follow Biddle et al. (2009) and investigate over-investment. CEOs who are 
dedicated to a quiet life would be unlikely to over-invest, as this requires effort in raising funds, 
taking decisions and following up on project development. Also, Biddle et al. (2009) show that 
firms with better financial reporting quality engage in less over-investment, as financial reporting 
quality acts as a disciplining mechanism. As we find that the pool of CEOs decrease generates 
lower financial reporting quality, this may lead to greater over-investment. We construct three 
measures of over-investment (Overinv Firm, Overinv Year and Overinv Industry). Table 9 shows 
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that Pool Decrease is related to higher over-investment. This is consistent with the idea that 
entrenched CEOs exploit their position to potentially engage in pet projects, trophy acquisitions 
or to build the firm beyond its optimal size. 
2.6. Robustness Checks on CEO Labor Market Incentives 
2.6.1. Pool Decrease in Terms of Managerial Ability Drain 
We create an alternative pool decrease proxy called Pool Decrease Ability which is a firm-
specific, time-varying measure that captures changes in the pool of highly able replacement 
CEOs, taking into account only those firms in the same industry that incorporate UTSA and have 
managers in the top tercile of ability, as measured by the Demerjian et al. (2012) proxy. Pool 
drain in terms of ability is likely to affect firms as they have less potential new CEOs with high 
ability in the managerial job market to replace their incumbent CEO. 
Table 10 shows the results. The relationship between Pool Decrease Ability and financial 
reporting quality is statistically significant for most of the financial reporting ability measures63. 
We do not find statistical significance for FRQ 1, AQWi but their signs are negative as expected. 
The Fog coefficient is not statistically significant but is positive as expected. Untabulated results 
show that the results for our CEO entrenchment measures (i.e., CEO tenure, CEO forced 
turnover and CEO compensation) remain unchanged.64  
2.6.2. Parallel Trends and Placebo Test  
                                                 
63 If we use the alternative measure of the decrease in the pool of CEOs for the CEO entrenchment tests (i.e., CEO 
tenure, Forced Turnover and CEO Compensation), our main results remain unchanged. 
64 Main results both for CEO entrenchment and financial reporting quality do not vary if we use the top quartile of 
managerial ability to construct the alternative measure of Pool Decrease. 
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To ensure the effects are driven by the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and following 
previous research such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) or Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016), we 
construct a leads and lags model. Figure 2 graphically shows (at 95% confidence level) that the 
main results are not anticipated by firms which is crucial for the validity of the identification 
strategy. This is consistent with the previous argumentation that UTSA establishes that trade 
secrets misappropriation previous to UTSA enactment cannot be legally pursued (448 MI. Trade 
& Commerce §1901-1910). Bertrand et al. (2004) show that difference in differences analyses in 
long time series may lead to an overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels when 
observations are correlated within each unit. To address this problem and following previous 
research such as Bertrand et al. (2004) or Guo and Masulis (2015), we run placebo tests with 
5,000 repetitions where the UTSA enactment year is randomly assigned. Untabulated results 
show that the t-statistics from the simulated financial reporting quality regressions follow a 
normal distribution. 
2.6.3. Extra Controls: IDD and NCAs 
Beyond UTSA, the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD, hereafter) and the inclusion of 
Noncompetition Agreements (NCAs, hereafter) in contracts also protect firms from trade secrets 
misappropriation. IDD is a doctrine and not a law as it derives from trade secret law and emerges 
from a number of US court decisions. Under IDD it is assumed that an employee would not be 
able to conduct their duties at a rival company without disclosing former firms’ trade secrets, i.e., 
it would be inevitable to disclose them. Although the evidence suggests this doctrine is not 
always followed even in States where the precedent exists, it obviously facilitates winning court 
cases that involve trade secrets misappropriation allegations (Klasa et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018). 
In addition, Gao et al. (2018a) show that firms under IDD decrease upward earnings 
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management to retain employees. In addition to IDD, contracts may include NCAs. These 
agreements are also known as covenants not to compete and for example, do not allow 
employees to join or create a rival company. In a recent paper, Chen et al. (2018a) show that 
Non-compete covenants affect firms’ contractual relations. In particular, the author shows that 
firms subject to these agreements have lower discretionary expenditures and lower future 
performance. These agreements are fairly common even when their enforceability appears to be 
generally low (Garmaise, 2011; Starr et al., 2018). 
To ensure Pool Decrease does not capture the incidence of IDD or NCAs, we run a 
robustness test where we include IDD and NCA to our models. IDD is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the company is headquartered in a state with IDD by year t and later and zero 
otherwise. Appendix 8 shows the state, year and court case of IDD adoption. We use the 
headquarter state following previous literature and because IDD are court decisions specifically 
located in certain states. To account for NCAs, we follow Garmaise (2011) and construct a 
“Noncompetition Agreement Enforceability Index.” Appendix 9 provides the details. NCA 
ranges from zero to twelve and indicates the headquarter states’ agreement in noncompetition 
enforceability. Table 11 shows that the main results remain unchanged when IDD and NCA are 
included. In fact, some results are stronger and, in most cases, IDD and NCA are not significant. 
Untabulated results show that if we include as controls the percentage of firms in the same 
industry that have enacted the IDD and have noncompetition agreements the results for labor 
market effects also remain unchanged. 
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2.7. Summary and Conclusions Chapter 2 
We show that a decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs introduces frictions in managerial 
labor markets and affects financial reporting quality. In particular, we show that the decrease in 
the pool of replacement CEOs increases the incumbent CEO entrenchment and lowers financial 
reporting and narrative disclosure quality. We also show that this pool decrease relates with 
lower CEO-firm match, lower firm efficiency, worse future firm performance and higher over-
investment decisions. The results are robust to the use of alternative measures for the decrease in 
the pool of replacement CEOs, the lead and lags model and to the inclusion of alternative trade 
secrets protection controls. 
This study has important implications for companies, investors and regulators. First, this 
is the first paper analysing a shock to the managerial labor market that generates a friction 
through the pool of replacement CEOs decrease. We show that the pool of replacement CEOs is 
relevant for firms and that its deterioration has undesired effects in companies. Second, it 
contributes to the literature of unintended regulations effects (e.g., Leuz et al., 2008). UTSA 
appears to protect firms competitive advantage through trade secrets misappropriation protection. 
However, we show that this has unexpected and negative effects on firms through a decrease in 
the pool of replacement CEOs. 
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2.8. Appendices Chapter 2  
Appendix 5 Variables definition Chapter 2 
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Pool Decrease  It it’s the percentage of firms by industry-year incorporated in states 
that have enacted the UTSA (Percentage of firms) multiplied by the 
quartile of one over the total number of top management team 
members in the industy (Talent Pool). 
COMPUSTAT, 
UTSA, ExecuComp 
and BoardEx 
CEO Tenure Number of years the CEO has been in office. BoardEx 
Aggregated Tenure Aggregated CEO tenure in period t+1, t+2 and t+3. BoardEx 
Forced Turnover Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is in the bottom returns 
quartile in the year preceding the CEO turnover. 
BoardEX and CRSP 
Aggregated Forced 
Turnover 
Aggregated Forced Turnover in period t+1, t+2 and t+3. BoardEX and CRSP 
CEO Pay Slice Percentage that the total CEO compensation represents over the 
compensation of the top five executives in the company. 
ExecuComp 
Salary CEOs’ salary. ExecuComp 
Bonus CEOs’ bonus. ExecuComp 
Total Compensation Natural logarithm of salary, bonus, other annual, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using 
Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts and all other total. 
ExecuComp 
FRQ 1 Abnormal discretionary accruals following Dechow et al. (1995).  It 
is multiplied by minus one which indicates that higher values of the 
measure relate with lower financial reporting quality. 
COMPUSTAT 
FRQ 2 Abnormal discretionary accruals following Jones (1991) and 
controlling by lagged ROA as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005).  It 
is multiplied by minus one which indicates that higher values of the 
measure relate with lower financial reporting quality. 
COMPUSTAT 
AQWi Modified version for the accruals quality measure as proposed by 
Wysocki (2009). It is the ratio between the standard deviations of 
the residuals (from year t-5 to t-1) from the simpler to the full 
model. The simpler model is the regression of working capital 
accruals on current cash flows. The full model is the regression of 
working capital accruals on lagged, current and future cash flows. 
COMPUSTAT 
AQ It is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the 
Dechow et al. (1995) model from year t-5 to year t-1. It is 
multiplied by minus one which indicates that higher values of the 
measure relate with lower financial reporting quality. 
COMPUSTAT 
Fog Fog index which is a financial statement readability measure. Li (2008) 
Bog Bog index which is a financial statement readability measure. Bonsall et al. (2017) 
Tone Disclosure tone calculated as the difference between the total 
number of positive and negative words divided by total number of 
words in each firm-year 10-K report.  
Loughran and 
McDonald word list 
and php algorithm. 
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VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Percentage of firms Percentage of firms by industry-year incorporated in states that 
have enacted the UTSA. 
COMPUSTAT, UTSA 
and BoardEx 
Talent Pool Total number of top management team members in each industry 
and year. 
BoardEx and 
ExecuComp 
Total firms Total number of firms in each industry. BoardEx 
Total Executives Total number of top management team members in each firm. ExecuComp 
Returns Contemporaneous annual stock returns calculated using CRSP 
monthly return data. 
CRSP 
CEO-firm match It is the coefficient of the CEO fixed effects in a model in which I 
regress the firm efficiency measure from Demerjian et al. (2012) on 
several firm and CEO characteristics. 
COMPUSTAT, 
BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Firm Efficiency Firm efficiency measure from Demerjian et al. (2012). Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. COMPUSTAT 
ROA Firm’s return on assets calculated as income before extraordinary 
items scaled by total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
Low Manipulation It is a variable that accounts for accrual-based firm’s manipulation. 
It is the abnormal discretionary accruals measure following Dechow 
et al. (1995). 
COMPUSTAT 
Winners 1 Indicator variable that equals 1 when the outsider CEO comes from 
a firm without UTSA and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Winners 2 Indicator variable that equals 1 when the outsider CEO’s 
managerial ability is lower than the sample median and comes from 
a firm without UTSA and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
ChangRet Change in Returns from period t-1 to t. CRSP 
AdjRet Industry-adjusted returns. It is calculated subtracting the industry-
year average returns from each return observation. 
CRSP 
ChangAdjRet Change in industry-adjusted returns from period t-1 to t. CRSP 
AdjROA Industry-adjusted ROA. It is calculated subtracting the industry-
year average ROA from each ROA observation. 
COMPUSTAT 
MTB Market-to-book ratio. Firm’s market value divided by book value of 
equity. 
COMPUSTAT 
Leverage Firm’s leverage calculated as total long term and current liabilities 
scaled by book value of equity. 
COMPUSTAT 
CEO Age It is the age of the CEO. For regressions it is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of CEO age. 
BoardEx 
Outsider CEO CEOs’ external appointment. Indicator variable that equals 1 when 
the incoming CEO is an outsider. 
BoardEx 
Outsider Same 
Industry 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider who comes 
from the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Outsider Low Talent Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider and is 
below the CEO ability median and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
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VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Outsider Low Talent Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider who is 
below the CEO ability median and comes from the same industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Outsider Low Talent 
Same Industry 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider who is 
below the CEO ability median and comes from the same industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Outsider Diff 
Industry 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider who comes 
from a different industry and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Outsider Low Talent 
Diff Industry 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is an outsider below the 
CEO ability median and comes from a different industry and 0 
otherwise. 
BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Early Years Indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is in the first three years 
of tenure and 0 otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Cycle Firm’s operating cycle. It is calculated as the days receivable plus 
the days inventory subtracting the days payable at the beginning of 
the year following Dechow (1994 and Zang (2012). 
COMPUSTAT 
REM Real earnings management proxy calculated as abnormal 
production minus abnormal discretionary expenses following Zang 
(2012). Abnormal production and abnormal discretionary expenses 
are calculated following Roychowdhury (2006). 
COMPUSTAT 
Audit Tenure Proxy for auditor scrutiny calculated as an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the number of years the auditor has been auditing the 
firm is greater than the median in the sample of eight years and 0 
otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
Big8 Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s auditor belongs to one of 
the Big 8 (or Big 6, Big 5, Big 4 in the recent years) and 0 
otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
Pool Decrease 50 Indicator variable that equals 1 when the variable Percentage of 
firms is equal or higher than 0.5 and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT, UTSA 
Pool Decrease 75 Indicator variable that equals 1 when the variable Percentage of 
firms is equal or higher than 0.75 and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT, UTSA 
Pool Decrease 90 Indicator variable that equals 1 when the variable Percentage of 
firms is equal or higher than 0.9 and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT, UTSA 
UTSA Indicator variable that equals 1 when a firm is incorporated in a 
state that has enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and 0 
otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
Investment This is calculated as follows: (research and development 
expenditure + capital expenditure + acquisition expenditure - cash 
receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment) * 100. This is 
scaled by lagged total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
Capex This is calculated as (capital expenditures*100)/lagged property, 
plant and equipment. 
COMPUSTAT 
Non-capex This is calculated as follows: (research and development 
expenditure + acquisition expenditure)*100 and everything scaled 
by lagged total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
   
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
98 
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Overinv Firm Ranked value based on the ranked deciles of cash and leverage. 
Leverage is multiplied by -1 before ranking for both variables to 
have a positive relationship with the likelihood of over-investment. 
COMPUSTAT 
Overinv Year For each year, I regress the average of Investment, Capex and Non-
Capex on sales growth. I calculate the deciles of the residual of the 
model and rank it to vary from 0 to 1. 
COMPUSTAT 
Overinv Industry For each industry-year, I regress the average of Investment, Capex 
and Non-Capex on industry-year sales growth. I calculate the 
deciles of the residual of the model and rank it to vary from 0 to 1. 
COMPUSTAT 
Pool Decrease 
Ability 
It it’s the percentage of firms by industry-year incorporated in states 
that have enacted the UTSA (Percentage of firms) that are part of 
industries in the top tercile of managerial ability multiplied by the 
quartile of one over the total number of top management team 
members in the industy (Talent Pool). 
COMPUSTAT, 
UTSA, ExecuComp 
and BoardEx and 
Demerjian et al. (2012) 
IDD Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company is headquartered in a 
state that has passed the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine by year t 
and later and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT and 
Klasa et al. (2018) 
NCA It is the Noncompetition Agreement Enforceability Index. It ranges 
from 0 to 12 and indicates the headquarter states’ agreement in 
noncompetition enforceability. 
COMPUSTAT and 
Garmaise (2011) 
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Appendix 6. Uniform Trade Secrets Act Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The map shows the different states that have adopted the UTSA from 1981 to 2013. The specific year of adoption for each 
US state and the statute can be found in Appendix 7. 
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Appendix 7. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
State  Year  Statute 
Alabama 1987 27 AL. COMMERCIAL LAW & 
CONSUMER PROTECTION § 8.27.1-8.27. 
Alaska 1988 45.50 AK. COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
& REGULATION OF COMPETITION 45.50.910-45.50.945 
Arizona 1990 44 AZ. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 44.401-44.407 
Arkansas 1981 75 AR. UNFAIR PRACTICES 4.75.601-4.75.607 
California 1985 5 CA. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 3426.1-3426.11 
Colorado 1986 74 CO. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 7.74.101-7.74.110 
Connecticut 1983 625 CT. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 35.50-35.58 
Delaware 1982 20 DE. TRADE SECRETS 2001-2009 
District of 
Columbia 
1989 4 DC. TRADE SECRETS 36.401-36.410 
Florida 1988 688 FL. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 688.001-688.009 
Georgia 1990 1 GA. SELLING & OTHER TRADE PRACTICES 10.1.760-10.1.767 
Hawaii 1989 26 HI. TRADE REGULATION & PRACTICE 482B.1-482B.9 
Idaho 1981 8 ID. IDAHO TRADE SECRETS ACT 48.801-48.803 
Illinois 1988 140 IL. ILLINOIS TRADE SECRETS ACT 765.351-765.359 
Indiana 1982 3 IN. TRADE SECRETS 24.2.3.1-24.2.3.1.8 
Iowa 1990 550 IA. TRADE SECRETS 550.1-550.8 
Kansas 1981 60 KS. KANSAS UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 60.3320-60.3330 
Kentucky 1990 365 KY. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 880-900 
Louisiana 1981 13A LA. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 51.1431-51.1439 
Maine 1987 302 ME. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 1541-1548 
Maryland 1989 11 MD. TRADE REGULATION 11.1201-11.1209 
Massachusetts (*) Not Enacted - 
Michigan 1998 445 MI. TRADE & COMMERCE 445.1901-445.1910 
Minnesota 1981 325C MN. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 325C.01-325C.08 
Mississippi 1990 26 MS. MISSISSIPPI UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
75.26.1-75.26.19 
Missouri 1995 417 MO. TRADEMARKS, NAMES AND 
PRIVATE EMBLEMS 417.450-417.467 
Montana 1985 14 MT. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 
& CONSUMER PROTECTION 30.14.401-30.14.409 
Nebraska 1988 87 NE. TRADE PRACTICES 87.501-87.507 
Nevada 1987 600A NV. TRADE SECRETS (UNIFORM ACT) 600A.010-600A.100 
New Hampshire 1990 350B NH. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 350B.1-350B.9 
New Jersey 2012 161 NJ. NEW JERSEY TRADE SECRETS ACT 1-10 
New Mexico 1989 57 NM. TRADE PRACTICES & REGULATIONS 57.3A.1-57.3A.7 
New York Not Enacted - 
North Carolina 1981 66 NC. COMMERCE & BUSINESS 66.152-66.162 
North Dakota 1983 47.25.1 ND. TRADE SECRETS 47.25.1.01-47.25.1.08 
Ohio 1994 1333 OH. TRADE PRACTICES 1333.61-1333.69 
Oklahoma 1986 78 OK. TADEMARKS & LABELS 85-95 
Oregon 1988 646 OR. TRADE PRACTICES & ANTITRUST REGULATION 
646.461- 646.475 
Pennsylvania 2004 12 PA. COMMERCE & TRADE 5301-5308 
Rhode Island 1986 6.41 RI. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 6.41.1-6.41.11 
South Carolina 1992 8 SC. TRADE SECRETS 39.8.1-39.8.9 
South Dakota 1988 37.29 SD. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 37.29.1-37.29.11 
Tennessee 2000 25 TN. TRADE PRACTICES 47.25.1701-47.25.1709 
Texas 2013 134A TX. TRADE SECRETS 134A.001-134A.008 
Utah 1989 24 UT. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 13.24.1-13.24.9 
Vermont 1996 143 VT. TRADE SECRETS 4601-4609 
Virginia 1986 26 VA. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 59.1.336-59.1.343 
Washington 1982 19.108 WS. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
19.108.010-19.108.930 
West Virginia 1986 47 WV. REGULATION OF TRADE 47.22.1-47.22.10 
Wisconsin 1986 134 WI. MISCELLANEOUS TRADE REGULATIONS 134.90 
Wyoming 2006 24 WY. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 40.24.101-40.24.110 
  
This table lists the different US states that have incorporated the UTSA from 1981 to 2016. Source: annotated states 
regulation. (*) The state of Massachusetts  has adopted the UTSA in 2018 but it is not part of the sample. 
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Appendix 8. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
State  Precedent-Setting Case(s)   Date Decision 
Arkansas Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst 3/18/1997 Adopt 
Connecticut Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman,  
921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996) 
2/28/1996 Adopt 
Delaware E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash 
& Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964) 
05/05/1964 Adopt 
Florida Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp.,  
122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 
07/11/1960 Adopt 
 Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co. 
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
5/21/2001 Reject 
Georgia Essex Group Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501 
(Ga. 1998) 
6/29/1998 Adopt 
Illinois Teradyne Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 
707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 111. 1989) 
02/09/1989 Adopt 
Indiana Ackerman v. Kimball Intl Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507 
(Ind. 1995) 
07/12/1995 Adopt 
Iowa Uncle Bs Bakery v. ORourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 
(N.D. Iowa 1996) 
04/01/1996 Adopt 
Kansas Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-duCros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 
1203 (D. Kan. 2006) 
02/02/2006 Adopt 
Massachusetts Bard v. Intoccia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15368 (D. 
Mass. 1994) 
10/13/1994 Adopt 
Michigan Allis-Chalmers Manuf. Co. v. Continental Aviation 
& Eng. Corp.,  
255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966) 
2/17/1966 Adopt 
 CMI Intl, Inc. v. Intermet Intl Corp., 649 N.W.2d 
808 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) 
4/30/2002 Reject 
Minnesota Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology Inc., 648 F. 
Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986) 
10/10/1986 Adopt 
Missouri H&R Block Eastern Tax Servs. Inc. v. Enchura,  
122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000) 
11/02/2000 Adopt 
New Jersey Natl Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 
530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) 
4/27/1987 Adopt 
New York Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 
556 (N.Y.A.D. 1919) 
12/05/1919 Adopt 
North 
Carolina 
Travenol Laboratories Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 
478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) 
6/17/1976 Adopt 
Ohio Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 
268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
9/29/2000 Adopt 
Pennsylvania Air Products & Chemical Inc. v. Johnson,  
442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
2/19/1982 Adopt 
Texas Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems Inc., 864 
S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App. 1993) 
5/28/1993 Adopt 
 Cardinal Health Staffing Network Inc. v. Bowen, 
106 S.W.3d 230 
04/03/2003 Reject 
Utah (Tex. App. 2003) Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos 
Research Group Inc.,  
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (Utah D.C. 1998) 
1/30/1998 Adopt 
Washington Solutec Corp. Inc. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
12/30/1997 Adopt 
 
This table lists a setting of previous legal cases where US state courts decided to adopt the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
(IDD). There are also three cases (Florida, Michigan and Texas) in which courts rejected IDD after adopting it. Source: 
Klasa et al. (2018). 
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Appendix 9 Noncompetition Enforceability Index 
State Score State Score 
Alabama 5 Missouri 7 
Alaska 3 Montana 2 
Arizona 3 Nebraska 4 
Arkansas 5 Nevada 5 
California 0 New Hampshire 2 
Colorado 2 New Jersey 4 
Connecticut 3 New Mexico 2 
Delaware 6 New York 3 
DC 7 North Carolina 4 
Florida 1992-1996 7 North Dakota 0 
Florida 1997-2004 9 Ohio 5 
Georgia 5 Oklahoma 1 
Hawaii 3 Oregon 6 
Idaho 6 Pennsylvania 6 
Illinois 5 Rhode Island 3 
Indiana 5 South Carolina 5 
Iowa 6 South Dakota 5 
Kansas 6 Tennessee 7 
Kentucky 6 Texas 1992-1994 5 
Louisiana 1992-2001, 
2004 
4 Texas 1995-2004 3 
Maine 4 Utah 6 
Maryland 5 Virginia 3 
Massachusetts 6 Washington 5 
Michigan 5 West Virginia 2 
Minnesota 5 Wisconsin 3 
Mississippi 4 Wyoming 4 
 
Source: Garmaise (2011). Garmaise (2011) follows Malsberger (2004) to evaluate the states’ agreement in 
noncompetition enforceability. The evaluation is based on 12 questions and thresholds applied to assess the 
noncompetition enforceability agreement in each state (Garmaise, 2011). Each state receives 1 point for each question if 
its laws exceed the threshold. The questions and thresholds are the following: 
“Question 1. Is there a state statute of general application that governs the enforceability of covenants not to compete? 
Threshold 1. States that enforce noncompetition agreements outside a sale-of-business context receive a score of 1. 
Question 2. What is an employer’s protectable interest and how is it defined? 
Threshold 2. States in which the employer can prevent the employee from future independent dealings with all the firm’s 
customers, not merely with the customers with whom the employee had direct contact, receive a score of 1. 
Question 3.  What must the plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of an enforceable covenant not to compete? 
Threshold 3. Laws that place greater weight on the interests of the firm relative to those of the former employee are above 
the threshold. For example, a law that requires that the contract be reasonably protective of the firm’s business interests 
and only meet the condition of not being unreasonably injurious 
to the employee’s interests would receive a score of 1. 
Question 4. Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the inception of the employment relationship provide 
sufficient consideration to support the covenant? 
Threshold 4. States for which the answer to Question 4 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Question 5. Will a change in the terms and conditions of employment provide sufficient consideration to support a 
covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun? 
Threshold 5. States for which the answer to Question 5 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Question 6. Will continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to compete entered 
into after the employment relationship has begun? 
Threshold 6. States for which the answer to Question 6 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Question 7.  What factors will the court consider in determining whether time and geographic restrictions in the covenant 
are reasonable? 
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Threshold 7. Jurisdictions in which courts are instructed not to consider economic or other hardships faced by the 
employee are above the threshold. 
Question 8. Who has the burden of proving the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the covenant not to compete? 
Threshold 8. States in which the burden of proof is clearly placed on the employee are above the threshold. 
Question 9. What type of time or geographic restrictions has the court found to be reasonable? Unreasonable? 
Threshold 9. Jurisdictions in which 3-year statewide restrictions have been upheld receive a score of 1. 
Question 10. If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete are unenforceable because they are overbroad, are the 
courts permitted to modify the covenant to make the restrictions more narrow and to make the covenants enforceable? 
Threshold 10. States for which the answer to Question 10 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Question 11.  If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the covenant enforceable? 
Threshold 11. States for which the answer to Question 11 is clearly “Yes” are above the threshold. 
Question 12. What damages may an employer recover and from whom for breach of a covenant not to compete? 
Threshold 12. If, in addition to lost profits, there is a potential for punitive damages against the former employee, the state 
receives a score of 1. States that explicitly exclude consideration of the reasonableness of the contract from the calculation 
of damages are also above the threshold”. 
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2.9. Tables and Figures Chapter 2 
Figure 1 Outsider CEOs over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Figure shows the time trend of the average of externally and internally appointed CEOs over the sample period. 
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Figure 2 Parallel Trends 
These two graphs show the dynamics of Pool Decrease on CEO Tenure and CEO Forced Turnover in period t+1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two graphs show the dynamics of Pool Decrease on CEO Pay Slice and CEO salary in period t+1. 
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Figure 2 (Continuation) 
These seven graphs show the dynamics of Pool Decrease on the different proxies of Financial Reporting Quality. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL A: Full Sample 
  N mean STD Min Q1 Q50 Q3 Max 
Pool Decrease 45,391 0.981 0.577 0 0.569 0.861 1.240 4 
Percentage of firms 45,391 0.420 0.148 0 0.338 0.419 0.518 1 
Talent Pool 45,391 827 771 3 186 540 1344 5388 
Total Firms 45,391 138 126 1 31 92 226 463 
Total Executives 45,391 5.975 0.762 1 6 6 6 14 
CEO Tenure 40,517 6.824 6.675 1 2 5 9 62 
Forced Turnover 45,391 0.051 0.221 0 0 0 0 1 
CPS 16,154 0.707 0.467 0.060 0.436 0.619 0.837 3.117 
Salary 16,291 693 340 31 441 648 906 1800 
Bonus 16,291 401.639 719.001 0 0 50 503.36 4062.5 
Total Compensation 16,182 4813 5439 210 1352 2927 6049 30566 
FRQ 1 43,285 -0.004 0.103 -0.398 -0.047 -0.004 0.040 0.378 
FRQ 2 43,645 -0.002 0.123 -1.486 -0.044 -0.002 0.040 1.282 
AQWi 34,662 1.071 0.812 0.011 0.848 1.002 1.162 87.116 
AQ 34,645 -0.303 0.441 -5.488 -0.303 -0.150 -0.086 -0.003 
Fog 15,710 19.508 1.693 0.905 18.526 19.351 20.252 41.845 
Bog 33,055 83.535 7.816 48 79 84 89 140 
Tone 9,258 -0.659 0.543 -4.596 -0.992 -0.637 -0.282 2.229 
CEO-Firm match 34,240 -0.001 0.109 -0.194 -0.068 -0.016 0.039 0.442 
Firm Efficiency 42,529 0.323 0.165 0 0.229 0.280 0.368 1 
Firm Size 45,391 5.766 2.068 1.070 4.276 5.735 7.223 11.474 
ROA 45,391 -0.060 0.641 -78.174 -0.045 0.033 0.076 5.677 
MTB 45,391 3.119 4.496 -9.835 1.231 2.105 3.682 27.640 
Leverage 45,391 0.588 1.857 -6.819 0.007 0.262 0.728 14.626 
CEO Age 45,391 3.975 0.161 3.091 3.871 3.989 4.078 4.564 
Outsider CEO 45,391 0.254 0.435 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 1 (Continuation) 
PANEL B: Pool Decrease and CEOs from the same industry 
                          Both external and internal CEOs Only external CEOs 
 Group Mean Difference Group Mean Difference 
Pool Decrease 50 0 
1 
0.512 
0.444 
0.070*** 0 0.523 0.091*** 
1 0.432  
Pool Decrease 75 0 0.490 0.085*** 0 0.491 0.026 
 1 0.405  1 0.465  
Pool Decrease 90 0 0.490 0.111*** 0 0.491 0.094** 
 1 0.379  1 0.397  
PANEL C: Pool Decrease and Outsider CEOs 
 Group Mean Difference    
Pool Decrease 50 0 0.249 -0.028***    
 1 0.277     
Pool Decrease 75 0 0.258 -0.062***    
 1 0.320     
Pool Decrease 90 0 0.258 0.026    
 1 0.284     
PANEL D: Outsider CEO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider 
  Same 
Industry 
Low Talent Low Talent 
Same Industry 
Diff Industry Low Talent 
Diff Industry 
       
Pool Decrease 0.025** 0.012 0.027*** 0.013** 0.012** 0.014* 
 (2.634) (1.356) (3.851) (2.580) (2.232) (2.003) 
Firm Size 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.005* -0.000 
 (0.542) (-0.767) (0.330) (0.850) (1.954) (-0.131) 
ROA -0.015*** 0.006 -0.074*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.049*** 
 (-2.999) (1.428) (-7.293) (-3.703) (-7.106) (-11.533) 
MTB -0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001* 
 (-0.210) (0.053) (-4.539) (-6.030) (-0.458) (-1.906) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.000 0.002*** 
 (-0.093) (-0.026) (4.631) (3.695) (-0.086) (3.404) 
CEO Age -0.230*** -0.093*** -0.102*** -0.053*** -0.137*** -0.048** 
 (-7.475) (-4.299) (-4.712) (-3.368) (-6.753) (-2.351) 
Low Manipulation -0.000* -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000* 0.000*** 
 (-1.690) (-0.196) (6.905) (5.827) (-1.734) (3.701) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 28,331 28,331 28,331 28,331 28,331 28,331 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.756 0.777 0.535 0.520 0.718 0.544 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables of this study (Panels A, B and C). Panel D shows the 
relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and different outsider indicator variables that account 
for externally appointed CEOs from the same and different industries and with low talent (t-statistics are in parenthesis). 
The sample comprises 28,331 firm-year observations for the period 1980-2016. The number of observations corresponds 
to the remaining sample of the main analyses when all the controls are included. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Pool Decrease 1              
(2) CEO Tenure 0.017 1             
(3) Forced Turnover 0.009 -0.021 1            
(4) CEO Pay Slice 0.0602 0.0156 -0.011 1           
(5) Salary 0.157 0.006 -0.0107 0.2393 1          
(6) Bonus -0.068 0.032 -0.016 0.194 0.292 1         
(7) Total Compensation 0.031 -0.031 -0.016 0.448 0.550 0.398 1        
(8) FRQ 1 0.008 -0.022 0.014 -0.025 -0.013 -0.008 -0.001 1       
(9) FRQ 2 0.004 -0.015 0.008 -0.023 -0.020 -0.001 0.014 0.915 1      
(10) AQWi 0.018 -0.008 -0.005 0.000 0.025 0.003 0.020 0.001 0.003 1     
(11) AQ 0.199 0.103 -0.015 -0.006 0.231 0.050 0.011 0.006 0.017 0.020 1    
(12) Fog 0.005 -0.008 -0.009 0.018 0.031 0.000 0.051 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.045 1   
(13) Bog -0.078 -0.073 0.054 0.036 0.014 -0.135 0.089 0.009 0.008 -0.007 -0.174 0.254 1  
(14) Tone -0.006 0.074 -0.064 -0.003 -0.032 0.091 -0.057 -0.044 -0.021 0.026 0.077 -0.108 -0.3312 1 
 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Bold (italic) numbers indicate statistical significance at 1% (5%). All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
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Table 3 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease, CEO Tenure, CEO Forced Turnover and CEO 
Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 
 CEO Tenure CEO Tenuret+1 CEO Tenuret+2 Aggregated Tenure 
     
Pool Decrease 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.162*** 
 (3.820) (3.543) (3.778) (2.769) 
Firm Size 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.025 
 (4.175) (2.901) (1.263) (0.757) 
ROA 0.002 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.206*** 
 (0.535) (3.769) (3.453) (3.814) 
MTB 0.002 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 
 (1.535) (2.936) (5.223) (3.932) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.010 
 (-0.066) (-1.398) (-2.846) (-1.215) 
CEO Age 3.085*** 1.835*** 1.183*** 3.887*** 
 (26.712) (22.828) (16.259) (21.551) 
Outsider CEO -0.046 -0.009 -0.009 -0.024 
 (-1.538) (-0.448) (-0.405) (-0.387) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 40,481 36,449 32,748 27,411 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.516 0.437 0.411 0.545 
PANEL B: CEO’s Forced Turnover  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Forced Forced  Forced  Aggregated 
 Turnover Turnovert+1 Turnovert+2 Forced Turnover 
     
Pool Decrease -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.019*** 
 (-3.963) (-2.858) (-2.986) (-2.803) 
Firm Size -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 
 (-3.039) (3.648) (8.258) (5.713) 
ROA -0.005** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.015** 
 (-2.040) (-3.911) (-0.410) (-2.337) 
MTB -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 
 (-11.709) (-9.094) (-0.211) (0.806) 
Leverage 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.001 
 (4.535) (4.766) (2.112) (-1.236) 
CEO Age 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.099*** 
 (13.258) (8.349) (5.034) (4.193) 
Outsider CEO 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.012** 0.042*** 
 (5.019) (4.790) (2.390) (3.361) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,391 40,608 36,346 32,214 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.073 0.085 0.078 0.261 
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Table 3 (Continuation) 
PANEL C: Sensitivity of Turnover to Firm Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Forced 
Turnovert+1 
Forced  
Turnover t+2 
Forced 
Turnovert+1 
Forced  
Turnover t+2 
     
Pool Decrease -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.976) (-3.338) (-4.042) (-3.328) 
Pool Decrease*ChangRet -0.043*** 0.006   
 (-5.701) (0.424)   
ChangRet -0.169*** -0.006   
 (-17.540) (-0.523)   
ChangAdjRet   -0.171*** -0.005 
   (-17.941) (-0.390) 
Pool Decrease*ChangAdjRet   -0.042*** 0.006 
   (-5.409) (0.358) 
Firm Size -0.001 0.008*** -0.001 0.008*** 
 (-0.442) (4.618) (-0.339) (4.629) 
MTB -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 
 (-5.356) (0.899) (-5.288) (0.895) 
Leverage 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
 (3.992) (1.544) (3.961) (1.536) 
CEO Age 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 
 (7.716) (5.237) (7.715) (5.238) 
Outsider CEO 0.037*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.018*** 
 (7.023) (3.670) (6.977) (3.667) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 31,559 28,226 31,559 28,226 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.117 0.082 0.116 0.082 
PANEL D: CEO’s Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CEO Pay Slice Salary Bonus Total 
Compensation 
     
Pool Decrease 0.080*** 0.067*** -0.078 0.018 
 (5.764) (4.065) (-0.955) (0.757) 
Firm Size 0.036*** 0.175*** 0.090** 0.384*** 
 (5.257) (22.448) (2.529) (41.385) 
ROA 0.046** 0.107*** 1.767*** 0.356*** 
 (2.406) (3.080) (9.070) (6.487) 
MTB 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 
 (5.528) (8.055) (10.208) (15.999) 
Leverage -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.132*** -0.063*** 
 (-10.808) (-9.244) (-8.790) (-18.972) 
CEO Age -0.051* 0.160*** 0.389 -0.058 
 (-1.719) (4.910) (1.132) (-1.164) 
Outsider CEO 0.029** 0.027* 0.484*** 0.015 
 (2.206) (1.697) (7.534) (0.967) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 16,112 16,251 16,251 16,142 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.273 0.588 0.533 0.662 
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This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and CEOs’ tenure, CEOs’ forced 
turnover, sensitivity of turnover to firm performance and compensation. Panel A shows the relationship between Pool 
Decrease and CEO Tenure. The dependent variables are in logarithm. Panel B shows the relationship between Pool 
Decrease and CEO Forced Turnover. Panel C shows the relationship between Pool Decrease and sensitivity of turnover to 
firm performance. Panel D shows the relationship between Pool Decrease and CEO compensation. Dependent variables in 
columns (2), (3) and (4) of Panel C are in logarithm. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are estimated using 
firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease and Financial Reporting Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 FRQ 1 FRQ 2 AQWi AQ Fog  Bog Tone 
        
Pool Decrease -0.270** -0.404*** -0.023** -0.041*** 0.088** 0.338*** 0.048** 
 (-2.163) (-3.770) (-2.252) (-5.298) (2.369) (3.042) (2.596) 
Cycle -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-8.427) (-10.827) (-0.105) (-0.201) (-0.318) (-5.003) (0.235) 
REM -1.678*** -2.873*** 0.041** -0.022** 0.025 0.300*** -0.033 
 (-7.862) (-8.713) (2.248) (-2.662) (0.820) (2.806) (-1.304) 
Audit Tenure 0.173 -0.040 -0.021*** 0.067*** -0.052 -0.390*** -0.020 
 (1.114) (-0.249) (-2.699) (6.011) (-1.503) (-5.176) (-1.498) 
Big8 -0.188 -0.188 0.032 -0.039*** 0.008 0.909*** 0.089* 
 (-1.327) (-1.111) (0.715) (-3.518) (0.142) (6.590) (1.867) 
Firm Size  -0.165 0.298 -0.009* -0.031*** -0.054 0.220*** 0.081*** 
 (-0.934) (1.372) (-1.887) (-3.624) (-1.560) (3.300) (8.323) 
ROA -2.121*** -2.767*** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.039*** -0.232*** 0.147*** 
 (-6.402) (-10.287) (4.791) (0.758) (-2.984) (-5.956) (4.159) 
MTB -0.059*** -0.015 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.010** -0.011 0.008*** 
 (-3.887) (-0.665) (3.182) (-6.989) (-2.641) (-1.197) (4.454) 
Leverage 0.018 -0.045 -0.003* 0.005*** 0.041*** 0.069*** -0.018*** 
 (0.566) (-1.173) (-1.694) (5.334) (4.372) (3.018) (-5.629) 
CEO Age 0.001 -0.444 0.038 0.172*** 0.040 -0.607 -0.043 
 (0.002) (-0.439) (1.376) (7.184) (0.335) (-1.592) (-0.823) 
Outsider CEO -0.100 -0.211 0.041*** 0.015* 0.075** 0.113 0.003 
 (-0.545) (-1.087) (5.588) (1.986) (2.418) (1.310) (0.113) 
Early Years 0.073 0.036 0.010 -0.015*** 0.012 0.028 -0.062*** 
 (0.998) (0.470) (1.605) (-4.372) (0.419) (0.491) (-3.618) 
        
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 40,085 40,085 32,648 32,634 14,909 30,951 8,762 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.089 0.086 0.216 0.633 0.274 0.780 0.639 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and financial reporting quality 
considering both financial (Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4) and disclosure measures (Columns 5, 6 and 7). Dependent variables 
FRQ 1 and FRQ 2 are multiplied by 100 to ease the coefficients interpretation. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. 
Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics 
are in parenthesis. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease by Subsamples 
PANEL A: Subsample of high and low technological firms 
 High technological firms Low technological firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 FRQ 1 FRQ 2 AQWi AQ Fog  Bog Tone FRQ_1 FRQ_2 AQWi AQ Fog  Bog Tone 
               
Pool Decrease -0.998*** -1.040*** 0.019 -0.090*** 0.183 0.641** -0.044 -0.237* -0.332** -0.037*** -0.009 0.062 0.156 0.061*** 
 (-3.811) (-2.754) (0.748) (-3.179) (0.941) (2.164) (-1.297) (-1.684) (-2.618) (-2.922) (-1.660) (0.875) (1.159) (3.600) 
Cycle -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-6.655) (-8.802) (1.029) (0.718) (-0.800) (-7.515) (1.041) (-6.090) (-7.695) (-0.932) (-2.515) (0.708) (0.791) (-0.933) 
REM -1.830*** -3.369*** 0.010* -0.028* 0.028 0.402*** -0.065*** -1.616** -2.387*** 0.088* 0.005 0.020 -0.052 0.009 
 (-2.745) (-4.511) (1.824) (-1.892) (0.930) (3.407) (-5.079) (-2.457) (-4.740) (1.825) (0.391) (0.292) (-0.277) (0.235) 
Audit Tenure -0.141 -0.409 -0.009 0.110*** -0.021 -0.709*** 0.007 0.366*** 0.182 -0.022** 0.029*** -0.063 -0.141 -0.026 
 (-0.599) (-1.616) (-0.450) (9.777) (-0.446) (-5.100) (0.346) (3.334) (1.546) (-2.312) (3.928) (-1.157) (-0.932) (-1.613) 
Big8 -0.786** -0.879** -0.001 -0.017 -0.155 1.098*** 0.178 0.062 0.165 0.047 -0.011 0.088 0.558*** 0.026 
 (-2.562) (-2.698) (-0.067) (-0.847) (-1.449) (2.917) (1.686) (0.236) (0.649) (0.602) (-1.256) (1.028) (2.915) (0.714) 
Firm Size 0.198 0.890*** 0.005 -0.047*** -0.121** 0.267** 0.071*** -0.388*** -0.114 -0.028*** -0.018** 0.015 0.294*** 0.091*** 
 (0.671) (2.971) (1.556) (-4.175) (-2.574) (2.501) (6.279) (-2.992) (-0.709) (-2.780) (-2.084) (0.510) (4.390) (5.033) 
ROA -1.726*** -2.365*** 0.005*** 0.007* -0.005 -0.163*** 0.052*** -4.291*** -5.060*** 0.010 -0.018 -0.094*** -0.594*** 0.344*** 
 (-5.575) (-7.718) (3.288) (1.712) (-0.395) (-8.277) (3.733) (-8.175) (-5.017) (1.318) (-1.537) (-3.818) (-4.415) (7.143) 
MTB -0.121*** -0.116** 0.001 -0.002** -0.007 -0.002 0.004** 0.034 0.125*** 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.040*** 0.010*** 
 (-3.707) (-2.573) (0.854) (-2.102) (-1.425) (-0.196) (2.137) (1.410) (4.066) (2.821) (-5.193) (-3.030) (-3.989) (2.958) 
Leverage 0.121* 0.136* -0.000 0.002 0.020** -0.008 -0.010 -0.087*** -0.203*** -0.003 0.003*** 0.049*** 0.123*** -0.020*** 
 (1.902) (1.749) (-0.336) (1.017) (2.292) (-0.266) (-1.463) (-3.559) (-6.798) (-1.595) (4.838) (4.392) (4.848) (-2.825) 
CEO Age -1.086 -1.125 -0.014 0.213*** 0.149 0.729 0.088 0.881** 0.329 0.089* 0.112*** -0.017 -1.199*** -0.128** 
 (-0.648) (-0.591) (-0.473) (4.887) (0.585) (0.854) (1.354) (2.260) (0.602) (1.752) (7.573) (-0.073) (-2.949) (-2.273) 
Outsider CEO 0.541 0.455 0.017 0.031* -0.069 -0.085 0.105** -0.534*** -0.689*** 0.061*** -0.003 0.159*** 0.310** -0.051* 
 (1.486) (1.645) (1.097) (1.766) (-1.446) (-0.488) (2.135) (-3.227) (-2.921) (4.255) (-0.617) (3.154) (2.249) (-1.769) 
Early Years 0.030 0.014 -0.008* -0.034*** 0.002 0.103 -0.016 0.117 0.074 0.021** -0.003 0.022 -0.006 -0.084*** 
 (0.196) (0.087) (-1.945) (-5.958) (0.031) (1.289) (-0.764) (1.386) (0.706) (2.606) (-0.832) (0.794) (-0.092) (-5.365) 
               
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,877 14,877 12,367 12,363 4,926 11,941 2,716 25,208 25,208 20,281 20,271 9,983 19,010 6,046 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.065 0.065 0.039 0.614 0.249 0.745 0.659 0.113 0.111 0.271 0.620 0.286 0.747 0.620 
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Table 5 (Continuation) 
PANEL B: Subsample of high and low competition 
 High competition firms Low competition firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 FRQ 1 FRQ 2 AQWi AQ Fog  Bog Tone FRQ 1 FRQ 2 AQWi AQ Fog  Bog Tone 
               
Pool Decrease -0.415** -0.482** -0.019 -0.048*** 0.039 0.466*** 0.040* -0.031 -0.275 -0.071*** -0.004 0.176 -0.074 0.063 
 (0.203) (0.190) (0.013) (0.008) (0.046) (0.107) (0.020) (0.474) (0.447) (0.017) (0.003) (0.113) (0.200) (0.062) 
Cycle -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
REM -1.633*** -2.908*** 0.043** -0.022** 0.016 0.258** -0.053** -2.797*** -2.936*** 0.013 0.006 -0.074 0.213 0.153*** 
 (0.252) (0.363) (0.017) (0.009) (0.026) (0.103) (0.026) (0.636) (0.450) (0.022) (0.005) (0.185) (0.366) (0.052) 
Audit Tenure 0.154 -0.057 -0.018** 0.070*** -0.041 -0.348*** -0.025 -0.015 -0.086 0.005 0.017*** -0.084 -0.347 0.007 
 (0.171) (0.178) (0.009) (0.011) (0.041) (0.067) (0.015) (0.142) (0.148) (0.015) (0.003) (0.141) (0.328) (0.021) 
Big8 -0.116 -0.158 0.020 -0.022** -0.031 0.777*** 0.070* 0.358 0.272 0.353** 0.004 1.026 -0.027 0.076 
 (0.141) (0.172) (0.050) (0.010) (0.057) (0.145) (0.041) (0.696) (1.193) (0.139) (0.008) (0.733) (1.027) (0.079) 
Firm Size -0.234 0.337 -0.015*** -0.040*** -0.052 0.269*** 0.109*** -0.164 0.132 0.046 -0.009** 0.006 0.048 -0.004 
 (0.230) (0.269) (0.006) (0.010) (0.033) (0.073) (0.011) (0.298) (0.359) (0.034) (0.004) (0.132) (0.261) (0.030) 
ROA -2.092*** -2.764*** 0.009*** 0.004 -0.042*** -0.235*** 0.100*** -11.743*** -9.337*** -0.091 0.084** 0.218 -4.456*** 1.457*** 
 (0.314) (0.267) (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.038) (0.027) (2.769) (1.989) (0.154) (0.033) (0.823) (1.493) (0.203) 
MTB -0.066*** -0.025 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.007* -0.002 0.008*** 0.100* 0.141*** 0.002 -0.002*** -0.021* -0.096*** 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.058) (0.051) (0.003) (0.000) (0.011) (0.022) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.032 -0.033 -0.002 0.006*** 0.035*** 0.072*** -0.020*** -0.233** -0.263** -0.009* 0.002** 0.056*** 0.058 -0.003 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.025) (0.003) (0.098) (0.096) (0.005) (0.001) (0.018) (0.035) (0.006) 
CEO Age -0.299 -0.780 0.033 0.190*** -0.036 -0.383 0.043 -0.023 -0.296 0.138 -0.002 0.698 -1.445 -0.173* 
 (0.835) (1.058) (0.025) (0.024) (0.130) (0.557) (0.046) (0.735) (0.759) (0.144) (0.012) (0.558) (1.737) (0.087) 
Outsider CEO -0.195 -0.258 0.049*** 0.009 0.085* 0.179** 0.025 0.236 0.014 -0.005 0.010 0.143 0.043 -0.034 
 (0.182) (0.188) (0.008) (0.005) (0.050) (0.085) (0.029) (0.159) (0.154) (0.024) (0.012) (0.097) (0.444) (0.031) 
Early Years 0.081 0.071 0.002 -0.015*** 0.025 0.011 -0.055*** -0.011 -0.143 0.027 -0.005** -0.019 -0.134 -0.078** 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.008) (0.004) (0.029) (0.060) (0.015) (0.149) (0.146) (0.021) (0.002) (0.040) (0.105) (0.032) 
               
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 34,988 34,988 28,523 28,509 12,554 27,037 6,604 4,959 4,959 4,009 4,009 2,293 3,747 2,113 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.083 0.080 0.212 0.629 0.260 0.786 0.666 0.151 0.134 0.249 0.530 0.366 0.783 0.632 
 
Panel A shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and financial reporting quality for the subsample of high technological firms 
(Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and for the subsample of low technological firms (Columns 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14). Panel B shows the relationship between the 
decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and financial reporting quality for the subsample of firms with high (Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and low (Columns 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13 and 14) competence using the Herfindahl index. Dependent variables FRQ 1 and FRQ 2 are multiplied by 100 to ease the coefficients interpretation. All 
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variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease, CEO-Firm Match and Firm Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CEO-Firm 
Match 
CEO-Firm 
Matcht+1 
CEO-Firm 
Matcht+2 
Firm 
Efficiency 
Firm 
Efficiencyt+1 
Firm 
Efficiencyt+2 
       
Pool Decrease -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.005** -0.006** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.051*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Age 0.017** 0.015** 0.012 0.006 0.011* 0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Outsider CEO -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.003 -0.005** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 34,221 30,585 27,366 42,457 38,410 34,533 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.840 0.838 0.841 0.643 0.634 0.636 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and current and future CEO-Firm 
Match and Firm Efficiency. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are estimated using firm and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease and Future Firm Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AdjROA AdjROAt+1 AdjROAt+2 AdjRet AdjRett+1 AdjRett+2 
       
Pool Decrease -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.002 -0.005* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Firm Size 0.089*** 0.007** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Returns  0.023*** 0.044*** 0.013***    
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)    
ROA    0.009* -0.002 0.010*** 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
MTB 0.006*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.010*** -0.007*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.028* 0.006 0.009 -0.006 -0.000 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Outsider CEO -0.025*** -0.009 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39,549 35,397 31,666 39,549 36,233 32,588 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.442 0.437 0.461 0.018 0.014 0.017 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and current and future firm 
performance measured using industry-adjusted ROA (Columns 1, 2 and 3) and industry-adjusted Returns (Columns 4, 5 
and 6). All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 Pool Decrease by “Winners” Subsample 
PANEL A: CEO Tenure 
 Winners 1 = 1 Winners 2 = 1 Winners 1 = 0 Winners 2 = 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CEO Tenure CEO Tenure CEO Tenure CEO Tenure 
     
Pool Decrease 0.069 0.339*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 
 (0.119) (0.076) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.169*** 0.316* 0.022* 0.026** 
 (0.028) (0.165) (0.012) (0.011) 
ROA 0.223 0.163 0.030** 0.031*** 
 (0.227) (0.308) (0.011) (0.011) 
MTB 0.000 0.015** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.029*** -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) 
CEO Age 3.673*** 3.935*** 3.160*** 3.150*** 
 (1.032) (0.811) (0.132) (0.129) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 591 198 34,555 34,938 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.777 0.780 0.518 0.519 
PANEL B: CEO Forced Turnover 
 Winners 1 = 1 Winners 2 = 1 Winners 1 = 0 Winners 2 = 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Forced Turnover Forced Turnover Forced Turnover Forced Turnover 
     
Pool Decrease -0.075*** -0.097* -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.017) (0.047) (0.002) (0.003) 
Firm Size -0.048*** 0.005 -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.000 0.228*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.003) (0.003) 
MTB -0.003 -0.005** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.003 -0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Age 0.186*** 0.631 0.083*** 0.082*** 
 (0.045) (0.514) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 652 210 38,904 39,337 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.176 0.207 0.074 0.074 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and CEO Tenure and Forced 
Turnover by “Winners” subsamples. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are estimated using firm and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
120 
Table 9 Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease and Firm Over-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Overinv Firm Overinv Year Overinv Industry Overinv Firm Overinv Year Overinv Industry 
       
Pool Decrease 0.060 0.022** 0.005 0.127* 0.019*** 0.016** 
 (0.067) (0.010) (0.006) (0.073) (0.007) (0.006) 
Firm Size -0.570*** -0.112*** -0.011*** -0.393*** -0.021*** -0.001 
 (0.040) (0.003) (0.002) (0.041) (0.004) (0.001) 
ROA 0.240*** -0.011*** 0.004 0.164*** -0.068*** 0.008*** 
 (0.052) (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) (0.012) (0.002) 
MTB 0.155*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.252*** 0.014*** 0.001** 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.386*** -0.020*** -0.000 -0.648*** -0.029*** -0.000 
 (0.044) (0.002) (0.001) (0.069) (0.002) (0.000) 
CEO Age -0.381 0.092*** 0.016 -0.475*** -0.032 0.005 
 (0.238) (0.014) (0.013) (0.131) (0.022) (0.005) 
Outsider CEO -0.173** 0.010 -0.014*** -0.151 -0.005 -0.008*** 
 (0.064) (0.006) (0.005) (0.105) (0.008) (0.002) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Industry FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,391 18,991 39,015 45,549 19,208 39,249 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.740 0.453 0.360 0.507 0.212 0.355 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and firm over-investment 
decisions. Over-investment proxies are calculated following Biddle et al. (2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 5. 
Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All the continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. CEO labor market incentives and accounting quality: The unintended consequences of trade secret 
regulations 
 
121 
Table 10 Alternative Measure of Pool of replacement CEOs Decrease 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 FRQ_1 FRQ_2 FRQ_3 FRQ_4 fog FRQ_5 FRQ_6 
        
Pool Decrease Ability -0.183 -0.255*** -0.013 -0.014*** 0.017 0.160** 0.035*** 
 (-1.600) (-2.900) (-0.923) (-3.649) (0.441) (2.157) (2.977) 
Cycle -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-8.298) (-10.710) (1.736) (-0.087) (-0.302) (-5.073) (0.528) 
REM -1.657*** -2.858*** 0.040** -0.023** 0.025 0.301*** -0.033 
 (-7.903) (-8.821) (2.203) (-2.679) (0.796) (2.811) (-1.319) 
Audit Tenure 0.177 -0.040 -0.019** 0.068*** -0.051 -0.399*** -0.019 
 (1.101) (-0.238) (-2.312) (6.113) (-1.394) (-5.293) (-1.410) 
Big8 -0.186 -0.185 0.029 -0.040*** -0.000 0.939*** 0.089* 
 (-1.285) (-1.046) (0.686) (-3.599) (-0.007) (6.625) (1.766) 
Firm Size -0.156 0.315 -0.009* -0.031*** -0.057 0.216*** 0.080*** 
 (-0.917) (1.468) (-1.927) (-3.587) (-1.622) (3.130) (8.484) 
ROA -2.122*** -2.775*** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.039*** -0.229*** 0.145*** 
 (-6.387) (-10.248) (4.732) (0.751) (-2.918) (-6.054) (4.241) 
MTB -0.057*** -0.013 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.010 0.008*** 
 (-3.683) (-0.567) (3.193) (-6.715) (-2.835) (-1.104) (4.507) 
Leverage 0.018 -0.047 -0.003* 0.005*** 0.043*** 0.067*** -0.017*** 
 (0.533) (-1.168) (-1.833) (5.110) (4.562) (2.937) (-5.665) 
CEO Age -0.028 -0.487 0.032 0.174*** 0.037 -0.604 -0.041 
 (-0.032) (-0.471) (1.164) (7.127) (0.293) (-1.557) (-0.759) 
Outsider CEO -0.103 -0.218 0.042*** 0.015* 0.072** 0.107 0.003 
 (-0.534) (-1.054) (5.772) (1.958) (2.330) (1.216) (0.124) 
Early Years 0.077 0.043 0.010* -0.014*** 0.010 0.018 -0.062*** 
 (1.040) (0.558) (1.729) (-4.177) (0.341) (0.333) (-3.549) 
        
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39,551 39,551 32,379 32,365 14,812 30,636 8,691 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.088 0.085 0.218 0.633 0.275 0.780 0.638 
 
This table shows the relationship between the decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs and financial reporting quality 
using an alternative proxy for decrease in the pool of replacement CEOs (Pool Decrease Ability) that accounts for firms’ 
talent loss. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are 
in parenthesis. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 IDD and NCA 
 
PANEL A: CEO Tenure 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 
 CEO Tenure CEO Tenuret+1 CEO Tenuret+2 Aggregated Tenure 
     
Pool Decrease 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.154** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.063) 
IDD 0.033 0.046 0.056 0.099 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.129) 
NCA 0.012*** 0.008* 0.006 0.015 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.013 0.025 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) 
ROA 0.001 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.200*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.056) 
MTB 0.002 0.002** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
CEO Age 3.072*** 1.825*** 1.176*** 3.850*** 
 (0.112) (0.077) (0.070) (0.182) 
Outsider CEO -0.048* -0.011 -0.012 -0.036 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.023) (0.062) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39,749 35,793 32,159 26,917 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.516 0.437 0.412 0.546 
PANEL B: Forced Turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Forced  
Turnover 
Forced  
Turnovert+1 
Forced  
Turnovert+2 
Aggregated  
Forced Turnover 
     
Pool Decrease -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
IDD -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008* -0.023** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
NCA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Size -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
ROA -0.005** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.015** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
MTB -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Age 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.097*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) 
Outsider CEO 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.013** 0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 
     
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 44,602 39,905 35,718 31,664 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.073 0.085 0.079 0.262 
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Table 11 (Continuation) 
PANEL C: CEO Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CEO Pay Slice Salary Bonus Total Compensation 
     
Pool Decrease 0.077*** 0.064*** -0.039 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.082) (0.018) 
IDD 0.026** 0.006 0.056 -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.119) (0.021) 
NCA 0.007*** -0.000 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) 
Firm Size 0.038*** 0.176*** 0.082** 0.386*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.032) (0.009) 
ROA 0.045** 0.109*** 1.761*** 0.353*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.200) (0.055) 
MTB 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.134*** -0.063*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.003) 
CEO Age -0.059** 0.152*** 0.412 -0.071 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.340) (0.046) 
Outsider CEO 0.028** 0.026 0.499*** 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.059) (0.016) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,864 15,999 15,999 15,891 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.273 0.588 0.533 0.660 
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Table 11 (Continuation) 
PANEL D: Financial Reporting Quality  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 FRQ_1 FRQ_2 AQWi AQ Fog Bog Tone 
        
Pool Decrease -0.215* -0.362*** -0.024** -0.043*** 0.087** 0.359*** 0.040** 
 (0.117) (0.108) (0.011) (0.008) (0.039) (0.113) (0.018) 
IDD 0.065 0.147 -0.000 -0.002 0.071 0.604** -0.017 
 (0.272) (0.255) (0.025) (0.015) (0.060) (0.251) (0.023) 
NCA -0.121*** -0.091*** -0.004 0.009*** -0.034*** -0.135 0.020*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (0.090) (0.006) 
Cycle -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REM -1.734*** -2.928*** 0.041** -0.023*** 0.025 0.297*** -0.034 
 (0.213) (0.315) (0.019) (0.008) (0.030) (0.106) (0.026) 
Audit Tenure 0.171 -0.046 -0.022** 0.068*** -0.053 -0.398*** -0.021 
 (0.154) (0.159) (0.008) (0.010) (0.035) (0.076) (0.014) 
Big8 -0.072 -0.051 0.034 -0.042*** 0.009 0.928*** 0.085* 
 (0.144) (0.180) (0.047) (0.010) (0.059) (0.120) (0.047) 
Firm Size -0.194 0.282 -0.010* -0.031*** -0.054 0.223*** 0.082*** 
 (0.187) (0.224) (0.005) (0.008) (0.036) (0.066) (0.009) 
ROA -2.099*** -2.748*** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.038*** -0.231*** 0.143*** 
 (0.326) (0.269) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.037) (0.034) 
MTB -0.061*** -0.015 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.010** -0.012 0.007*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.023 -0.041 -0.003* 0.005*** 0.040*** 0.068*** -0.017*** 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.023) (0.003) 
CEO Age 0.072 -0.361 0.037 0.174*** 0.039 -0.640 -0.040 
 (0.899) (1.078) (0.028) (0.023) (0.121) (0.405) (0.049) 
Outsider CEO -0.126 -0.227 0.041*** 0.014* 0.076** 0.115 0.006 
 (0.176) (0.192) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.082) (0.027) 
Early Years 0.060 0.013 0.011 -0.015*** 0.011 0.020 -0.062*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.007) (0.004) (0.031) (0.053) (0.017) 
        
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39,449 39,449 32,127 32,114 14,776 30,627 8,660 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.089 0.085 0.215 0.630 0.274 0.780 0.639 
 
This table shows the main regressions with IDD and NCA as controls. All variables are defined in Appendix 5. Models are 
estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
Takeover Protection through Narrative Disclosure 
3.1. Introduction  
We examine the association between managerial strategic use of narrative disclosure tone and 
the existence of hostile takeover threats. We predict that firms use narratives as a takeover 
defense mechanism. In particular, we expect that managers use more pessimistic tone in 10-K 
reports to lower firm visibility and drive away bidders’ attention, protecting themselves from 
takeovers. To assess whether pessimistic language acts as a defense mechanism, we study the use 
of negative tone, as well as analyze abnormal negative tone, which we denote pessimism. 
Pessimism therefore means use of negative tone beyond what would be expected given the firm’s 
fundamentals (such as performance, risk or complexity). This focus on negative and pessimistic 
tone allows us to contribute to prior work, as the effects of negative disclosure are scarce (e.g., 
Huang et al., 2014b), as prior literature usually focuses on the strategic use of positive rather than 
negative disclosure (e.g., Huang et al., 2014a; Bochkay et al., 2018).  
US companies experienced several waves of hostile takeovers in the early 1980s. At the time 
of this heightened takeover environment, many rules were enacted at the state and firm level. 
The main goal of these rules was to protect managers from unexpected takeovers. Antitakeover 
provisions have been widely studied by previous literature. Previous studies analyze how 
antitakeover provisions affect managerial preferences and corporate governance (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 1999; 2003), firm value (Gompers et al., 2003) or shareholder wealth (DeAngelo 
and Rice, 1983). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study analyzing 
whether managers use more negative tone in their disclosures when confront higher probability 
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of experiencing a hostile takeover. This is, whether managers use narrative disclosure to protect 
their companies from unwelcome bids. Takeover protection effectiveness depends not only on 
the type of protection adopted but also on the investors’ view of firms’ managers (Coates, 2000).  
Understanding the consequences of higher probability of hostile takeovers and, thus, more 
antitakeover provisions (i.e., higher takeover protection) on narrative disclosure is important, as 
narratives are an efficient tool to disclose relevant information (Merkley, 2014) and have an 
impact on investors’ decisions (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). Indeed, a growing literature 
shows that market participants consider not only firms’ quantitative information but also its 
qualitative disclosures, and provides mounting evidence that narratives have economic 
consequences (Frazier et al., 1984; Gibbins et al., 1990; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; 
Feldman et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2014b). Companies disclosures are useful to stakeholders 
with different interests in the firm such as investors who want to discern their investment 
opportunities or financial analysts who issue their buy or sell recommendations. There is a 
debate in the literature about whether firms should issue accurate information to attract resource 
providers or whether issuing valuable information may attract rivals (Darrough and Stoughton, 
1990; Verrechia, 1983) or potential acquirers.     
Antitakeover provisions have the main goal of making the firm unattractive to potential 
unwelcome bidders. Some provisions such as poison pills or pension parachutes make the target 
less attractive to the acquirer. Other antitakeover provisions such as fair price or silver 
parachutes increase the acquisition price. Director duties, unequal voting, supermajority, written 
consent, special meeting, black check and staggered boards complicate that the bidder can 
acquire the control over the target company. Then, our main prediction is that a higher 
probability of confronting a hostile takeover is likely to increase the negative tone and pessimism 
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used by managers in their 10-K disclosures. More negative tone and pessimism in firms’ 
narratives is likely to dissuade potential acquirers as the firm looks less attractive.  
However, the opposite may be true. As the type of narratives used by firms in their 10-K 
reports affect their returns (Feldman et al., 2010), it could be that firms subject to higher 
probability of receiving a hostile takeover, do not use a more pessimistic disclosure tone because 
this is likely to impair the market’s perception of the company. This would be detrimental for 
shareholders and, eventually, for managers who can be dismissed for bad firm’s results.   
To test our predictions, we use the Cain et al. (2017)’s takeover index which is referred as 
Hostile Takeover in our study. The authors construct the takeover index using first the state-level 
variation of takeover activity which is plausibly exogenous to discretional firm decisions. After 
analyzing which are the relevant takeover laws and court cases, they construct a firm-level index 
of hostile takeover susceptibility.65 To measure negative tone, we use the Huang et al. (2014a) 
proxy of raw disclosure tone to construct our Negative Tone variable. The residual from the 
Huang et al. (2014a)’s model is our abnormal pessimistic disclosure variable (Pessimism).66 Our 
sample ranges from 1994 to 2013. 
We report the following key findings. First, we find that firms more susceptible to hostile 
takeovers have more negative and pessimistic tone in their 10-K reports. Additional analyses 
show that the main effect is located in the subsample of firms located in states that have enacted 
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD). We follow Dey and White (2019) who claim that firms 
headquartered in states with IDD have higher probability of being acquired. We also find that the 
                                                 
65 The authors use 17 different takeover laws and court cases from year 1965 to 2014. To appease omitted variables 
concerns, their index is constructed using legal determinants as well as firms’ characteristics such as aggregated 
capital liquidity and firm age. These firm characteristics are likely to affect the probability of receiving a hostile 
takeover bid but are not part of firms’ discretionary decisions. We thank professor McKeon for making the index 
available at http://pages.uoregon.edu/smckeon/ 
66 We multiply both raw and abnormal disclosure tone variables by -1 to have a direct measure of pessimistic and 
abnormal pessimistic tone in 10-Ks. 
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G-index from Gompers et al. (2003) and E-index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) have a positive 
relationship with negative tone and pessimism in firms’ narratives. In addition, we show that 
firms with higher likelihood of having a hostile takeover bid that use more negative tone or 
pessimism in their disclosures are less likely to experience new acquisition threats. We also find 
that these firms show lower present and future prices. Finally, we show that hostile takeover 
susceptibility relates with lower present and future firm performance both in terms of returns. 
This is consistent with Cain et al. (2017) and Gompers et al. (2003) who show that antitakeover 
provisions relate with lower firm value which is in line with managerial entrenchment and 
agency costs. Also, these firms with higher probability of receiving hostile takeover bids engage 
in less accrual-based earnings management.  
As robustness test, we use Constituency Statutes enactment as a plausible exogenous 
decrease in firms’ need of internal antitakeover provisions. We find that firms incorporated in 
states that have enacted the Constituency Statutes (i.e., with less need for antitakeover 
protection) use less negative and pessimistic tone.   
We contribute to prior work on firm-initiated takeover defenses by adding one defense 
mechanism through more negative disclosures. We also contribute to the literature on narratives 
and tone by looking at how narratives can be used to protect firms from unwelcome takeover 
bids. Most of previous literature focuses on positive tone and optimism in firms’ narratives (e.g., 
Huang et al., 2014a). We offer a novel insight into cases where managers may opt for negative 
tone as a firm-initiated antitakeover defense which has not been explored in detail in prior 
research. 
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The remainder of Chapter 3 is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents prior research and 
hypotheses, section 3.3 and 3.4 describe the methods, sample main results. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 
present our additional analyses and robustness checks. Finally, section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development on Antitakeover Provisions and 
Narrative Disclosure 
3.2.1. Antitakeover Provisions 
Until the late 1960s, there was less need for antitakeover protection as most business 
combinations occurred after managers of both companies agreed on a friendly takeover (Weston 
et al., 2003). However, during the 1960s, most of the friendly business combinations were 
substituted by tender offers. Tender offers allow potential acquirers to make the offer directly to 
the shareholders of the target firm without considering managers’ opinion. Some tender offers 
were friendly, but others were not accepted by managers of the target companies and involved 
hostility (Weston et al., 2003).67  
During the early 1980s, there were several waves of hostile takeover offers in the U.S. even 
to the largest public companies (Gompers et al., 2003) which lead to companies implementing 
mechanisms for takeover defenses and restrictions to shareholder rights. Some of these 
antitakeover provisions increase the managers’ ability to stop an undesired bid or create 
constraints for shareholders to meet or vote. In addition to internal antitakeover provisions, many 
states enacted antitakeover laws providing further external protection to companies (e.g., 
Business Combination Law or Constituency Statutes).  
                                                 
67 The evolution of the takeover market generated a change in regulations. The 1968 Williams Act was created to 
amend the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and introduced provisions to make sure that both shareholders and 
managers have ex-ante information of a potential takeover bid, have time to evaluate it and the possibility of suing 
the bidder if it is considered necessary (Straska and Waller, 2014).  
Chapter 3. Takeover protection through narrative disclosure 
130 
Antitakeover provisions represent a source of controversy among practitioners and 
researchers (Straska and Waller, 2014). The main concern is whether antitakeover provisions can 
have detrimental consequences for shareholders wealth and capital allocation in markets. Straska 
and Waller (2014) survey theoretical and empirical studies related to antitakeover provisions and 
their effect on shareholder value. The authors state that the opponents of antitakeover provisions 
argument that giving more power to managers may increase their entrenchment, worsening 
agency problems, which may have negative effects on shareholders’ value (Macey, 1988). On 
the other hand, antitakeover provisions defendants claim that these provisions allow managers to 
negotiate in better terms during takeovers and eliminate short-term oriented managerial decisions 
which would improve future firm value.  
Previous literature has extensively analyzed internal (i.e., firm-initiated antitakeover 
provisions) and external (i.e., state-initiated so they are state laws) antitakeover provisions. 
Gompers et al. (2003) develop an antitakeover index, the G-index, including 24 internal and 
external antitakeover provisions. In the same line, Bebchuk et al. (2009) analyze the relative 
importance of the 24 provisions included in the G- index and create an entrenchment index, the 
E-index, using 6 internal provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments). Most of prior studies consider firms with higher antitakeover protection (i.e., 
higher values of the G-index or E-index), poor corporate governance firms. Some provisions aim 
to decrease the attractiveness of the target firm (e.g, poison pills or pension parachutes). Other 
provisions increase the price of the target company in case of acquisition (e.g., fair price or silver 
parachutes). Antitakeover provisions such as director duties, unequal voting, supermajority, 
written consent, special meeting, black check and staggered boards decrease the probability that 
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the potential acquirer can control the target firm. As example of external antitakeover provisions, 
Business Combination laws include a moratorium of 2 to 5 years for assets sales, mergers and 
1other types of transactions between blockholders and other firms. This can change in case 
managers in the board approve the transaction. Constituency Statutes allow firms to consider the 
interests of both shareholders and non-financial stakeholders during takeover processes.68  
An important number of previous studies have analyzed the consequences of the G-index and 
E-index in terms of returns (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers et al., 2009), firm value (e.g., 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Cremers and Ferrell, 2014), acquisition returns (Masulis et al., 2007) or 
takeover premiums (Sokolyk, 2011), among others. However, some studies criticize the use of 
these indexes as they could incorrectly measure takeover protection (Karpoff et al., 2016). The 
specific critics relate to the inclusion or exclusion of certain mechanisms, the equal weighting 
assigned to all the provisions and the potential measurement errors.69 Other criticisms relate to 
endogeneity concerns (e.g., Core et al., 2006; Bhagat et al., 2008; Brickley and Zimmerman, 
2010) as the implementation of internal antitakeover provisions is a discretional managers’ 
decision.  
Cain et al. (2017) create a takeover index analyzing 17 takeover laws and court cases and the 
hostile takeover hazard. They analyze these takeover laws for the period 1965 to 2014 and find 
that some of these laws such as poison pills or business combination laws have not a significant 
effect on hostile takeover activity. Other provisions such as fair price laws have effectively 
reduced hostile takeovers. To construct their index, the authors first focus on state-level variation 
in takeover activity and then create a firm-level index adding aggregated capital liquidity and 
                                                 
68 For a complete definition of the different internal and external antitakeover provisions see Appendix 10 in 
Gompers et al. (2003).  
69 Some examples would be Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), Romano et al. (2008) or Black et 
al. (2016).  
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firm age to decrease omitted variable concerns. Thus, their measure is plausible exogenous to 
discretionary firm decisions which differs from other measures such as G-index or E-index. The 
Cain et al. (2017) takeover index captures the hostile takeovers susceptibility of firms.  
3.2.2. Narrative Disclosure 
Prior research documents that corporate narratives are efficient channels to disclose information 
(Merkley, 2014) with economic consequences for the firm (Frazier et al., 1984; Gibbins et al., 
1990; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2014b). Narrative 
disclosure helps managers to convey firm-specific information about their firms to market 
participants. In this line, Merkley (2014) shows that narratives possess reliable information 
content. The author finds that managers adjust R&D disclosures considering earnings 
performance to provide relevant information and not to obfuscate the real firm performance. 
Previous literature provides evidence that firm-level heterogeneity exists along narrative 
dimensions such as financial statements readability (e.g. Li, 2008), or disclosure tone (Frazier et 
al., 1984; Feldman et al., 2010).  
Firms disclosures can be informative of the real firm’s situation in terms of performance 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). However, managerial disclosure is a discretional managerial 
choice and, normally, it focuses on good news to affect stock prices in a favorably way and gives 
lower weight to negative news (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). Previous studies such as Yermack 
(1997) or Aboody and Kasznik (2000) evidence that managers exploit their priviledged 
information for personal gain. There are studies analyzing the effect of negative tone on 
investors. In this line, Tetlock et al. (2008) analyze the effect on investors of negative words in 
firm-related news. In particular, the authors find that firms with more proportion of negative 
words in financial firms’ news are more likely to show lower earnings. Huang et al. (2014b) 
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analyze analyst reports and find that investors react more strongly to negative than to positive 
narratives.   
Thus, narrative disclosures have an important effect on investors and markets. However, 
there exists scarce literature on how negative tone in firms’ 10-K disclosures can be used as a 
managerial strategy. Guo et al. (2017) show that firms with higher risk of competitors entry use 
more vague tone in their annual reports but, they do not analyze negative tone. Our argument is 
that the negative tone and pessimism in firms 10-K reports relate with a defense mechanism 
against potential unwelcome takeover bids. In this line, Fu and Liu (2017) find that firms with 
more antitakeover provisions (i.e., firms with higher takeover pressure) are more likely to issue 
management earnings forecast, specially those firms with negative earnigns information. The 
authors explain that firms with more antitakeover provisions do not have short-term pressures 
because their managers are less likely to be fired for takeover reasons.  
3.2.3. Takeover Protection and Narrative Disclosure 
The different antitakeover provisions, both internal (i.e., firm-initiated) and external (i.e., state-
initiated), have the common characteristic of making the target company less attractive to 
potential acquirers. When companies have higher probability of experiencing a hostile takeover, 
it seems plausible that their main goal is to keep away unwelcome potential acquirers.  
Previous literature shows that managers are willing to report, in general, good news and 
withhold bad news, such as dividend cuts, to avoid negative market reactions when they need 
positive market reactions (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009a; Ali et al., 2015; 
Campbell, 2018). However, considering that narrative disclosure tone has an important effect on 
investors, it is likely that managers are prone to use more negative or pessimistic tone in their 10-
K reports to avoid hostile takeovers.  
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Negative and pessimistic tone may impair the market’s view of the company but, it is 
important to consider that antitakeover provisions give managers more power within the firm 
(i.e., higher managerial entrenchment). Then, it is likely that managers are less affected by the 
potential detrimental effects on firms of negative and pessimistic tone. Previous studies argument 
that managers incentives to act depend on their losses and gains perceptions (e.g., Smith and 
Grimm, 1991; Smith et al., 1991). Then, managers are likely to use pessimistic tone if their 
perception of the benefits (i.e., avoid an unwelcome bid) surpasses the costs (i.e., potential 
detrimental effect on market perception of the firm). Regarding quantitative firms’ strategies, 
McDonnell et al. (2019) show that firms subject to activist challenges engage in downward 
earnings management activities to reduce the audience’s assessment of their performance. The 
main argument is that firms’ outperformance can be interpreted as a signal that firms act in a 
dishonest way. Related to takeover literature, Servaes and Tamayo (2014) show that when a 
same-industry firm experiences a hostile takeover, other firms belonging to the same industry 
reduce capital expending and cash holdings and have larger leverage and shareholder payouts. 
The authors also find that these industry peers engage in more antitakeover provisions. Fu and 
Liu (2017) show that firms with more antitakeover provisions are more likely to engage in 
managerial earnings forecasts mainly when they have negative earnings. The authors explain that 
managers in firms with more antitakeover provisions are not short-term oriented, so they can 
concentrate their efforts in long-oriented strategies. This result may be also consistent with firms 
trying to protect themselves from unwelcome takeover bids showing their bad results which is 
likely to relate with more negative tone in disclosures. In this line, and regarding qualitative 
firms’ strategies, Guo et al. (2017) show that firms use strategic narratives to avoid competitors’ 
entries. In particular, the authors find that managers use more vagueness in their annual 
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disclosures to reduce potential entry firms’ attention. Thus, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H: Firms with higher probability of receiving a hostile takeover are likely to use more 
negative tone and pessimism in their narratives to protect the firm from unwelcome bidders.  
3.3. Empirical Constructs on Pessimism and Takeovers 
We study the impact of hostile takeovers susceptibility on negative (Negative Tone) and 
pessimistic (Pessimism) disclosure tone in 10-K reports. To study whether managers use 
narratives to protect their companies from unwelcome bids, we propose the following model: 
Negative Tone (Pessimism)it = αs + αt + β Hostile Takeoverit + γ’ Xit + εit,          (1) 
where our dependent variable Negative Tone is measured following Huang et al. (2014a) as 
the level of raw disclosure tone in the 10-K reports (i.e., positive minus negative words scaled by 
total words) which are downloaded from EDGAR database and are parsed using a php algorithm. 
We multiply raw disclosure tone by -1 for the variable to have a direct relationship with 
pessimistic disclosure tone. We also use Pessimism, which is the residual from the Huang et al. 
(2014a) model multiplied by -1, as dependent variable. Hostile Takeover is the takeover index 
developed by Cain et al. (2017). The authors use a sample that ranges from 1965 to 2014 and 
include a full set of takeover laws and court cases. They apply the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) to find which variables explain hostile takeover hazard. Once they have the model with the 
best AIC, the authors apply the estimated coefficients to construct their takeover index. In 
particular, the authors focus on state-level variation in takeover bids which is not very likely to 
be at the firm discretion. Then, they create a firm-level index adding aggregated capital liquidity 
and firm age to assuage potential omitted variable issues. In model (1), i, t and s are the firm, 
time and industry indicators. Industry (SIC-2) and year fixed effects represented by αs and αt, 
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respectively.70 Following Cain et al. (2017), we do not use firm fixed effects in our main 
regressions.71 The authors mention that the index is sticky over time and adding fixed effects 
may absorb the variation we are interested in analyzing. In this line, Cremers and Ferrell (2014) 
do not find statistically significant results when they add firm fixed effects in their G-index 
analysis. Following Huang et al. (2014a) we include the following control variables: Earnings, 
Returns, Size, btm, Volatility Ret, Volatility Earn, Firm Age, Busseg, Geoseg, Loss, Earn change, 
afe and af. All variables are defined in Appendix 10. 
To construct the variable Negative Tone, we first need to calculate disclosure tone. For this, 
we examine 516,628,725 words containing 3,465,099 positive words and 7,595,709 negative 
words in a total of 30,122 10-K reports.72 The parsing method for 10-Ks is described in 
Appendix 11. Negative disclosure tone (Pessimism) is measured as positive words minus 
negative words scaled by total words and expressed in percentage and multiplied by -1 to have a 
direct relationship with pessimism. We use the Loughran and McDonald word lists of positive 
and negative words created specifically for financial documents.73 We use the 2014 updated 
version of their word list which contains 354 positive and 2,329 negative words (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2015). Their word list presents two important advantages. First, the list is more 
complete in terms of words included. Second, it is also customized to financial documents and 
                                                 
70 If we use SIC-3 or SIC-4 our main results do not change.  
71 Cain et al. (2017) explain in page 481 that “firm fixed effects can be problematic when the variables in the model 
are slow-moving…”. 
72 These filings include 10-K, 10-K405, 10-KSB and 10-KSB40. All the amended reports (/A) are not considered 
because we focus on the first version of the report. 
73 There exist other word lists in the accounting and finance literature: Harvard's General Inquirer (GI), Diction and 
the list developed by Henry (2008). However, these lists have some limitations such as not including relevant 
keywords common in financial reports (e.g. loss, impairment, adverse) which is the case of Henry´s (2008) list 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2016). Harvard GI and Diction word lists have been used in many studies as they were the 
first word lists publicly available, but they are not created specifically for financial documents.  
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specifically created from the 10-Ks making this list the most accurate to derive or proxy for 
managers’ positive disclosure tone (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). 
3.4. Sample and Results on Pessimism and Takeovers 
We obtain financial and accounting data from Compustat and CRSP. Analysts data are obtained 
from IBES database. Merging these databases results in a total of 24,123 firm-year observations 
representing 2,157 US firms. We remove financial firms from the sample because their 
characteristics and disclosure tone differ from non-financial firms.74 The final sample is 
comprised of 10,231 firm-year observations representing 1,241 non-financial firms between 
1994 and 2013. Data for mergers and acquisitions is from Securities Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum database. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our main variables of interest. Negative Tone has 
a positive mean and median suggesting that managers in our sample use, on average, more 
negative disclosure tone in 10-K reports. Pessimism has a negative mean and median suggesting 
that, on average, mangers in our sample use less pessimistic tone in their 10-Ks. Hostile 
Takeover represents the firms’ probability of receiving a hostile takeover and has a mean of 
0.176 and a median of 0.148. Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Hostile 
Takeover has a positive and significant correlation with Negative Tone. Surprisingly, we find that 
the correlation between Hostile Takeover and Pessimism is negative and significant.  
Table 3 Panel A shows the results for the main analysis. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the 
relationship between Hostile Takeover and present and future Negative Tone. In every model, the 
Hostile Takeover coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Columns (4), (5) and (6) 
                                                 
74 Some words such as risk and casualty have negative meaning in non-financial firms, but they might not be 
negative in the context of financial firms (Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). 
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show the relationship between Hostile Takeover and present and future Pessimism. In every 
model, the Hostile Takeover coefficient is positive and statistically significant. These results 
confirm that firms with higher susceptibility to hostile takeovers use more negative and 
pessimistic disclosure tone in their 10-Ks. This is consistent with our argument that as narratives 
have an important effect on investors perception of the firm (Frazier et al., 1984; Gibbins et al., 
1990; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2014b), managers 
may use pessimistic disclosure tone to keep away unwelcome potential bidders. Thus, our 
hypothesis holds. Table 1 Panel B shows that managers use fewer positive words when they are 
more susceptible to hostile takeovers.75  
3.5. Additional Analyses on Pessimism and Takeovers 
Our main results should be stronger for the subsample of firms that are more attractive in terms 
of takeovers. In this line, Dey and White (2019) state that firms located in states that have 
enacted the IDD have higher probability of being acquired. This is in line with Chen et al. (2018) 
who find that IDD firms have higher probability of experiencing a takeover. IDD relates with 
trade secret protection regulations and emerge from a number of US court decisions. In firms 
located in states that have enacted the IDD, former employees cannot work for a competitor if 
the employee would inevitably need to use their trade secret knowledge in the rival company to 
correctly develop the job (Klasa et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018). Then, as IDD restricts competitors 
from acquiring private firm information from employees, it is likely that they try to obtain the 
trade secrets information by acquiring the firm (Tate and Yang, 2016). In addition, under IDD it 
                                                 
75 Our main results remain unchanged if we control for CEO ability using the proxy developed by Demerjian et al. 
(2012). Untabulated results show that the coefficient for the CEO ability variable is positive but not significant. 
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is less likely that employees leave and transfer important firm information, so firms may increase 
organizational capital investment which would make the company more attractive to bidders.  
Dey and White (2019) find that IDD relates with firms using more antitakeover provisions. 
We divide our sample in firms whose headquarter is in states that have enacted the IDD and 
firms headquartered in states without IDD.76 Table 4 shows that the main effect of Hostile 
Takeovers on Negative Tone and Pessimism is for the subsample of firms with IDD (Columns 1 
and 2). This is expected as firms with IDD are more attractive to potential acquirers.  
Many previous studies have used the G-index (Gompers et al., 2003) and the E-index 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009) to account for antitakeover provisions (e.g., Cremers and Ferrell, 2014; 
Sokolyk, 2011; Cremers et al., 2009, Bebchuk et al., 2009; Masulis et al., 2007; Gompers et al., 
2003). However, these measures have been widely criticized because every provision has the 
same weight, there could be measurement errors (e.g., Black et al., 2016; Romano et al., 2008; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Cremers and Nair, 2005) or endogeneity issues as internal antitakeover 
provisions represent managerial decisions (e.g., Core et al., 2006; Bhagat et al., 2008; Brickley 
and Zimmerman, 2010). As these indexes are constructed using antitakeover provisions which 
main goal is to make the firm unattractive to unwelcome bidders, they should relate with more 
negative tone in firm disclosures. Table 5 shows that both G-index and E-index have a positive 
and statistically significant relationship with present and future Negative Tone and Pessimism. 
We also analyze whether the use of negative and pessimistic disclosure tone really protect 
firms from new takeover announcements. We use data from SDC database to obtain all the M&A 
announcements from 1993 to 2013. The dependent variable Takeover threat is a dummy variable 
                                                 
76 Appendix 12 shows state and year of IDD enactment.  
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that equals one if the firm experiences a new acquisition announcement threat and zero 
otherwise. Correlation between Negative Tone and Takeover is negative (-0.033) and statistically 
significant (p-value<0.01). For Pessimism, the correlation with Takeover is positive but not 
statistically significant. Correlation between Hostile Takeover and Takeover is positive (0.067) 
and statistically significant (p-value<0.01). 
Table 6 shows the results for this analysis. We find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the interaction between Negative Tone and Hostile Takeover in Column (1). 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the interaction between Pessimism and Hostile Takeover is 
negative and statistically significant for current and future takeover threats. These results show 
that firms with higher probability of experiencing an unwelcome takeover bid that are more 
negative or pessimistic in their narratives, are less likely to experience a new takeover threat. As 
expected, a higher probability of experiencing a hostile takeover (Hostile Takeover variable) 
relates positively with having a new acquisition threat. However, we only find statistical 
significance in Column (1).  
Untabulated results show that the relationship between the interactions Negative 
Tone*Hostile Takeover and Pessimism*Hostile Takeover and having a hostile takeover threat is 
negative is most of the models, but we do not find statistically significance. The number of 
observations drop as we do not have many hostile takeover announcements in our sample. In our 
sample there is a 24.2% of firms experiencing a new acquirement threat. But we find that only a 
0.5% of those firms experience a new hostile acquirement threat. This lack of significance for 
hostile takeovers is in line with Cain et al. (2017) results. Thus, results in table 6 are in line with 
our argument that firms use negative and pessimistic tone in narratives as a defense mechanism 
against potential unwelcome takeover bids. 
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In addition, using CRSP delisting data due to merger-related issues, in untabulated results we 
find that firms with higher susceptibility to experience hostile takeovers that use more negative 
disclosure tone, are less likely to suffer a delisting because of merger-related situations. We find 
a negative but not significant coefficient for the relationship between firms’ delisting given 
merger-related issues and the interaction between Pessimism and Hostile Takeover. 
 Previous literature argues that firms with higher probability of experiencing unwelcome 
takeover bids have higher incentives to maximize the firm’s price, so they are more expensive 
for the potential acquirers (Macey, 1988). Using negative or pessimist disclosure tone in 
narratives is likely to impair market’s assessment of firms’ value which, in turn, would decrease 
firms’ prices. Salva and Zhang (2017) argue that financial bidders are specialized in identifying 
mispriced firms to buy them and obtain positive future benefits. On the other hand, strategic 
acquirers would focus on takeovers that provide them with synergistic gains. It is fair to assume 
that both financial and strategic bidders look for good firms in the capital markets. Table 7 shows 
the relationship between negative and pessimistic disclosure tone and present and future firm’s 
price. Results show that Hostile Takeover has a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with firm price. This is consistent with the idea that potential bidders are likely to look for good 
firms to buy. We also find that firms with higher susceptibility to hostile takeovers that use more 
negative or pessimistic disclosure tone present lower present and future price. This is consistent 
with the idea that disclosure tone has an effect on markets’ perception of firm value. It is 
interesting to note that the coefficients for Negative Tone and Pessimism are not statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficients sum of Negative Tone*Hostile Takeover and Hostile 
Takeover and the coefficients sum of Negative Tone*Pessimism and Hostile Takeover are not 
statistically significant.  Our intuition is that though the use of negative or pessimistic narratives, 
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managers can convince potential unwelcome bidders that their firms does not represent a good 
investment.77  
Previous literature analyzes the relationship between antitakeover provisions and firm 
performance. In particular, Cain et al. (2017) show that higher hostile takeover susceptibility 
relates with lower firm value. This result is also consistent with Gompers et al. (2003) who show 
that their antitakeover index (the G-index) has a negative relationship with firm performance. 
Table 8 shows that, consistent with Cain et al. (2017), Hostile Takeover relates with lower 
present and future firm returns. This would link with the idea that higher probability of hostile 
takeovers makes firms to increase the antitakeover provisions which increases managerial 
entrenchment having detrimental effects on firm performance. We find that firms that use more 
pessimistic narratives have a negative and significant relationship with current returns. This is 
consistent with the potential costs of engaging in negative disclosure strategies as markets may 
have a negatively value the firm. We do not find significant relationship for the interaction 
between Negative Tone (Pessimism) and Hostile Takeover. 
Our main results show that firms more subject to hostile takeovers use more negative and 
pessimistic disclosure tone as qualitative strategy to protect the firm from unwanted takeovers. 
Higher protection against potential unwelcome bidders may decrease the importance of 
complying short-term goals and allow managers to concentrate on long-term issues. This 
situation is likely to decrease the need for accrual-based earnings management. Table 9 shows 
that Hostile Takeovers relate with lower accrual-based earnings management. Accrual earnings 
management are calculated following Jones (1991).78  We find Hostile Takeover has a negative 
                                                 
77 Untabulated results show that these results hold when the dependent variable is the target firm’s price one day, 
one week or four weeks before the takeover deal.   
78 Using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to proxy for accrual earnings management, our main 
results do not change.  
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and statistically significant relationship with present and future accrual-based earnings 
management.79 We do not find significant results for the interaction between Negative Tone 
(Pessimism) and Hostile Takeover.80 Results in table 4 show that managers engage in less 
accrual-based activities when there is a higher probability of receiving an unwelcome bid. This is 
consistent with the idea that higher susceptibility to takeovers make firms to need more 
antitakeover provisions which, in turn, give more power to managers and decrease their need of 
meeting short-term goals. However, we do not find significant results for firms that use negative 
tone in hostile takeover environments.81 
3.6. Robustness Checks on Pessimism and Takeovers 
As robustness check, we use as a plausible exogenous decrease in firms’ need of takeover 
protection, the Constituency Statutes enactment. Constituency Statutes allow directors to 
consider the effect of structural and operational decisions not only on shareholders, but also on 
the interests of non-financial stakeholders. Their passage has two related consequences: (1) they 
increase stakeholder-oriented practices (e.g., Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2016), and also, (2) they 
act as de facto antitakeover protection laws (e.g., Bisconti 2009). To the extent that these Statues 
reduce the need of firm-initiated defensive actions and improve investment in socially 
responsible initiatives, we predict that they will lead to less negative and pessimistic disclosure 
tone. Although Constituency Statutes are not simple antitakeover provisions (as they protect all 
stakeholders),82 these laws act as external antitakeover protection.  
                                                 
79 We do not find conclusive results for real earnings management. If we use Zang (2012) to proxy for real earnings 
management (abnormal production minus abnormal discretionary expenses) we find that Hostile Takeover has a 
positive and significant relationship with real earnings management at time t. However, if we use the Roychowdhury 
(2006) proxy for real earnings management we do not find significant results.  
80 Untabulated results show that we do not find significant results for abnormal pessimistic disclosure tone nor for 
the interaction between Abn. Pessimism and Hostile Takeover. 
81 Untabulated results show that we do not find significant results for pessimism.  
82 Although the nature of most Statutes is permissive (Bainbridge, 1992), they are legally enforceable and different 
with respect to the traditional shareholder primacy view (Orts, 1992; Stout, 2012). The legal enforceability of the 
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We follow studies such as Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016) or Gao et al. (2018), and exploit 
the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered enactment of Constituency Statutes in 
U.S. Table 10 shows the results. Constituency Statutes is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firms incorporated in states that have enacted the Statutes (treated firms) and 0 otherwise (control 
firms).83  We control for E-index (Columns 1 and 3) and for G-index (Columns 2 and 4) to 
account for other internal and external antitakeover provisions that could be affecting firms’ 
narratives. Results in Table 10 show that the coefficient for Constituency Statutes is negative and 
statistically significant. This shows that firms with lower need to protect themselves use a less 
negative and pessimistic tone in their 10-K reports.  
Finally, one potential concern could be that firms with higher levels of negative tone and 
pessimism in their disclosures attract potential acquirers. This is because firms more susceptible 
to hostile takeover bids with more negative or pessimistic disclosure tone have lower prices. This 
would relate with a reverse causality issue where pessimism would determine firms’ propensity 
to hostile takeovers. To deal with this issue, we perform the Granger Causality test. Untabulated 
results show that negative tone and pessimism in previous periods are neither positive nor 
significantly related to firms’ susceptibility to a hostile takeover. 
3.7. Summary and Conclusions Chapter 3 
We analyze whether firms that are more likely to experience unwelcome takeover bids use 
negative and pessimistic disclosure tone as a mechanism defense against those potential 
acquirers. To proxy for firms’ susceptibility to hostile takeovers we use the Cain et al. (2017) 
                                                 
Statutes has been shown in real business cases. For example, in a federal bankruptcy case, In re McCalla Interiors, 
Inc., 228 B.R. 657 (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio 1998), the Court explicitly alluded the Ohio 
Constituency Statutes to defend the employees’ and customers’ interests.  
83 Appendix 13 shows state and year of Constituency Statutes enactment.  
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measure that contains takeover laws and court cases as well as firm characteristics such as 
aggregated capital liquidity and firm age. As these elements are not likely to be at the managerial 
discretion, the Cain et al. (2017) proxy provides a plausible exogenous measure for firms’ 
propensity to hostile takeovers. In particular, we find that firms with higher probability of 
experiencing an unwelcome takeover use more negative and pessimistic disclosure tone in their 
10-K reports. 
We also find that our main results are mainly located in the subsample of firms that are more 
attractive for potential acquirers (i.e., firms located in states that have enacted the IDD). Also, 
firms in hostile takeovers environments that use more negative and pessimistic tone in their 
disclosures are less related with new takeover announcements. This is in line with our argument 
that pessimistic disclosure is used by firms as a defense mechanism against unwelcome takeover 
bids. Our results also show that these firms with higher propensity to unwelcome takeovers that 
use negative or pessimistic disclosure tone have lower prices. Finally, we find that the propensity 
to hostile takeovers relate with lower accrual-based earnings management activities and lower 
firm performance in terms of lower returns.  
 Our results are robust to the use of Constituency Statutes as an exogenous decrease in firms’ 
need of internal antitakeover provisions. Additionally, using the Granger Causality test, we find 
that previous negative or pessimistic disclosure tone is not related in a statistically significant 
way with firms’ propensity to hostile takeovers.  
Our study contributes to previous literature on negative narrative disclosure as most of 
previous studies focus on positive or optimistic disclosure tone. We also contribute to previous 
narrative disclosure literature showing that managers in firms more subject to unwelcome bids 
disclose more pessimistic narratives to protect the firm form potential acquirers. 
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3.8. Appendices Chapter 3 
Appendix 10 Variables Definition 
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Negative Tone  Disclosure tone calculated as the difference between positive 
words and negative words scaled by total number of words in 
each firm-year 10-K report and expressed in percentage. It is 
multiplied by -1 to have a direct relationship with pessimistic 
tone. 
Loughran and McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Pessimism Abnormal pessimism disclosure calculated as the residual of 
the model from Huang et al. (2014a). It is multiplied by 100 
to ease interpretation. It is multiplied by -1 to have a direct 
relationship with abnormal pessimistic tone. 
Loughran and McDonald word 
list, php algorithm, 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, IBES. 
Hostile 
Takeover 
The takeover propensity index is calculated as the probability 
for a firm of suffering a hostile takeover considering 17 
different antitakeover provisions and several firm-specific 
characteristics (capital liquidity and firm age). 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/smckeon/ 
Positive Words Count of the total number of positive words in each firm-year 
10-K filing.   
Loughran and McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Negative 
Words 
Count of the total number of negative words in each firm-year 
10-K filing.   
Loughran and McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Total Words Count of the total number of words in each firm-year 10-K 
filing. 
Loughran and McDonald word list 
and php algorithm 
Accrual EM Accrual-based earnings management calculated as the 
absolute value of the residual of the model created by Jones 
(1991). 
COMPUSTAT and Jones (1991) 
Constituency 
Statutes 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the company is incorporated 
in a state that has enacted the constituency statutes by year t 
and later and 0 otherwise. 
Karpoff and Wittry (2018) 
 
E-index Index of internal antitakeover firm’s provisions. Bebchuk et al. (2008) and 
RiskMetrics 
G-index Index of internal and external antitakeover firm’s provisions. 
In its calculation, we do not add the external antitakeover 
provisions considered by Gompers et al. (2003).  
Gompers et al. (2003) and 
RiskMetrics 
Takeover 
threat 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm experiences a new 
acquisition threat (using the announcement date) and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC Platinum  
Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items. COMPUSTAT 
Returns Contemporaneous annual stock returns calculated using 
CRSP monthly return data. 
CRSP 
Size Logarithm of firm market value. COMPUSTAT 
btm Book-to-market ratio. COMPUSTAT 
Volatility Ret Standard deviation of stock returns over the last five fiscal 
years. 
CRSP 
Volatility Earn Standard deviation of earnings over the last five fiscal years. COMPUSTAT 
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VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE 
Firm Age Logarithm of 1 plus the firm age calculated from the first year 
the firm entered the CRSP dataset. 
COMPUSTAT 
 
Busseg Logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments, or 1 if 
the value is missing form Compustat. 
COMPUSTAT 
Geoseg Logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments, or 1 
if the value is missing form Compustat. 
COMPUSTAT 
Loss It is an indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings before 
extraordinary items are negative and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
Earn change Difference between earnings before extraordinary items in 
period t versus period t-1 scaled by total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
afe Analyst forecast error, defined as IBES earnings per share 
minus the median of the most recent analysts’ forecasts, 
deflated by stock price per share at the end of the fiscal year. 
IBES 
af Analyst consensus forecast for one-year-ahead earnings per 
share scaled by stock price per share at the end of the fiscal 
year to control for managerial assessment about future 
performance. 
IBES 
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Appendix 11 Cleaning 10-K Reports 
 
The first step is obtaining the 10-K filings. We download them from SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR). We use a customized web crawling algorithm created with php programming language. The types of 
10-K reports downloaded are the following: 10-K, 10-K405, 10-KSB and 10-KSB40. 
 
We realized that several filings contain little or none information before year 1996. After contacting directly with the 
SEC, we received this information: “not all documents filed with the Commission by public companies will be available on 
EDGAR. Companies were phased into EDGAR filing over a three-year period, ending May 6, 1996. As of that date, all 
public domestic companies were required to make their filings on EDGAR, except for filings made in paper because of a 
hardship exemption. Third-party filings with respect to these companies, such as tender offers and Schedules 13D, are 
also filed on EDGAR. More information appears in https://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm. We remove those filings 
that appear empty or with scarce information. 
 
After downloading all the 10-Ks filings corresponding to firms in our database, we go through the following steps: 
 
1) Clean all filings by removing every HTML tags. 
2) Exclude the filer’s name, CIK number and firm address. This is, we exclude the cover page (the header). 
3) Remove all the tables and exhibits because these items are more likely to contain template language that is less 
meaningful to measure disclosure tone (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
4) Our algorithm eliminates capital letters (command ignore case). 
5) We do not eliminate the stop words as they should be part of the number of total words of each 10-K. 
6) Our algorithm eliminates the punctuation. For example, the set of words ‘increase. The’ is equivalent to increase 
and the without considering punctuation or capital letters. This can be achieved using the regular expressions 
existing in php programming language. A regular expression, also known as regex, is a sequence of characters that 
forms a search pattern.  Regular expressions consist of constants and operator symbols that denote sets of strings 
and operations over these sets, respectively.  
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Appendix 12 Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Enactment 
State Precedent-Setting Case(s) Date Decision 
Arkansas Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. 
Ark. 1997) 
3/18/1997 Adopt 
Connecticut Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 
1996) 
2/28/1996 Adopt 
Delaware E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 
200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964) 
05/05/1964 Adopt 
Florida Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 
07/11/1960 Adopt 
 Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co. Inc., 148 F. 
Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
5/21/2001 Reject 
Georgia Essex Group Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1998) 6/29/1998 Adopt 
Illinois Teradyne Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 
(N.D. 111. 1989) 
02/09/1989 Adopt 
Indiana Ackerman v. Kimball Intl Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995) 07/12/1995 Adopt 
Iowa Uncle Bs Bakery v. ORourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 
1996) 
04/01/1996 Adopt 
Kansas Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-duCros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 
2006) 
02/02/2006 Adopt 
Massachusetts Bard v. Intoccia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15368 (D. Mass. 1994) 10/13/1994 Adopt 
Michigan Allis-Chalmers Manuf. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng. 
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966) 
2/17/1966 Adopt 
 CMI Intl, Inc. v. Intermet Intl Corp., 649 N.W.2d 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2002) 
4/30/2002 Reject 
Minnesota Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 
1986) 
10/10/1986 Adopt 
Missouri H&R Block Eastern Tax Servs. Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 
1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000) 
11/02/2000 Adopt 
New Jersey Natl Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) 
4/27/1987 Adopt 
New York Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 556 (N.Y.A.D. 
1919) 
12/05/1919 Adopt 
North 
Carolina 
Travenol Laboratories Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1976) 
6/17/1976 Adopt 
Ohio Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2000) 
9/29/2000 Adopt 
Pennsylvania Air Products & Chemical Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1982) 
2/19/1982 Adopt 
Texas Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548 
(Tex. App. 1993) 
5/28/1993 Adopt 
 Cardinal Health Sta_ng Network Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 
App. 2003) 
04/03/2003 Reject 
Utah Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 
(Utah D.C. 1998) 
1/30/1998 Adopt 
Washington Solutec Corp. Inc. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1997) Adopt 
12/30/1997 Adopt 
 
This table lists a setting of previous legal cases where US state courts decided to adopt the Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine (IDD). There are also three cases (Florida, Michigan and Texas) in which courts rejected IDD after adopting it. 
Source: Klasa et al. (2018). 
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Appendix 13 Constituency Statutes Enactment 
State  Year  
Arizona 1987 
Connecticut 1988 
Florida 1989 
Georgia 1989 
Hawaii 1989 
Idaho 1988 
Illinois 1985 
Indiana 1986 
Iowa 1989 
Kentucky  1988 
Louisiana 1988 
Maine 1985 
Maryland 1999 
Massachusetts 1989 
Minnesota 1987 
Mississippi 1990 
Missouri 1986 
Nebraska 1988 
Nevada 1991 
New Jersey 1989 
New Mexico 1987 
New York 1987 
North Carolina 1993 
North Dakota 1993 
Ohio 1984 
Oregon 1989 
Pennsylvania 1990 
Rhode Island 1990 
South Dakota 1990 
Tennessee 1988 
Texas 2003 
Vermont 1998 
Virginia 1988 
Wisconsin 1987 
Wyoming 1990 
 
Source: Karpoff and Wittry (2018) 
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3.9. Tables and Figures Chapter 3 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Negative Tone  10,231 0.645 0.529 -2.229 0.267 0.628 0.981 4.596 
Pessimism 10,231 -0.039 0.457 -2.607 -0.331 -0.063 0.220 3.741 
Hostile Takeover 10,231 0.176 0.097 0.020 0.099 0.148 0.246 0.427 
Positive Words 10,231 202 146 0 82 183 291 1,714 
Negative Words 10,231 432 373 0 128 346 644 5,029 
Total Words 10,231 29,008 21,126 92 13,244 26,522 40,502 464,821 
Accrual EM 10,158 0.084 0.080 0.000 0.027 0.059 0.114 0.395 
Real EM 9,524 0.052 0.422 -2.745 0.142 0.063 0.298 2.020 
Constituency Statutes 10,231 0.311 0.463 0 0 0 1 1 
E-index 8 2 2 0 1 2 4 6 
G-index 8 4 3 0 2 4 6 15 
Earnings 10,231 0.044 0.100 -1.308 0.019 0.051 0.087 1.247 
Returns 10,231 0.012 0.035 -0.072 -0.008 0.012 0.033 0.086 
Size 10,231 7.538 1.641 3.513 6.337 7.488 8.700 10.954 
btm 10,231 0.479 0.672 0.000 0.166 0.330 0.586 18.373 
Volatility Ret 10,231 0.122 0.067 0.041 0.074 0.104 0.148 0.361 
Volatility Earn 10,231 0.049 0.051 0.002 0.016 0.029 0.061 0.200 
Firm Age 10,231 2.479 0.484 0 2.197 2.565 2.833 3.258 
Busseg 10,231 1.067 0.375 0 1 1 1 3.401 
Geoseg 10,231 1.122 0.448 0 1 1 1 4.060 
Loss 10,231 0.177 0.381 0 0 0 0 1 
Earn change 10,231 -0.004 0.065 -0.248 -0.022 0.000 0.018 0.236 
afe 10,231 -0.009 0.037 -1.107 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.409 
af 10,231 0.057 0.068 -0.084 0.029 0.049 0.071 1.955 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013.  All variables are defined Appendix 10.  
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Table 2 Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Negative Tone 1           
(2) Pessimism 0.841 1          
(3) Hostile Takeover -0.024 0.024 1         
(4) Positive Words 0.346 0.039 -0.085 1        
(5) Negative Words 0.672 0.379 -0.082 0.865 1       
(6) Total Words 0.388 0.112 -0.066 0.835 0.824 1      
(7) Accrual EM 0.058 0.008 -0.119 0.075 0.066 0.050 1     
(8) Real EM 0.033 0.026 0.059 0.020 0.034 0.030 0.066 1    
(9) Constituency Statutes -0.111 -0.071 -0.094 -0.087 -0.123 -0.098 -0.022 0.037 1   
(10) E-index 0.178 0.010 0.047 0.340 0.320 0.284 0.000 0.057 0.053 1  
(11) G-index -0.002 -0.007 0.114 0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.027 0.008 0.370 1 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. Bold numbers indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, italic numbers indicate significance at 5%.  All variables are defined Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. 
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Table 3 Hostile takeover and pessimistic disclosure tone  
PANEL A: Hostile takeover, negative and pessimistic disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Negative  
Tone 
Negative  
Tonet+1 
Negative  
Tonet+2 
 
Pessimism 
 
Pessimismt+1 
 
Pessimismt+2 
       
Hostile Takeover 0.409*** 0.353** 0.308** 0.334** 0.278* 0.255* 
 (2.875) (2.475) (2.120) (2.346) (1.920) (1.727) 
Earnings -0.502*** -0.659*** -0.590*** 0.193 0.140 -0.015 
 (-4.362) (-4.867) (-4.283) (1.556) (0.976) (-0.103) 
Returns 0.002 -0.710*** -1.064*** -0.397** -0.200 -0.715*** 
 (0.013) (-4.246) (-6.415) (-2.481) (-1.072) (-3.698) 
Size 0.019** 0.028*** 0.030*** -0.019** -0.005 0.000 
 (2.201) (3.163) (3.258) (-2.142) (-0.573) (0.012) 
btm 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.071*** -0.032 -0.022 -0.013 
 (2.598) (2.979) (3.487) (-1.643) (-1.148) (-0.633) 
Volatility Ret 0.490*** 0.752*** 0.989*** 0.227* 0.349*** 0.492*** 
 (3.993) (5.849) (7.508) (1.765) (2.610) (3.738) 
Volatility Earn 1.996*** 1.585*** 1.343*** -0.029 -0.087 0.070 
 (10.646) (8.231) (6.511) (-0.152) (-0.430) (0.319) 
Firm Age -0.013 -0.021 -0.016 0.005 0.006 0.011 
 (-0.491) (-0.782) (-0.560) (0.198) (0.225) (0.398) 
Busseg -0.030 -0.030 -0.034 -0.018 -0.010 -0.005 
 (-1.600) (-1.368) (-1.320) (-0.930) (-0.419) (-0.161) 
Geoseg -0.029 -0.045* -0.056* 0.016 0.011 0.000 
 (-1.344) (-1.798) (-1.914) (0.712) (0.436) (0.002) 
Loss 0.131*** 0.176*** 0.159*** 0.045** 0.138*** 0.112*** 
 (6.540) (8.234) (7.011) (2.167) (6.111) (4.666) 
Earn change 0.823*** 0.538*** 0.336*** 0.476*** 0.480*** 0.206* 
 (8.199) (5.433) (3.176) (4.411) (4.543) (1.773) 
afe -0.330* -0.503*** -0.323** 0.241 -0.126 -0.100 
 (-1.945) (-2.959) (-1.966) (1.074) (-0.611) (-0.450) 
af 0.006 0.329* 0.407** -0.171 0.083 0.120 
 (0.048) (1.906) (2.322) (-1.252) (0.385) (0.462) 
       
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,231 9,552 8,822 10,231 9,361 8,577 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.372 0.380 0.369 0.130 0.132 0.132 
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PANEL B: Hostile takeover, negative and positive words 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Positive Words Positive Wordst+1 Negative Words Negative Wordst+1 
     
Hostile Takeover -1.319*** -1.467*** -0.555 -0.661 
 (-3.104) (-3.147) (-1.259) (-1.357) 
     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,130 9,439 10,130 9,439 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.816 0.816 0.835 0.836 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Panel A shows the relationship between 
Hostile Takeover, pessimistic and abnormal pessimistic disclosure tone. Panel B shows the relationship between Hostile 
Takeover, Positive Words and Negative Words. For the sake of interpretation, Positive Words is the natural logarithm of 1 
plus total number of positive words in each 10-K report. Negative Words is the natural logarithm of 1 plus total number of 
negative words in each 10-K report. Models are estimated using industry (SIC-2) and year fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 
1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Hostile takeover and disclosure tone by IDD subsamples 
 Firms with IDD Firms without IDD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Negative Tone Pessimism Negative Tone Pessimism 
     
Hostile Takeover 0.476*** 0.405** 0.371* 0.313 
 (2.756) (2.337) (1.759) (1.477) 
Earnings -0.541*** 0.083 -0.423*** 0.344** 
 (-3.273) (0.451) (-2.953) (2.309) 
Returns 0.083 -0.286 -0.020 -0.453** 
 (0.377) (-1.241) (-0.102) (-2.201) 
Size 0.012 -0.029** 0.023* -0.013 
 (1.113) (-2.533) (1.928) (-1.025) 
btm 0.032* -0.042* 0.057*** -0.018 
 (1.751) (-1.809) (2.676) (-0.689) 
Volatility Ret 0.419*** 0.136 0.467** 0.196 
 (2.787) (0.860) (2.502) (1.002) 
Volatility Earn 1.878*** -0.191 2.088*** 0.097 
 (6.924) (-0.694) (8.078) (0.365) 
Firm Age -0.015 -0.001 -0.007 0.008 
 (-0.415) (-0.015) (-0.209) (0.222) 
Busseg -0.047* -0.031 -0.030 -0.021 
 (-1.688) (-1.085) (-1.110) (-0.784) 
Geoseg -0.028 0.010 -0.014 0.037 
 (-0.908) (0.331) (-0.511) (1.341) 
Loss 0.101*** 0.014 0.161*** 0.074*** 
 (3.631) (0.478) (5.879) (2.620) 
Earn change 0.738*** 0.418*** 0.894*** 0.516*** 
 (5.080) (2.726) (7.000) (3.716) 
afe -0.615*** -0.028 -0.098 0.443** 
 (-3.004) (-0.080) (-0.453) (1.968) 
af 0.082 -0.120 -0.067 -0.226 
 (0.631) (-0.774) (-0.394) (-1.277) 
     
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,508 5,508 4,695 4,695 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.340 0.107 0.433 0.199 
 
The sample comprises 5,508 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. This table shows the relationship between 
Hostile Takeover and pessimistic disclosure tone by subsamples of firms located in states with and without IDD. Models 
are estimated using industry (SIC-2) and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Antitakeover provisions and disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Negative 
Tone 
Negative 
Tonet+1 
Negative 
Tone 
Negative 
Tonet+1 
Pessimism Pessimismt+1 Pessimism Pessimismt+1 
         
E-index 0.020** 0.021**   0.018* 0.016*   
 (2.166) (2.184)   (1.904) (1.675)   
G-index   0.007** 0.005**   0.006** 0.004 
   (2.365) (2.044)   (2.198) (1.320) 
Earnings -0.644*** -1.022*** -0.642*** -1.022*** 0.120 -0.434*** 0.122 -0.434*** 
 (-5.036) (-6.934) (-5.007) (-6.903) (0.974) (-2.670) (0.990) (-2.664) 
Returns 0.623*** 0.093 0.631*** 0.101 0.188 0.538*** 0.195 0.542*** 
 (4.350) (0.648) (4.408) (0.700) (1.274) (3.670) (1.320) (3.702) 
Size -0.102*** -0.080*** -0.103*** -0.080*** -0.139*** -0.086*** -0.140*** -0.087*** 
 (-6.126) (-4.747) (-6.186) (-4.778) (-7.727) (-4.671) (-7.779) (-4.687) 
btm 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.010 -0.070*** -0.039 -0.070*** -0.039 
 (0.376) (0.720) (0.369) (0.723) (-2.967) (-1.522) (-2.963) (-1.516) 
Volatility Ret -0.050 0.212* -0.056 0.205* -0.390*** -0.030 -0.394*** -0.035 
 (-0.438) (1.833) (-0.484) (1.769) (-3.327) (-0.246) (-3.363) (-0.292) 
Volatility Earn 1.019*** 0.373* 1.021*** 0.376* -1.047*** -0.861*** -1.045*** -0.857*** 
 (4.768) (1.763) (4.761) (1.767) (-4.742) (-3.848) (-4.719) (-3.814) 
Firm Age 0.102 0.043 0.097 0.041 -0.036 -0.068 -0.042 -0.069 
 (1.434) (0.587) (1.360) (0.553) (-0.501) (-0.876) (-0.583) (-0.890) 
Busseg -0.028 -0.021 -0.027 -0.019 -0.020 -0.006 -0.018 -0.005 
 (-1.373) (-0.977) (-1.276) (-0.881) (-0.936) (-0.258) (-0.853) (-0.195) 
Geoseg 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.058*** 0.074*** 0.058*** 0.074*** 
 (0.950) (0.827) (0.914) (0.788) (2.836) (3.338) (2.795) (3.296) 
Loss 0.066*** 0.117*** 0.065*** 0.117*** -0.015 0.094*** -0.015 0.094*** 
 (4.275) (6.705) (4.252) (6.665) (-0.975) (4.985) (-0.991) (4.961) 
Earn change 0.928*** 0.797*** 0.930*** 0.796*** 0.683*** 0.761*** 0.685*** 0.761*** 
 (9.657) (8.753) (9.632) (8.713) (6.716) (7.736) (6.695) (7.712) 
afe -0.509*** -0.463** -0.501*** -0.453** -0.007 -0.149 0.000 -0.142 
 (-2.716) (-2.392) (-2.699) (-2.350) (-0.034) (-0.689) (0.000) (-0.658) 
af -0.181** 0.329*** -0.178** 0.333*** -0.314*** 0.074 -0.311*** 0.077 
 (-2.365) (3.460) (-2.305) (3.490) (-3.834) (0.667) (-3.779) (0.697) 
         
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,870 8,156 8,870 8,156 8,870 8,038 8,870 8,038 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.693 0.700 0.693 0.700 0.586 0.581 0.585 0.581 
 
The sample comprises 8,870 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Negative and pessimistic disclosure tone and takeover threat 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Takeover 
threat 
Takeover  
threatt+1 
Takeover  
threat 
Takeover  
threatt+1 
     
Negative Tone*Hostile Takeover -0.236** -0.148   
 (-2.322) (-1.475)   
Negative Tone 0.057*** 0.044**   
 (2.993) (2.213)   
Pessimism*Hostile Takeover   -0.240** -0.201* 
   (-2.053) (-1.779) 
Pessimism   0.058*** 0.055** 
   (2.731) (2.471) 
Hostile Takeover 0.208** 0.108 0.060 0.015 
 (2.110) (1.078) (0.844) (0.200) 
Earnings 0.171** 0.078 0.150** 0.054 
 (2.359) (0.940) (2.074) (0.655) 
Returns -0.953*** -0.233 -0.945*** -0.223 
 (-6.666) (-1.518) (-6.606) (-1.456) 
Size 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 
 (7.025) (7.226) (7.224) (7.451) 
btm 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 (0.929) (1.115) (1.077) (1.234) 
Volatility Ret 0.069 -0.253*** 0.064 -0.254*** 
 (0.784) (-2.840) (0.733) (-2.850) 
Volatility Earn 0.104 0.122 0.152 0.170 
 (0.961) (1.078) (1.447) (1.554) 
Firm Age 0.033** 0.013 0.030** 0.011 
 (2.568) (0.942) (2.329) (0.801) 
Busseg 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (1.197) (1.028) (1.146) (0.993) 
Geoseg -0.017 0.006 -0.019 0.004 
 (-1.304) (0.364) (-1.402) (0.274) 
Loss -0.018 -0.007 -0.016 -0.006 
 (-1.223) (-0.437) (-1.114) (-0.347) 
Earn change 0.045 0.091 0.059 0.104 
 (0.533) (1.063) (0.694) (1.214) 
afe -0.032 -0.077 -0.046 -0.088 
 (-0.245) (-0.481) (-0.343) (-0.550) 
af 0.123* 0.111 0.130* 0.118 
 (1.702) (1.280) (1.789) (1.355) 
     
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,231 9,161 10,231 9,161 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using industry (SIC-
2) and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Hostile takeover, disclosure tone and price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Price Pricet+1 Price Pricet+1 
      
Negative Tone*Hostile Takeover β1 -12.762*** -12.829**   
  (-2.665) (-2.398)   
Negative Tone β2 -1.329 -0.935   
  (-1.316) (-0.815)   
Pessimism*Hostile Takeover β3   -9.290* -11.752** 
    (-1.785) (-2.019) 
Pessimism β4   -1.649 -0.932 
    (-1.573) (-0.779) 
Hostile Takeover β5 15.186*** 17.290*** 6.883* 9.117** 
  (3.276) (3.388) (1.681) (2.086) 
Earnings β6 13.134*** 12.032*** 15.103*** 13.965*** 
  (4.058) (3.166) (4.642) (3.702) 
Returns β7 94.972*** 72.051*** 93.710*** 71.039*** 
  (20.836) (13.101) (20.430) (12.888) 
Size β8 7.008*** 6.094*** 6.880*** 5.972*** 
  (32.935) (26.067) (32.164) (25.505) 
btm β9 0.239 -0.346 -0.018 -0.569 
  (0.727) (-0.988) (-0.053) (-1.615) 
Volatility Ret β10 -17.367*** -24.516*** -18.812*** -25.771*** 
  (-5.033) (-6.330) (-5.431) (-6.641) 
Volatility Earn β11 -23.349*** -28.244*** -29.628*** -33.793*** 
  (-4.406) (-4.834) (-5.708) (-5.842) 
Firm Age β12 -3.484*** -3.952*** -3.587*** -4.068*** 
  (-4.468) (-4.623) (-4.573) (-4.730) 
Busseg β13 -0.721 -0.441 -0.704 -0.450 
  (-1.003) (-0.521) (-0.980) (-0.531) 
Geoseg β14 -0.603 -0.021 -0.470 0.070 
  (-0.824) (-0.024) (-0.645) (0.080) 
Loss β15 -3.413*** -3.048*** -3.727*** -3.298*** 
  (-6.279) (-4.754) (-6.833) (-5.170) 
change Earn β16 -14.284*** -9.511*** -15.315*** -10.433*** 
  (-5.699) (-3.204) (-6.211) (-3.564) 
afe β17 -13.270*** -2.351 -11.581*** -0.903 
  (-3.328) (-0.348) (-2.855) (-0.133) 
af β18 -9.732*** -6.883** -10.220*** -7.331** 
  (-3.971) (-2.334) (-4.073) (-2.464) 
      
Significance β1 + β5  0.612 0.383 - - 
Significance β3 + β5  - - 0.729 0.726 
      
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  10,231 9,090 10,231 9,090 
Adj. R-sqr.  0.621 0.526 0.620 0.525 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using industry (SIC-
2) and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 Hostile takeover and firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Returns Returnst+1 Returns Returnst+1 
     
Hostile Takeover  -0.014*** -0.010* -0.011*** -0.008** 
 (-3.144) (-1.934) (-3.042) (-2.033) 
Negative Tone -0.001 -0.000   
 (-0.555) (-0.320)   
Negative Tone*Hostile Takeover 0.004 0.004   
 (0.768) (0.663)   
Pessimism   -0.003** 0.002 
   (-2.372) (1.317) 
Pessimism*Hostile Takeover   0.010 -0.008 
   (1.523) (-1.083) 
Earnings 0.013** -0.001 0.014** -0.001 
 (1.986) (-0.106) (2.112) (-0.177) 
Size 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 
 (11.057) (0.162) (11.116) (0.229) 
btm -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
 (-6.735) (-5.784) (-6.878) (-5.793) 
Volatility Ret 0.145*** 0.043*** 0.145*** 0.043*** 
 (17.488) (5.185) (17.592) (5.218) 
Volatility Earn -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (-1.258) (-1.129) (-1.333) (-1.126) 
Firm Age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (1.551) (-0.854) (1.630) (-0.807) 
Busseg 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.701) (1.367) (0.668) (1.409) 
Geoseg -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (-1.260) (-2.381) (-1.182) (-2.421) 
Loss -0.009*** 0.001 -0.008*** 0.001 
 (-6.427) (0.503) (-6.359) (0.510) 
Earn change 0.070*** 0.017** 0.070*** 0.017** 
 (9.415) (2.309) (9.570) (2.335) 
afe 0.035* -0.082*** 0.035* -0.082*** 
 (1.708) (-4.764) (1.740) (-4.784) 
af -0.103*** 0.038*** -0.103*** 0.039*** 
 (-5.993) (3.582) (-6.073) (3.643) 
     
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,231 9,156 10,231 9,156 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.376 0.215 0.376 0.215 
 
The sample comprises 10,231 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using industry (SIC-
2) and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and 
* represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 Hostile takeover and earnings management 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Accrual EM Accrual EMt+1 Accrual EM Accrual EMt+1 
     
Hostile Takeover -0.078*** -0.115*** -0.086*** -0.103*** 
 (-2.918) (-3.969) (-3.664) (-3.339) 
Negative Tone -0.001 -0.007*   
 (-0.128) (-1.735)   
Negative Tone*Hostile Takeover -0.014 0.025   
 (-0.801) (1.409)   
Pessimism   0.001 -0.003 
   (0.323) (-0.668) 
Pessimism*Hostile Takeover   -0.024 0.004 
   (-1.455) (0.177) 
Earnings -0.085*** -0.020 -0.084*** -0.017 
 (-6.320) (-1.625) (-6.061) (-1.438) 
Returns -0.007 0.114*** -0.008 0.113*** 
 (-0.221) (3.053) (-0.265) (3.073) 
Size 0.007*** -0.002 0.007*** -0.002 
 (4.400) (-0.835) (4.426) (-0.903) 
btm -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (-6.114) (-4.292) (-7.202) (-4.820) 
Volatility Ret 0.071*** 0.037*** 0.070*** 0.036*** 
 (5.575) (3.006) (5.600) (2.955) 
Volatility Earn -0.041*** -0.091*** -0.047*** -0.097*** 
 (-3.057) (-6.288) (-3.039) (-7.585) 
Firm Age -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.049*** 
 (-11.079) (-8.152) (-10.952) (-9.104) 
Busseg 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 
 (1.027) (1.757) (1.047) (1.763) 
Geoseg -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.189) (-0.899) (-0.144) (-0.882) 
Loss 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004* 
 (0.649) (-1.670) (0.566) (-1.699) 
Earn change 0.012 -0.001 0.011 -0.003 
 (0.526) (-0.138) (0.534) (-0.309) 
afe 0.005 -0.039* 0.006 -0.037* 
 (0.228) (-1.774) (0.276) (-1.715) 
af 0.026* 0.001 0.026** 0.001 
 (2.019) (0.031) (2.048) (0.021) 
     
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,057 8,912 10,057 8,912 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.236 0.243 0.236 0.243 
 
The sample comprises 10,057 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using industry (SIC-
2) and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is Accrual EM which is calculated following Jones (1991). Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at the 
1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
Chapter 3. Takeover protection through narrative disclosure 
 
161 
Table 10 Constituency statutes and disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Negative  
Tone 
Negative  
Tone 
Pessimism Pessimism 
     
Constituency Statutes -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.104*** 
 (-4.124) (-4.194) (-5.867) (-5.837) 
E-index 0.020*  0.018  
 (1.858)  (1.613)  
G-index  0.007***  0.005** 
  (2.811)  (2.320) 
Earnings -0.641*** -0.640*** 0.123* 0.123* 
 (-7.605) (-7.597) (1.693) (1.697) 
Returns 0.619*** 0.629*** 0.184 0.194 
 (4.585) (4.879) (1.128) (1.237) 
Size -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 (-6.298) (-6.547) (-8.350) (-8.614) 
btm 0.004 0.004 -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.561) (0.578) (-3.934) (-3.943) 
Volatility Ret -0.050 -0.058 -0.390*** -0.397*** 
 (-0.592) (-0.686) (-4.602) (-4.676) 
Volatility Earn 1.020*** 1.022*** -1.046*** -1.044*** 
 (4.608) (4.512) (-4.995) (-4.886) 
Firm Age 0.100*** 0.098*** -0.038 -0.040 
 (3.326) (3.231) (-1.430) (-1.493) 
Busseg -0.028 -0.027 -0.020 -0.018 
 (-1.602) (-1.474) (-1.077) (-0.971) 
Geoseg 0.019 0.019 0.058** 0.057** 
 (0.677) (0.660) (2.134) (2.099) 
Loss 0.066*** 0.066*** -0.015 -0.015 
 (6.348) (6.409) (-1.404) (-1.456) 
Earn change 0.927*** 0.929*** 0.682*** 0.684*** 
 (11.385) (11.448) (9.203) (9.284) 
afe -0.512*** -0.505*** -0.011 -0.004 
 (-4.637) (-4.869) (-0.084) (-0.032) 
af -0.182*** -0.179*** -0.316*** -0.312*** 
 (-3.994) (-3.982) (-5.713) (-5.803) 
     
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,870 8,870 8,870 8,870 
Adj. R-sqr. 0.694 0.693 0.586 0.585 
 
The sample comprises 8,870 firm-year observations for the period 1994-2013. Models are estimated using firm and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by incorporation state and t-statistics are in parenthesis. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 10. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. ***, 
**, and * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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